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ABSTRACT
With an annual growth of almost 20% since the year 2000, Indian merchandise
exports exceeded 300 billion U.S. dollars in 2012. The country is becoming a major
supplier to the world. However, companies sourcing products and operating in India are
experiencing a variety of supply chain disruptions that impede their operations and
finances. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the frequency, impact and
severity of supply chain risks experienced by companies in India, as well as assess the
usefulness of mitigation methods and enquire about future expected disruptions. It is
hoped that the results will prepare managers to better prioritize their supply chain risk
management efforts and investments. The scope of this study is upstream (sourcing and
operations) disruptions that affected Indian supply chains over the past three years,
including the areas of logistics and transportation. The methodology is a quantitative,
empirical study, using a survey instrument in the form of a questionnaire distributed
electronically to thousands of members of four prominent trade associations in India.
The platform for the questionnaire is a modification of a traditional risk analysis
progression: mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving, also dubbed
“MIAMI”.
The main findings are that there are major and significant differences in severity
(frequency and impact) between the thirteen risk categories presented. There are also
significant group differences among the respondents. Traditional mitigation methods
differ with respect to usefulness, and expected risks are somewhat different than past
i

risks. Conclusions reached are that chronic risks such as inadequate transportation,
logistics and utilities infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and bureaucracy/red
tape are more severe than highly publicized and visible risks such as natural disasters,
terrorism and crime. Traditional mitigation methods are useful for many of the
disruptions, but ineffective for non-physical risks. There is a certain optimism with
respect to future infrastructure related disruptions.
Limitations of the study include a relatively low response rate, the classic
difficulty in risk analysis of comparing and scaling the impact of disruptions, and that it is
not fine grained enough to fully describe any specific industry sectors. This study
contributes to the field of supply chain risk management by adding crucial empirical
information from a heretofore unexplored market.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Companies sourcing products and services in far-away places are best served by
having in place plans and programs for handling the many risks involved. Bad things will
inevitably happen to long and complex supply chains that are under pressure to deliver
goods expediently and cheaply. Supply chain risk management is a growing and
increasingly formalized practice for treating the various supply chain risks. Its focus is on
preventing costly disturbances from happening or minimizing the impact of the
disturbances1 that inevitably happen in global supply chains. This dissertation builds on
a solid foundation of academic and practitioner research and literature and uses a
certain methodology for assessing supply chain risks in the emerging economy of India.
This empirical study applies the framework of mapping, identification, assessing,
mitigating and improving (“MIAMI”) when enquiring supply chain executives about risks
they have experienced.
Sodhi et al. concluded a 2012 paper in Production and Operations Management
with their finding that there are three gaps pertinent to future research in supply chain
risk management: 1) No clear consensus on the definition of SCRM (Supply Chain Risk
Management); 2) Lack of commensurate research on response to supply chain risk
incidents; and 3) a shortage of empirical research in the area of SCRM (Manmohan S.

1

According to Webster’s Dictionary, both disturb and disrupt mean to “throw into disorder”. This
dissertation uses the term disruption most of the time, but occasionally the synonym disturbance is
applied (Merriam-Webster, 1976). Disruption can be further defined as “an event that results in a
displacement or discontinuity; the act of causing disorder” (J. C. Coyle, Novack, Gibson, & Bardi, 2011)

1

Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012). This dissertation attempts to add to the body of knowledge
by modifying a methodological framework and contributing up-to-date empirical
information to aid the profession in controlling and reducing supply chain risks.
Supply chain risk management has become a high priority issues for companies
operating in global markets. The ability to meet customer demand and preserve the
financial bottom line hinge on effective preparation and mitigation efforts. Sourcing and
operating in less developed economies present supply chain managers with a new set of
potential risks and uncertainties.
India’s economy is growing rapidly. Its exports sector has been experiencing an
annual growth of almost 20% for the past few years, as more companies perform
sourcing and production there. It is expected that India will become a more realistic and
attractive alternative for many categories of goods and services. India is still
inexpensive, with an abundance of labor and a very promising demographic profile.
However, the country represents a cocktail of serious supply chain risks for firms
attempting to source or produce there. This dissertation will survey Indian supply chain
managers on what specific risks they encounter, what impact these risks had on their
companies, what mitigation steps may have worked, and what specific risks they expect
to experience in the future. We also check for group differences. For example, do
foreign owned firms have different risk experiences than Indian firms?
The usefulness of this research cannot be overestimated. So far, articles, news
reports and commentaries about doing business in India have been full of mostly
anecdotal stories of the risks and disturbances experienced there. Literature on Indian
2

supply chains describe poor infrastructure, bureaucratic delays, red tape and the
prevalence of corruption. A comprehensive review of the literature reveals no academic
studies that enquire on-the-ground practitioners about the identification, assessment
and mitigation of supply chain risks in India. The results of this research will be valuable
for companies contemplating or currently sourcing and producing there. It is hoped that
the results will reveal the issues of real concern to supply chain managers in India, and
can help practitioners focus in on risk factors that deserve immediate attention.
It appears that India is not necessarily riskier than other countries in Asia when it
comes to supply chain exposures. Overall risk consists of a mosaic of miscellaneous
operational and environmental disruptions. India has a different set of risks than China,
for example, or even Pakistan and Bangladesh next door. Each specific supply chain is
also different, meaning that the interplay between this and the country’s environmental
factors determine the relevant risk topography and circumstances for a company. The
risk exposure, experience and impact will depend on a given company’s industry and
product categories.
Although supply chains span from raw materials to the ultimate consumers, this
dissertation limits its focus to the upstream portion, specifically the sourcing and
production in India. However, any such delineation has fuzzy borders. Many of the
downstream risks are the same as the upstream risks. This dissertation is concerned
with the supply chain risks encountered within India. Whether these are within the
upstream or downstream portion of the supply chain is of less concern.

3

The dissertation is organized as follows: A comprehensive literature review
outlines the attractiveness of sourcing in India, defines global supply chains and supply
chain risk, and discusses what modern supply chain risk management encompasses.
Thereafter, the attention will be on a thorough review and discussion of the five MIAMI
steps: mapping the supply chain, identifying relevant risks, assessing the probability and
impact of these risks, mitigating the relevant risks through prevention and minimization
strategies, and improving the risk management process through a system of control,
monitoring and learning. The dissertation culminates with the empirical study. The
research methodology and survey process are explained in Chapter 4, and the results
are revealed and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 is a concluding chapter that
recaps the overall findings, makes some comments on possible causalities, suggests that
some Indian risks are not remedied with traditional mitigation methods, and
recommends general paths for further and more pin-pointed research into Indian supply
chain risks.

4

CHAPTER 2: SOME BACKGROUND ON INDIA
a. The Rise of India
India is no longer an exotic destination for sourcing and procurement.
Globalization has moved India closer in many ways, and it is much easier now for foreign
companies to do business there. Foreign and Indian owned firms are producing more
goods and services within India than at any time in history. The country’s exports and
domestic consumption are at record highs. India’s gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita doubled over the ten years from 2002 to 2012. According to the World Bank2, the
annual GDP growth averaged 7.1% over the 12-year period from 2000 to 2011, with a
high of 9.8% in 2007 and lows of 3.9% in 2002 and 2008. After a slowdown in 2012-13,
The Economist Magazine projects the 2014 growth will be 7.3% (Economist, 2013b). In
terms of GDP, India is now the world’s tenth largest economy, although some sources
already put it third in PPP3-adjusted terms, after the U.S. and China (McKinsey, 2013).
The country’s exports have experienced an even more impressive growth. From
2000 to 2011 the merchandise exports grew from US$ 42 billion to US$ 301 billion4,
equal to an average compound growth rate of 19.6%. In fact, since 2007 this growth
rate has accelerated to an average of 19.8%. In comparison, China’s average exports
growth rate from 2000 to 2011 was a bit higher at 20.3%, but this slowed to an average
of 11.7% between 2007 and 2011. In addition to merchandise exports – which include

2

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
“Purchasing Power Parity” adjusts currency exchange rates to reflect real purchasing power
4
Hereafter, all dollar amounts will be in U.S. dollars.
3
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tangible goods and commodities – India has a thriving services exports sector, adding
another 50% to total exports. The total annual exports of $450 billion are a huge
contributor to the country’s $ 2 trillion economy. In 2011, India was the world’s 19th
largest merchandise exporter and the 6th largest services exporter5. Table 1 compares
the growth in India’s merchandise vs. services exports since the year 2000. Despite a
leveling out in 2012, with these types of longer term growth rates, exports will soon
exceed one quarter of India’s official economic output, and the country will move up
into the upper echelons of global export powerhouses.
Table 1: INDIA’S MERCHANDISE VS. SERVICES EXPORTS, 2000 – 2011:
Category:6
Year 2000:
Year 2011:
Compound average
growth::
Merchandise exports $ 42 billion
$ 301 billion
19.6%
Services exports

$ 17 billion

$ 148 billion

Total

$ 59 billion

$ 449 billion

21.7%

Sourcing from India is likely to keep growing at a rapid rate over the next
decades. Consumers all over the world are likely to see more “Made in India” tags, and
the country can expect a boom in exports of raw materials, components, finished
products and services. Long and complex supply chains, combined with corporate
performance and efficiency pressures, make for some interesting risk scenarios in a
country as diverse and arguably chaotic as India. Sahay et al. suggest that managing the

5

http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr658_e.htm
Merchandise exports: Tangible goods exported. Services exports: Business, technical or
professional services Incl. software); travel; passenger fares; transportation; royalties and license fees
6
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supply chain in such a vast country as India is most challenging for companies because
of business practices, government regulations, technological capability and
transportation infrastructure, among other factors (Sahay, Gupta, & Mohan, 2006).
Global companies have many choices from where to source their products.
Figure 2 illustrates a particular chosen path, where companies decide to outsource7
production to an offshore location, in this case India. In India, companies either deal
with arms-length suppliers or set up their own subsidiaries, which again tend to source
locally from 2nd tier suppliers and so on.
Figure 1: THE UPSTREAM FOCUS OF THIS DISSERTATION
Where to
produce?
In-house

Outsource

Domestically

Nearshoring

Offshoring

China

Southeast
Asia

India

Eastern
Europe

Other

Company
subsidiary

Supplier
2nd tier
suppliers
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Suppliers

A useful definition of sourcing: “The act through which work is contracted or delegated to an
external or internal entity that could be physically located anywhere”. Outsourcing is defined as a subset
of this, i.e. “contracting with a third party provider” (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2011), p.7.
We prefer the term “global sourcing” over similar terms such as “outsourcing” and “offshoring”.
Outsourcing is a practice that does not necessarily involve foreign trade; a company that hires a janitorial
service to clean its offices is outsourcing an activity that previously may have been done in-house.
Offshoring typically refers to companies moving its production facilities abroad and setting up factories
there. Another acceptable synonym for global sourcing is the more maritime sounding “offshore
sourcing”, although it raises the question of whether Canada and Mexico are really offshore in relation to
the United States. See table 3 for examples of definitions and nuances.

7

b. Why Source Overseas?
Companies source abroad because it makes sense economically. Globalization in
its many manifestations has broken down crucial barriers that previously prevented a
smooth worldwide trade in goods and services: regulatory barriers, tariff barriers,
communications barriers, transportation barriers, immigration barriers, cultural barriers,
and so on. With the gradual breakdown of factors that prevented global commerce, we
have seen global exports as a percentage of global output (nominal GDP) rise from 12%
in 1980 to more than 25% in 2011 (various sources, incl. World Bank and World Trade
Organization)8. Global trade has doubled in relative importance the past thirty years.
One can argue that this is due to a self-reinforcing process: the more that rich nations
import from the developing nations, the more these developing nations are able to
build their own economies and import back from the rich nations.
Typical drivers for global sourcing can include:






Price and competitive pressures (Olson, 2012)
Globalization and trade liberalization (breakdown of trade barriers)
Easier and cheaper communications (digitalization, data transfers, travel,
transportation networks, incl. containerized shipping technology)
Qualified and cheap labor abroad
Rise of the global consumer and purchasing power in Asia
While stating that the ultimate objective of a company’s global sourcing strategy

is to exploit both its own and its suppliers’ competitive advantages and the comparative
locational advantages of various countries in the global competition, Kotabe and Murray

8

The nominal world GDP is reported to have been $70.1 trillion in 2011 and $18.8 trillion in
1980. World exports (obviously identical to world imports) were $17.8 trillion in 2011 and $2.3 trillion in
1980.
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also make an interesting observation that in the U.S., managements’ strategic emphasis
has drifted away from manufacturing to marketing and finance over the years (Kotabe &
Murray, 2004). In other words, American firms did not see a value or core competency
in manufacturing, and were more likely to move this activity overseas.
The Economist Magazine, in a January 2013 Special Report on outsourcing and
offshoring, outlined the broad range of variables, including the complex web of
strategies, priorities and risks now faced by managers of multinational companies.
(The_Economist, 2013). Globalization is serving as the “great equalizer”, making the cost
differences between the West and the developing world less stark and less of an
economic argument for offshoring. Other arguments – often conflicting – are often
heard. For example, more automated production makes it less beneficial to rely on low
cost labor, while growing consumer markets in emerging economies renders it more
economical to locate production plants there. A chart in The Economist’s special report
forecasted the “manufacturing outsourcing cost index”9 of China to be practically equal
to the U.S. in 2015, while for India the forecast for 2015 was 83% of the U.S. cost. The
surprising prediction for China is confirmed by the official Chinese newspaper China
Daily, which reported that Chinese wages saw double digit growth of 14.3% between
2010 and 201110. China’s rapid wage increases, combined with a U.S. stagnation in

9

Although the magazine did not specify how it arrived at this index, it mentioned that high
transportation costs and delays partially offset the lower labor costs. The index can be considered a
measure for total landed cost.
10
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-05/29/content_15416969.htm
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manufacturing wages since the 1990’s, means the wage gap has narrowed between
China and the U.S.
Eight arguments for global sourcing
Deresky suggests five main reasons why companies find it beneficial to do global
sourcing (Deresky, 2008). How these relate to India is discussed in more detail below:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Save money (experience cost efficiencies; lower cost of production)
Access to foreign markets and customers
Avoid trade barriers
Diversify production
Leverage global talent (access to human resources)
Three other reasons found in the international business literature include:

6. Reduce fixed costs at home and be more flexible (Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008)
7. Improved agility by shedding unnecessary overhead (S. T. Cavusgil, G. Knight,
& J. S. Riesenberger, 2008b)
8. Gain access to suppliers’ capabilities (Kotabe & Murray, 2004)

1. Save money:
Indian factory workers are often paid less than $1,000 per year, and even
engineers with doctoral degrees may receive annual salaries of no more than $10,000.
Nevertheless, supply chain professionals are concerned with the Total Landed Costs, or
the Total Cost of Outsourcing – TCO - (Mangan, Lalwani, & Butcher, 2008), which
includes:




The basic cost of the product of service (of which the labor cost is a component)
The cost incurred to manage the outsourcing arrangement (incl. setting up,
monitoring from beginning to end of the relationship, coordination, risk
management and contingency planning)
Added transportation and inventory costs
10

There are now reports that companies sourcing in China are finding that the
overall cost savings are less than they hoped for and what they experienced just a few
years ago (Rein, 2012; Shister, 2011). Several authors have observed a possible loss of
Chinese competitiveness. Some of it is due to rising costs and a strengthening Renminbi.
Steeply rising wages and higher rents take a toll on factories that rely on cheap inputs
(Bradsher, 2012; Rein, 2012)11. Because of rough labor conditions and workers
becoming more assertive about their rights, there also appears to be more frequent
factory riots, strikes and worker unrest in China (Barboza & Bradsher, 2012; Wan, 2012).
These result in plant closings; for example Foxconn Technology’s production of iPhones
was interrupted in the fall of 2012 (Foxconn supplies Apple, Dell, HP and Microsoft).
2. Gain access to foreign markets and customers
Setting up production arrangements or facilities in foreign countries can serve at
least three purposes: 1) production for sale and consumption in the host country; 2)
sourcing and production for exports back to the home country; and 3) production for
sale and consumption to countries with which the host country has free trade
agreements. An example of the third case would be to manufacture items in India that
are marketed to other Asian countries. Such sales would often benefit from regional
free trade agreements.

11

In his 2012 book, Rein lists several reasons why China is in the process of losing its
competitiveness, for example, 1) more expensive production through rising labor costs, high labor
turnover, expensive land and buildings, rising currency, inflation, and higher commodities prices; and 2)
business risks such as inconsistent product safety and quality, corruption, weak judicial system, corner
cutting, shoddy real estate construction, and poor educational system. He also claims that China is not
putting more emphasis on domestic consumption and production for its home markets (Rein, 2012)

11

3. Avoid Trade Barriers
India’s high import tariffs, trade restrictions and discrimination against foreign
products12 (India is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on
Government Procurement (Makar, 2008)) often make it more attractive to manufacture
within India the products to be sold there.
4. Diversify Production
From a supply continuity standpoint it makes perfect sense to diversify the
production of high value products over two or more facilities. Diversification (having
redundancies) is one of the classic mitigation methods for reducing overall supply chain
vulnerability.
5. Leverage Global Talent
Multinationals such as IBM and Microsoft are benefiting from a good supply of
Indian professionals with engineering, science and programming backgrounds.
Internally, large corporations can also free up expensive home country labor by shifting
certain tasks to cheaper labor at other locations of their sprawling, global networks.
6. Reduce fixed costs at home and be more flexible
As Kotabe and Murray have pointed out, global outsourcing usually reduces the
capital investment in in-house manufacturing facilities, thus lowering the company’s

12

The U.S. Dept. of Commerce writes: “Current procurement practices can result in
discrimination against foreign suppliers when goods or services of comparable quality and price are
available locally” (Commercial_Service, 2012).

12

fixed assets, its breakeven point, and boosting its ROA (return on assets) and ROE
(return on equity) given the same operating margins (Kotabe & Murray, 2004). Company
executives have a strong incentive to seek better returns, and will tend to increase
outsourcing to accomplish this. Switching from high fixed capital costs to a variable cost
environment will be beneficial in a market that is unpredictable, volatile and in need of
production and marketing flexibilities.
7. Improve agility by shedding unnecessary overhead
The flexibility created by moving to a variable cost scenario improves agility and
the capability to respond quickly to changes in markets, technologies and the
environment (Bowser & Balasubramaniam, 2009; Christensen, 2003). Agility implies
greater organizational flexibility and faster responsiveness to evolving customer needs
(Cavusgil et al., 2008b).
8. Gain access to suppliers’ capabilities
In complex supply chains, each link will have specific core competencies that add
value to the “value chain”13. For many firms it is cheaper and makes more sense to find
suppliers that can contribute value to the production process, rather than building up or
continuing in-house activities. Indian suppliers have competitive strengths that add
value to the total product, including but not limited to inexpensive and highly qualified

13

Value chain: The sequence of value-adding activities performed by the participants in the
supply chain in the process of developing, producing, marketing and servicing a product (Cavusgil et al.,
2008b)

13

labor, engineering and software coding talent, highly experienced textile workers and
tailors, and valuable raw materials, especially mined and agricultural products.
Further arguments for sourcing in India
If “demographics is destiny”, India will have an ample supply of labor for decades
to come, creating an obvious and partially untapped potential. While cost reduction is
the primary driver to India (Deresky, 2008), much has been written lately about other
benefits of doing business or investing there. Examples include ongoing economic
reforms, trade liberalization, deregulation, infrastructure investments, and the
membership in the World Trade Organization. Many multinationals appreciate the
advanced English skills, a “westernized” managerial class, and the convenience of
opposite time zones (S. T. Cavusgil, G. Knight, & J. R. Riesenberger, 2008a; CIA, 2012;
Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008; Economist, 2013a; Engardio, 2007; Makar, 2008).
Western firms are increasing their investments in India. The web version of the
newspaper The Hindu recently reported that General Electric is investing $ 200 million in
Pune, which will be its first manufacturing facility in the country14. Through its joint
venture with the Tata Global Beverages, Starbucks in 2013 opened its first stores in
Mumbai and New Delhi. The Wall Street Journal reported that the initial plans were to
invest $80 million and open 80 stores in the country. The same article also wrote that
Dunkin’ Brands were planning to open 30 Dunkin’ Donuts outlets together with its

14

September 24, 2012: http://www.thehindu.com/business/global-firms-will-increaseinvestments-in-india-ge/article3932064.ece
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Indian partner by 2014.15 The Swedish giant retailer IKEA recently obtained approval by
the Finance Ministry and plans to invest $1.75 billion in as many as 25 new stores in the
country.16 Following the recent relaxation of regulations on foreign (single brand)
retailers in India, this would be the largest FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) by a foreign
retailer ever recorded.17 These examples illustrate that foreign multinationals have an
ongoing interest in getting established in India, either with manufacturing plants or with
distribution and retail facilities to sell directly to the growing class of Indian consumers.
India’s continued economic growth, regulatory streamlining and improving
infrastructure will increasingly make the country a more viable and less risky destination
for sourcing and manufacturing. Foreign investors have to navigate both the federal
and statewide mazes of rules, regulations, incentives and rivalries. Despite the potential
long term benefits of doing business in India, sourcing from there can be a risky
proposition. Mark Crone writes that the traditional three drivers of sourcing strategy –
cost, quality and service – now has a new important sibling: risk (Crone, 2006). Various
risks are infiltrating supply chains, and sourcing and operating in India can present
management with a multitude of challenges. It seems appropriate for us to research the
particularities of the supply chain challenges experienced in India.
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October 26, 2012:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203922804578080072469407526.html
16
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323585604579008593008552768
17
November 19, 2012: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/finance-ministry-to-decide-on-ikeas-fdiproposal-on-tuesday/306324-7.html
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
Because this dissertation focuses on supply chain management risks in India, it is
useful to provide appropriate definitions before we move on.
a. Supply Chain Management
A supply chain is a conceptual term for a string or network of companies from
suppliers to end-users, with the intention of integrating supply and demand via
coordinated company efforts (Frankel, Bolumole, Eltantawy, Paulraj, & Gundlach, 2008).
There are numerous, similar definitions of supply chain offered by many authors18 (for
some examples, see Table 2). For the purposes of this research, the definition offered by
the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals will be used:
“Supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics
management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with
channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party service providers,
and customers. In essence, supply chain management integrates supply and demand
management within and across companies” 19.

18

(Canbolat, Gupta, Matera, & Chelst, 2008; Cavinato, 2004; Chapman, Christopher, Jüttner,
Peck, & Wilding, 2002; Enyinda, Ogbuehi, & Briggs, 2008; Frankel et al., 2008; Hallikas, Puumalainen,
Vesterinen, & Virolainen, 2005; Mangan et al., 2008; Ramsey & Moffett, 2011; Ritchie & Brindley, 2007;
Sheffi, 2005; P. J. Singh, Smith, & Sohal, 2005; Takahashi, 2012; Thun & Hoenig, 2011).
19

CSCMP’s website: http://cscmp.org/aboutcscmp/definitions.asp
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Table 2: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
Definition
A network of interrelated entities that combine to
enable the satisfaction of customer demand.
The network of organizations that are involved, through
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different
processes and activities that produce value in the form
of products and services in the hands of the ultimate
consumer.
The fundamental purpose of a supply chain is to match
supply with demand.
Global supply chain refers to the firm’s integrated
network of sourcing, production, and distribution,
organized on a worldwide scale and located in countries
where competitive advantage can be maximized. It
involves both upstream (supplier) and downstream
(customer) flows.
A linked set of resources and processes that begins with
the sourcing of raw materials and extends through the
delivery of products and services to the end user across
the modes of transport.
Complex networks of different players, established with
core objectives to minimize the costs, maximize the
value and explore new markets through effectively
managed relationships between members.
A network of organizations possibly including suppliers,
manufacturers, logistics providers,
wholesalers/distributors, and retailers that aims to
produce and deliver products or services for the end
customer.

Author
(Chapman et al., 2002) p. 60
(Christopher & Peck, 2004) p. 2

(Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007)
(Cavusgil et al., 2008b) p. 497

(ISO, 2011)
(International Organization for
Standardization)
(Singhal, Agarwal, & Mittal, 2011)
p. 21

(Manmohan S. Sodhi et al., 2012)
p. 6

Two of the definitions in Table 2 mention sourcing as an element of the supply
chain. Sourcing is recognized as part of a set of activities named Supply Management.
This term is broader than what was earlier referred to as Purchasing. The Institute of
Supply Management (ISM) offers this definition: “The identification, acquisition, access,
positioning, management of resources and related capabilities the organization needs or
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potentially needs in the attainment of its strategic objectives”20. Interestingly,
“sourcing” is absent from this definition, as are the popular terms “procurement” and
“purchasing”. Burt et al. describe supply management as a five-step process consisting
of identification of the need, identification of suppliers, establishing a price, establishing
a purchase agreement, and finally managing the relationship with the chosen supplier
(Burt, Petcavage, & Pinkerton, 2010). Frankel et al. offer some historical perspective and
a good compilation of definitions while describing the recent evolution from purchasing
to supply management (Frankel et al., 2008). ISM lists this definition of “sourcing” in
their online glossary: “(1) The process of identifying sources that could provide needed
products or services for the acquiring organization; (2) The term used to reflect the entire
purchasing process or cycle”21. The process of identifying sources is not particularly risky
or perilous. It is when the sourcing efforts result in ongoing supplier relationships that
the buying organization is exposed to incremental hazards and risks. Table 3 lists four
valid definitions of outsourcing.
You will notice that the third of the four definitions in Table 3 specifically
includes production activities. This is an appropriate segue into the second and closely
related functional focus of this dissertation, namely manufacturing and production
activities in India. As mentioned, we are not particularly interested in the demand side
of the supply chain, but both the sourcing and production sides are of concern. The

20
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https://www.ism.ws/Glossary/GlossaryTermDetail.cfm?TermID=2575
http://www.ism.ws/Glossary/GlossaryTermDetail.cfm?TermID=2462

18

main reason the demand side is not being targeted here is that those risks are deemed
independent from the sourcing and manufacturing in India. Problems with constructing
Table 3: DEFINITIONS OF OUTSOURCING
Definition
A deliberate decision to have outsiders or strategic allies
perform certain activities in the value chain.
The use of professional, skilled, service-sector workers
located in countries other than that in which the firm is
domiciled.
The procurement of selected value-adding activities,
including production of intermediate goods or finished
products, from independent suppliers. Global sourcing [is]
the procurement of products or services from
independent suppliers or company-owned subsidiaries
located abroad for consumption in the home country or a
third country. Offshoring refers to the relocation of a
business process or entire manufacturing facility to a
foreign country.
Broadly, an activity may be organized in one of four
alternative ways: domestic outsourcing, offshore
outsourcing, domestic in-house, or offshore in-house.

Author
(Cullen & Parboteeah, 2008) p.
225
(Deresky, 2008) p. 468

(Cavusgil et al., 2008b), 2008,
pages 266, 484 and 489

(Gray, Roth, & Leiblein, 2011)

reliable sales forecasts or predicting consumer demand patterns have little to do with
where the product is made. So we will exclude the demand side challenges and risks
from further analysis in this research. When we empirically survey supply chain
practitioners about their risk experiences, it is likely that they will provide answers that
reflect what they experience both on the supply side and the demand (downstream)
side, notwithstanding our preference to have them focus on the supply and production
side.
Returning to the realm of supply chain management, we now get a sense of the
human activities that go into the many steps of getting product from “dust to rust”,
“farm to fork”, “cradle to grave”. The eight definitions in Table 4 give us a feel for the
19

domain, including the lengthier CSCMP definition. “Management” is appropriately
defined as “the process of guiding the development, maintenance, and allocation of
resources to attain organizational goals” (Gitman & McDaniel, 2009). Its four core
activities consist of planning, organizing, leading and controlling. If they are done right,
the company will benefit from organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and be able
to achieve its mission and objectives (Gitman & McDaniel, 2009).
Some of the seven definitions from Table 4 allude to the desirability of
collaboration and coordination among the participants in the supply chain. Clusters of
connected networks represent an extended enterprise perspective of supply chain
management, providing us with an opportunity to impact the total system of
interrelated companies for increased efficiency and effectiveness (J. J. Coyle, Langley,
Novack, & Gibson, 2013). Effectiveness is concerned with the extent to which company
goals are accomplished. They usually include customer service measures such as leadtime, stock-out probability, and fill rates. Efficiency measures how well company
resources are utilized, for which measures may include procurement, inventory and
operating costs (Lai, Ngai, & Cheng, 2002). The supply chain management challenge is to
be effective in providing excellent customer service while keeping the overall costs
down.
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Table 4: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (SCM)
Definition
The integration of key business processes from end user
through original suppliers that provides products, services,
and information that add value for customers and other
stakeholders.
The management of upstream and downstream
relationships with suppliers and customers in order to
create enhanced value in the final market place at less cost
to the supply chain as a whole.
SCM recognizes dependencies between firms. It has
achieved the status of a generic term for various
systematic processes that implicitly consider time- and
functional dependencies between firms’ activities.
A multi-disciplinary and multi-functional set of activities
which deals not only with the more physical and tangible
attributes and activities (e.g. logistics), but equally the
more behavioural and intangible dimensions (e.g.
relationship building and management)
SCM is the integration and management of supply chain
organizations and activities through cooperative
relationships, effective business processes, and high levels
of information sharing to create high-performing value
systems that provide member organizations a sustainable
competitive advantage.
SCM is interested in the coordination and collaboration of
processes and activities across functions within a network
of organizations.
SCM encompasses the planning and management of all
activities involved in sourcing and procurement,
conversion, and all logistics management activities.
Importantly, it also includes coordination and
collaboration with channel partners, which can be
suppliers, intermediaries, third party service providers,
and customers. In essence, supply chain management
integrates supply and demand management within and
across companies.
The management of material, information and financial
flows through the supply chain. It includes the
coordination and collaboration of processes and activities
across different functions such as marketing, sales,
production, product design, procurement, logistics,
finance, and information technology within the supply
chain.
21

Author
The Global Supply Chain Forum
(GSCF), as reported by (Lambert
& Cooper, 2000)
(Christopher, 2002) p. 2

(Svensson, 2002) p. 116

(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007) p.
1401

(Handfield, 2007)

(Olson, 2012) p. 12

CSCMP, 2012
(http://www.cscmp.org/aboutus/supply-chain-managementdefinitions)

(Manmohan S. Sodhi et al.,
2012) p. 6

While it is quite clear that sourcing, procurement and materials management
(the management of incoming supplies) are part of supply chain management, it may be
a stretch to include production and manufacturing as activities under the purview of
logistics and supply chain managers. As Coyle et al. point out, logistics, by its nature,
focuses on processes that cut across traditional functional boundaries (J. J. Coyle et al.,
2013). The supply chain interfaces and integrates with other functional areas such as
marketing, manufacturing, operations, engineering, finance, accounting and human
resources. Because the manufacturing or “conversion” processes are intensely
dependent on input from the supply chain function, it makes sense for this research to
study risks not just isolated to the logistics activities of a firm, but in a more integrative
perspective that includes the manufacturing functions. The coupling between supply
chain activities and manufacturing is so close that disturbances will tend to affect both.
Nevertheless, we will not attempt to uncover or analyze disruptions that may occur
solely as a result of manufacturing operations. For example, we will not be concerned
with machine breakdowns (a manufacturing problem) unless they are caused by
insufficient power supply or poor raw materials (supply chain problems).
Most risks that affect the supply chain, i.e. supply chain management risks,
should squarely belong within the domain of the supply chain managers. Supply chain
leaders cannot walk away from trouble as soon as disruptions inevitably happen, and
they cannot customarily rely on other mechanisms and structures within the firm22 to
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For example, enterprise risk systems, security systems, procedures and personnel, insurance
coordinators, etc.
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rectify perilous situations or provide safety nets. Generally, if the risks originated with
the supply chain, they belong in the supply chain and should be handled primarily by
supply chain people.23 We remarked earlier that the act of management consists of the
four main activities of planning, organizing, leading and controlling. It would make
sense that an awareness of risks should permeate and shape how managers think and
act throughout the execution of these four activities. When supply chain managers
formulate strategies, policies and operating procedures, risks and how to control them
must be constantly in the back of their minds.
b. Supply Chain Risks
This part of the presentation will discuss the three concepts of risk, supply chain
risk, and supply chain risk management. The dissertation will eventually arrive at a
discussion of risks encountered when sourcing overseas, and particularly in India. An
extensive literature review and the ensuing survey of supply chain professionals working
in India will help us uncover and identify the specific risks experienced in India, their
impacts and which methods practitioners find are useful in mitigating them.
Stage 1: Risk
The 2003 version of Guinness World Records features the highest fall survived
without a parachute: In 1972, a Yugoslavian air stewardess survived a 33,000 foot fall
after a midair airplane explosion (Folkard, 2003)24. Despite this miraculous story, the

23

As we will see, there are of course exceptions to this. Many risk scenarios are serious enough
to engage the entire organization, and they can potentially damage a lot more than just the supply chain.
24
The author remembers this story. Supposedly the survivor was using the lavatory when it
happened, and this encapsulated unit landed on a long and snowy slope that softened the impact.
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example of jumping from an airplane without a parachute has been used as an
illustration of something totally risk “free”: You are 100% certain to die, so there is no
risk involved (Holton, 2004). Risk ≠ Certainty. Certainty also implies 100% probability
and absolutely no variability of outcomes. Table 5 lists several definitions of risk by
authors and thinkers both outside and inside the world of supply chain management.
The three terms (bold print) that repeat themselves are 1) Probability25; 2) Variability26;
and 3) Uncertainty27. Probability is a measure of relative frequency of an event and is
limited within a range from zero (no chance) to one (certainty) (Waner & Costenoble,
2007). Some probabilities are objectively determined; for example a fair coin toss has a
probability of 0.5 (or 50%) of landing on heads. Most other probabilities are subjectively
determined: 60% chance of rain tomorrow; 90% certain that the company will meet its
profitability target; between 90% and 100% probability that a magnitude 5 or higher
earthquake will hit the Puget Sound region over the next 100 years28. Although such
estimates are often made by scientists and government agencies, they are still
subjective probabilities that may be based on what the estimator knows and a
combination of educated guessing, statistics, various forecasting and simulation
techniques, and rounding. As Holton points out, probability quantifies perceived
uncertainty, meaning that most probability assessments are based on incomplete
information and possible ignorance of the “unknown unknowns”29 (Holton, 2004).

25

Acceptable acronyms for probability are chance and likelihood.
Acceptable acronyms for variability are fluctuations, variation and variance.
27
An acceptable acronym for uncertainty is unpredictability.
28
http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eqprob/2002/out/image.24079.jpg
29
A statement most recently attributed to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
26
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Table 5: DEFINITIONS OF RISK
Definition
Usually if the term “yield” were replaced by “expected
yield” or “expected return”, and “risk” by “variance of
return”, little change of apparent meaning would result.
The threat of injury, damage or loss, a dangerous
element or factor, or the chance of loss.
Explicit recognition of the [known] probabilities of
events outside the decision maker’s control.
Risk is always relative to the observer. It is subjective
just as is probability itself. It depends on what the
observer knows.
Risk is an set of triplets; R = [(si, pi, xi)], i = 1,2,…,N,
where si is a scenario identification or description, pi is
the probability of that scenario; and xi is the
consequence or evaluation measure of that scenario,
i.e. the measure of damage.
Reflecting variation in the distribution of possible
outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values.
Risk has become increasingly a term referring not to the
unpredictability of outcomes but to their costs,
particularly their costs in terms of mortality and
morbidity.
Risk refers to variation in corporate outcomes or
performance that cannot be forecast ex ante.
Unpredictability in corporate outcome variables.
The extent to which there is uncertainty about whether
potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of
decisions will be realized.
The probability that a particular adverse event occurs
during a stated period of time, or results from a
particular challenge. As a probability in the sense of
statistical theory, risk obeys all the formal laws of
combining probabilities.
The elements of the risk construct are a) potential
losses, b) significance of those losses, and c) the
uncertainty of those losses.
The risk of any particular type of loss is a combination
of the probability of that loss and the significance of
that loss to the individual or organization.
The uncertainty component of risk stems from
imperfect knowledge.
The risk of any particular type of loss is a combination
of the probability of that loss P (Lossn) and the
significance of that loss to the individual or
25

Author
(Markowitz, 1952) p. 89

(Merriam-Webster, 1976)
(Cleland & Kocaoglu, 1981) p. 308
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) p. 22

(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) p. 13

(March & Shapira, 1987) p. 1404
(March & Shapira, 1987) p. 1411

(Miller, 1992) p. 311 and p. 312

(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) p. 9

(Royal_Society, 1992)

(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995; Yates &
Stone, 1992)
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116

(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116
(V.-W. Mitchell, 1995) p. 116

organization, I (Lossn). Therefore, Riskn = P (Lossn) x I
(Lossn)
A chance of danger, damage, loss, injury, or any other
undesired consequences.
The probability of variance in an expected outcome.
Vulnerable; likely to be lost or damaged.
Risk is perceived to exist when there is a relatively high
likelihood that a detrimental event can occur and that
event has a significant associated impact or cost.
…Knight’s famous definition of risk. Risk relates to
objective probabilities. Uncertainty relates to
subjective probabilities.
Risk, then, is exposure to a proposition of which one is
uncertain. …we can never operationally define risk. At
best, we can operationally define only our perception of
risk.
Risk is calculable; it can be expressed in terms of odds.
Uncertainty is incalculable.
The expected outcome of an uncertain event
A common sense definition of risk – acknowledged by
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO,
2002) – mainly deals with two of its essential
components: losses (along with related amounts) and
uncertainty of their occurrence.
The fluctuations (variability) around the expected value
(mean) of a measure.
A situation is risky when it entails exposure to two
essential components: exposure to an event and the
uncertainty of possible outcomes – both of which are
necessary in completing a risky situation.
Risk = f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence)
Fluctuations which cannot be predicted precisely and
change their nature, impact and occurrence over time.

(Harland, Brenchley, & Walker,
2003)
(Spekman & Davis, 2004) p. 416
(Christopher & Peck, 2004) p. 3
(Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, &
Cavinato, 2004) p. 397
(Holton, 2004) p. 20 (referring to
Frank Knight’s 1921 book)
(Holton, 2004) p. 22 and p. 24

(Nohria, 2006)
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 196
(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 6

(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 6
(Rao & Goldsby, 2009) p. 100

(TSA, 2010)
(Singhal et al., 2011) p. 21

The first entry in Table 5 exemplifies the financial interpretation of variability,
and combined with Wagner & Bode’s (2009) more statistically derived statement
towards the end of the same table, we get a sense that risk occurs when there is
possible variability of future outcomes. Risk, in short, is that the reality might be
different than what we prepared for. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the
variability of an asset’s historical returns are divided into a systematic portion (returns
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that co-varies with the market return) and a nonsystematic (residual) portion that can
be called the specific risk (March & Shapira, 1987). Financial theory will penalize assets
with highly variable returns by demanding a higher rate of return, or risk premium. The
main rationale for this is found in utility theory, where decision makers (managers)
display preferences for certain outcomes (Baird, 1989). Most decision makers are risk
averse, implying that they want a premium (higher expected return) if they are to take
on a wider range of possible outcomes30. Variability (or volatility) compared to a
benchmark standard31 makes managers uncomfortable, and this has a price. Financial
portfolio managers strive to create optimal mixtures of assets – yielding high returns
with low risk – by combining investments with different attributes and performances.
Supply chain managers aim for similar risk reduction by diversifying sources and taking
steps to spread the exposure (Eule, 2012). Trkman and McCormack are touching upon
this issue when they discuss supplier portfolio management in a 2009 paper (Trkman &
McCormack, 2009). They sorted suppliers into four categories32 depending on how they
perform under endogenous and exogenous uncertainty, and concluded that the most
desirable supplier mix depends on the operating environment of the supply chain
leader, its strategy and the type of supply chain involved. They clearly endorsed using
dual or multiple sourcing strategies, choosing suppliers with different performance

30

Their risk preferences create a concave preference curve, where preference is plotted vis-à-vis
monetary value or outcome.
31
In the U.S. stock market, the benchmark is typically the S&P 500 index, and stocks with a low
variability compared to this (i.e. a “beta” below one) are considered low risk.
32
‘Rocks’, ‘Stars’, ‘Millstones’ and ‘Bouncers’ (e.g. the Stars perform well in turbulent
environments)
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characteristics (recall financial “betas”). Aydin et al. write about decentralized supply
risk management, where to reduce overall supply risks 33 they recommend finding and
developing non-correlated suppliers to make use of diversification. They see benefit in
dividing the suppliers into clusters to enjoy the fruits of both supplier competition and
diversification (Aydin, Babich, Beil, & Yang, 2012). Adding to this type of positive
thinking regarding risk, Richard de Neufville, in a paper about real options, encourages
us to understand that uncertainty is not always a risk to be avoided, as it also presents
valuable opportunities that can be exploited (Neufville, 2003). He encourages managing
the risks instead of avoiding them. In that respect, real options theory34 underpins the
claim that to build decisive advantage, a company must be faster at generating options
and realigning resources than its competitors (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). In supply
chain management, there seems to be similarities with financial management.
Several authors have suggested that companies should view supplier risk in
much the same way as financial institutions look at investor or investment risks,
meaning that a higher level of risk requires a higher level of reward to assume those
risks (Favre & McCreery, 2008). While it may be useful to use applications from financial
risk management, supply chains present other types of risks, including the possibility of
personal injury and property damage. Such safety issues can make it unethical and often
unthinkable to tinker with the risk and reward relationship.

33

The three supply risks they highlight are 1) Shortage of critical parts or loss of supplier capacity;
2) Loss of finished goods inventory due to use of defective parts; and 3) Inflated supply costs
34
Real options theory stipulates that systems are built flexible enough so that they can adapt to
changing conditions, new strategies and changing environments. The structure gives the manager the
option to choose alternative paths under ways. Having real options builds resilience into a system.
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Some academic articles attempt to optimize supplier networks by applying
mathematical or statistical tools for trade-off analyses among metrics such as expected
costs, quality acceptance levels and on-time delivery distributions. Wu and Olson
authored a 2008 paper where they compared three different quantitative models:
chance constrained programming (CCP), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and multiobjective programming (MOP), combined with (Monte Carlo) simulations for all three
methods. Such methods can serve as useful tools to evaluate and improve supplier
selection decisions in uncertain supply chain environments (Wu & Olson, 2008).
Uncertainty is the third term that kept appearing in Table 5: Definitions of Risk.
Some writers – notably Frank Knight - have attempted to separate risk from uncertainty
by characterizing risk as measurable and uncertainty as unmeasurable, so that risk
relates to objective probabilities and uncertainty relates to subjective probabilities
(Holton, 2004). In this view, risk is calculable; it can be expressed in terms of odds, while
uncertainty is incalculable (Nohria, 2006). This view of risk is quite ambitious, as it
requires known probability distributions of possible outcomes. However, as Vilko et al.
point out, the cases when probability distributions cannot be defined are much more
common than those where probability distributions are known (Vilko, Edelmann, &
Hallikas, 2010).
It seems the literature is moving away from a strict interpretive separation
between risk and uncertainty, and the two terms are often used interchangeably, or
conjunctively, as in “risk occurs because there is uncertainty about the future” (Waters,
2011). Another take on this is that “the uncertainty component of risk stems from
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imperfect knowledge” (V.-W. Mitchell, 1995). Regardless of whether risk is part of
uncertainty or vice versa, we are more interested in how risks and uncertainties can hurt
supply chain operations.
The notion of risk involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage
that might be incurred. Kaplan and Garrick express this as risk = uncertainty + damage
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). This effectively cuts out the possible positive effects of risk,
and limits our concern to risks that cause loss or damage. For our purposes, Culp’s
definition that risk can be defined as any source of randomness that may have an
adverse impact on a person or corporation is useful (McCormack et al., 2008), as well as
other descriptions that only cover the negative sides of risk: losses, disruptions,
untoward situations, glitches, damage, hazards, disturbances, costs, etc.
Lastly, for any uncertain outcome to have a possibility of hurting us, we need to
have exposure to or an interest in what might transpire. Risk, then, entails not only
uncertainty, but also exposure, leading to Holton’s definition: Risk is exposure to a
proposition of which one is uncertain (Holton, 2004). Kent Miller offers a slightly
different interpretation by stating that exposure refers to the sensitivity of a firm or
project’s cash flows to changes in any of a number of interrelated uncertain variables
(Miller, 1992). According to Kaplan and Garrick, a risk analysis consists of answers to the
following three questions, also dubbed their “set of triplets” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981):
1) What can happen, i.e. what can go wrong?
2) How likely is it that it might happen?
3) What are the consequences (impact) if it happens?
30

This division into Scenario, Likelihood and Consequence can be used to calculate
a risk distribution curve, where the risk that the organization faces is the whole curve.
So to answer the question “what is the risk”, a single number is not enough to
communicate the idea of risk. As Kaplan and Garrick write, “It takes a whole curve”.
Similarly, risk can be defined as a collection of pairs of likelihood (L) and outcomes35 (O),
so that Risk = [(L1, O1), (L2, O2),…..(Ln, On)] where each 2-tuple is a possible scenario
(McCormack et al., 2008). The alternative to the distribution curve concept is the point
concept of risk, which combines the probability of a particular type of loss with the
significance (impact) of that loss to the organization: Riskn = P (Lossn) x I (Lossn) (V.-W.
Mitchell, 1995). To get an accurate depiction of the risk theatre, the whole distribution
curve needs to be known. Many unacceptable and unpalatable risks can hide behind
midpoints such as expected values and averages.
It is crucial for a company to determine whether it is truly exposed to any of the
possible risks or hazards that exist. It becomes important to know whether its
perception of exposure is commensurate with the risk level (sets of likelihoods
multiplied by impacts) that can be anticipated. As Holton points out, there is no true risk
because everything is a matter of perception. He claims we can at best only
operationalize our perception of risk, and that is what we use to develop metrics and
risk assessments, subjective as they may be (Holton, 2004). Experienced managers will
learn to discern exaggerated anxieties and worries from more objectively derived and

35

Outcomes are the same as impacts.
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cool-headed assessments of exposure and risk. Organizations are not vulnerable to
every possible risk that may exist. Contrary to what the public may think, the instances
of piracy in the Gulf of Aden are not a major threat to the integrity of the global
transportation system. However, it is a real concern to the shipping lines trafficking that
particular stretch of water. Risk identification and assessment is ultimately a very
particular and individual endeavor.
Stage 2: Supply Chain Risk
Because risk is a product of exposure and uncertainty (Holton, 2004), one can
conceptualize exposure as being inherent in the firm’s nature36, while the uncertainty
comes from the broader environment in which the firm is operating. In a systems sense,
there is also a dynamic interplay between a firm’s exposure and how it responds to its
environment, and how the environment responds to the firm’s exposure37. A firm’s
exposure to a disruptive event will influence how vulnerable it is to such an event (or
scenario), as the firm’s vulnerability to a disruptive event can be viewed as a
combination of the likelihood of a disruption and its potential severity (Sheffi, 2005).
Exposure makes a firm vulnerable to disruptions. There is agreement among supply
chain academics and practitioners that over the past few decades, vulnerability of
supply chains to disturbances or disruptions has increased (Christopher, 2002;
Christopher & Lee, 2004; Kotabe & Murray, 2004; S. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). The main
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Including its attributes such as business model, strategies, asset base, location, industries
served, ownership structure, product range, management style, corporate culture, history, etc.
37
Case in point: a well-guarded and protected warehouse is less likely to be a target for burglars
or intruders.

32

reasons for this increased vulnerability can be traced to three main and somewhat
intertwined factors:
1. Increased competitive pressures: This lead to efforts to make processes and
supply chains both more efficient and more effective (responsive). Efficiencies
were achieved by making supply chains leaner, which implied lower inventories
and quicker turnaround times. Many firms switched to single sourcing of crucial
supplies. Customer responsiveness was improved by better quality control,
faster to market, better selection, higher fill rates and shrinking product life
cycles. (Melnyk, Ragatz, & Zsidisin, 2005). To stay relevant, firms were forced to
embrace operational efficiencies.
2. Accelerated globalization of markets: Globalization made it easier to find
cheaper sources overseas, and with both suppliers and customers in foreign
markets, the supply chains experienced longer freight routes and longer lead
times, in addition to various cultural and communications snags. Global supply
chains have more delay points and greater uncertainties (Manuj & Mentzer,
2008a; Vanderspek, 2012).
3. Increased inter-firm dependencies: The trend is towards increased collaboration
within the supply chain networks to achieve better visibility and distribution
accuracy. These couplings up and down the supply chain have created greater
mutual dependencies and sensitivities.
The three factors have contributed to increasing the complexity of modern,
global supply chains (ScienceWatch, 2011). In a network sense, the many new nodes,
links, relationships and interactions have created supply chains that are vulnerable to a
variety of internal and external disruptions and hiccups. Complexity of a supply chain
can also more simply be defined as the sum of two components: the total number of
nodes and the total number of forward, backward and within-tier materials flows within
a given supply chain (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). As
has been argued, accidents arise from systems, and they are inevitable if these systems
are complex and tightly coupled (de_Koster, Stam, & Balk, 2011; Perrow, 1999a, 1999b).
Perrow’s “Normal Accident Theory” holds that accidents become inevitable or normal in
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complex, tightly coupled technological systems (Perrow, 1999a; S. M. Wagner & C.
Bode, 2006)38. Low visibility, tight couplings and a lack of slack could be detrimental to
resilience, where resilience is defined as the ability to recover quickly from disturbances
(Sheffi, 2005)39. Supply chain visibility is defined roughly as availability of and access to
relevant data (O. Khan & Zsidisin, 2012). Visibility reveals a bigger piece of the big
picture, and allows for better planning and decision making. It entails having access to
sales and production forecasts and inventory levels of both suppliers and customers, as
well as updated information on availability of logistics resources (transportation and
warehouse capacity, etc.)40 While lack of visibility is not strictly a risk, it is a deficiency in
a defensive mechanism that healthy supply chains should possess.
There are many benefits to reshaping the supply chain structures and practices
to make them more efficient and effective, but many authors point out that these
efforts have made them more susceptible to risks in the business environment (S.
Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). Modern supply chain management and the adoption of lean
principles have resulted in “system fragility”, according to Melnyk et al. Waste
reduction strategies such as buffer reductions41 have led to a state where companies

38

Complex systems imply complex interactions within the supply chain and between the supply
chain and its environment (Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss, 2011)
39
A more elaborate definition is “the supply chain’s ability to cope with the consequences of
unavoidable risk events in order to return to its original operations or move to a new, more desirable
state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011).
40
In classic information theory, the availability of information cuts down on uncertainty. For
management purposes (planning, organizing, control), access to good information (through, for example,
greater visibility) certainly helps in assessing the situation and making better decisions (Denning & Bell,
2012)
41
There are typically three types of buffers: safety stock, extended lead times and excess
capacity (Melnyk et al., 2005)
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have less control over their operations and are less able to respond to disruptions. In
stable and predictable markets these powerful tools for making operations leaner and
more efficient are quite effective, but they have created more fragile supply chains that
appear less resilient when faced with risks and disruptive events (Melnyk et al., 2005).
Waters confirms this by stating that removing slack in the supply chain is creating
inflexible chains where even small and unexpected events can bring everything to a
standstill (Waters, 2011). Through surveying 760 German companies, Wagner and Bode
were able to empirically show that several structural variables of supply design42 were
relevant for a firm’s exposure to supply chain risk. These supply chain design variables
amplified a firm’s exposure to risk (S. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). In their survey of
German auto industry executives, Thun and Hoenig asked them to rank seven drivers of
supply chain risk (Thun & Hoenig, 2011). Globalization came out first, followed by
product variety, outsourcing, reduction of suppliers, focus on efficiency, central
distribution and centralized production.
Disruption risks are caused by events that create a supply shortage for certain
durations (Haksöz & Arslan, 2012). Disruptions can vary from everyday annoyances
such as incoming deliveries that are late by a few hours to major catastrophic events
that in the worst case might not only hurt people and the environment, but also force
the company out of business. Just by reading the daily newspapers, one can easily find
headlines announcing yet another supply chain disaster somewhere in the world. As this

42

Such as the firm’s degree of dependence on certain suppliers or customers, the degree of
single sourcing or reliance on global supply sources.
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was written, the U.S. East Coast experienced Sandy - one of the worst hurricanes and
floods in history; a generic Lipitor cholesterol drug produced in India was recalled
because of findings of glass particles in the capsules, and a factory fire in Bangladesh
killed more than 140 textile workers.43 The New York Times reported on January 23,
2013 that since 2005, factory fires in Bangladesh have killed 600 workers. A few months
later, a Dhaka garment factory building collapsed, killing more than 1,100 workers.
Disruptions can be either internal or external to the focal supply chain, and they
can be either caused by nature or by human actions. Table 6 lists definitions of supply
chain risk by recognized authors in the field. In the spirit of the “triple bottom line” 44,
we appreciate definitions that mention negative consequences to people and the
environment, in addition to the obvious profit degradation. With the possible exception
of Harland et al.’s definition, the dozen variations in Table 6 do not contain direct
references to these big picture risks, and only Zsidisin specifically mentions “threats to
customer life and safety”. From a financial standpoint, it is likely that any disaster that
causes loss of life or environmental damage will ultimately be costly for a business and
affect the bottom line, but when we define supply chain risks, a more deliberate and
balanced mention of the non-financial outcomes seems reasonable.45 This view is

43

After the November 2012 Bangladesh factory fire (following a similar fire just a few months
earlier in Karachi, Pakistan), commentators pointed out that “low prices can have high costs”. Favre and
McCreery noted that “low dollar spend suppliers can be a source of significant risk exposure” (Favre &
McCreery, 2008)
44
Or the popularly labeled 3 P’s: People, Planet and Profit
45
Sadly, people were still perishing from the after-effects of the November 2012 hurricane Sandy
when several press commentators chirped in that this disaster would be “good for business”. They were
referring to greater sales of building materials and more work for contractors.
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Table 6: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK
Definition
Author
A variation in the distribution of possible supply chain
outcomes, their likelihood, and their subjective value.
Any risks for the information, material and product
flows from original supplier to the delivery of the final
product for the end user. In simple terms, supply chain
risks refer to the possibility and effect of a mismatch
between supply and demand.
Chance of danger, damage, loss, injury or any other
undesired consequences.
The essence of most disruptions is a reduction in
capacity and therefore inability to meet demand.
Unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the
normal flow of goods and materials within a supply
chain, and, as a consequence, expose firms within the
supply chain to operational and financial risks.
The distribution of performance outcomes of interest
expressed in terms of losses, probability, speed of
event, speed of losses, the time for detection of the
events, and frequency.
The combination of (1) an unintended, anomalous
triggering event that materializes somewhere in the
supply chain or its environment, and (2) a
consequential situation which significantly threatens
normal business operations.
Supply chain disruption: An unintended, untoward
situation. For the affected firms, it is an exceptional and
anomalous situation in comparison to every-day
business.
Risks can be classified into Source Risks, Make Risks,
Deliver Risks, and Return Risks.
Deviation from the expected value of a supply chain
performance objective resulting in negative
consequences for the affected firm.
The negative outcome resulting from adverse events
that occur in supply chains, logistics networks, and
transportation operations.
Risk is the potential to lose time and money or otherwise not be able to accomplish an organization’s goals.
Operational risks and disruptions: Operational risks
involve inherent uncertainties for SC elements such as
customer demand, supply and cost. Disruption risks
come from disasters (natural and man-made) and from
economic crises.
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(Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003)
building on (March & Shapira,
1987) p. 1404
(Jüttner et al., 2003) p. 7

(Harland et al., 2003) p. 52
(Sheffi, 2005) p. 14
(Craighead et al., 2007) p. 132

(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p.197

(Wagner & Bode, 2008) p. 309

(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 6

(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 22
(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 5

(Wagner & Bode, 2009) p. 5

(Gitman & McDaniel, 2009) p. 4
(Olson, 2012) p. 13

supported by Carter and Rogers, who in 2008 defined supply chain risk management as
“the ability of a firm to understand and manage its economic, environmental, and social
risks in the supply chain” (Carter & Rogers, 2008).
Supply management refers to the upstream activities of sourcing and
procurement, so it makes sense to include some alternative definitions of “supply risk”
(as opposed to “supply chain risk”):
Table 7: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY RISK
Definition
The probability of an incident associated with inbound
supply from individual supplier failures or the supply
market occurring, in which its outcomes result in the
inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer
demand or cause threats to customer life and safety.
Involving the potential occurrence of events
associated with inbound supply that can have
significant detrimental effects on the purchasing firm.
Threats to supply continuity.
Supply risk is the uncertainty associated with supplier
activities and in general supplier relationships, i.e. the
transpiration of significant and/or disappointing
failures with inbound goods and services.
Risk related to a given supplier’s characteristics
evolves from the deviation between the level of
manufacturer expectation and the actual supplier
performance.
The distribution of outcomes related to adverse
events in inbound supply that affect the ability of the
focal firm to meet customer demand (in terms of both
quantity and quality) within anticipated costs and
time, or causes threats to customer life and safety
Those risks associated with the sourcing of products
by a focal firm.

Author
(Zsidisin, 2003a) p. 222

(Zsidisin, 2003b)

(Melnyk et al., 2005)
(Jüttner, 2005), and (Zsidisin, Panelli,
& Upton, 2000)

(Levary, 2007) p. 392

(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 197,
building on (Zsidisin, 2003a)

(Christopher, Mena, Khan, & Yurt,
2011) p. 67

Although the definition by Manuj & Mentzer in Table 7 takes into account the
customers and their well-being, we can think of costly risks and disruptions that do not
necessarily trickle all the way down to the customer. Many everyday annoyances and
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delays can be costly and expensive to remedy, but they do not necessarily incapacitate
the firm’s ability to make deliveries and meet demand. Left unchecked, the many
imperfections and inefficiencies in supply management will cause the overall cost level
to rise over time, but firms are often able to satisfy demand regardless46. Risk
management, then, becomes an effective method to help reduce the chaos.
Levary’s definition from Table 7 is interesting from a risk theory standpoint. Risk
occurs when there is a deviation between what is expected and what is experienced.
What is expected should already be taken care of (discounted) through the company’s
regular management practices, and risk is encountered when something unexpected
happens. Perhaps many of the everyday annoyances are to be expected, in which case
they should be remedied through sound and regular management practices. Most low
level disruptions can be dealt with as part of business as usual (Glendon, 2012). In
supply chain risk management, if we can disregard many pedestrian disruptions that are
bound to happen, the focus becomes on identifying, assessing, mitigating and
controlling disruptions with probability and frequency, but with significant impact on
the company’s operations, the environment and human safety. Adam Prakash puts it
this way: “…unpredictable changes – or “shocks” – are of primary concern. When
shocks surpass a certain critical size or threshold and persist at those levels, traditional
policy prescriptions and coping mechanisms are likely to fail” (Prakash, 2011).

46

Undoubtedly, sloppy management practices can over time contribute to “death by a thousand
cuts”, so attention has to be paid to supply chain annoyances. Blake Johnson calls these “garden-variety
business uncertainty” that needs to be dealt with (B. Johnson, 2012).
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It is a plausible assumption that money can be made on a sustained basis for
companies that tackle and overcome risk better than others. The fact that risks exist
and that things can go wrong serve as a natural barrier for over-establishment in any
industry. There is seemingly something Darwinian (“survival of the fittest”) about the
ability to thrive and make money in any business. The ability to deal with (and over time
adapt to) various risk factors is an important element for continued existence.
Unprepared firms essentially gamble that they will avoid the effects of a disruptive or
damaging event (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008). Deliberate supply chain risk preparedness and
management will be imperative to long term sustainability and should give the firm or
supply chain competitive advantage in a perilous world.
A useful paper by Spekman and Davis groups supply chain risks into four general
categories (Spekman & Davis, 2004):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Risks inherent in supply chain flows (goods, information and money)
Risks associated with security (crimes). (Security management is an
important subset of the realm of risk management) 47
Risks associated with opportunistic behavior (trust issues)
Risks associated with corporate social responsibility (the “triple bottom
line”)

The prevailing view is now an all-risk strategy that emphasizes the firm and its
employees’ collective attention to both supply chain security management and supply
chain risk management principles and methods (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008; Closs &

47

Includes man-made threats such as terrorism, theft, vandalism, smuggling, piracy, riots and arson.
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McGarrell, 2004; J. J. Coyle et al., 2013; Iakovou, Vlachos, & Xanthopoulos, 2009;
Marucheck, Greis, Mena, & Cai, 2011; Sweet, 2006; Williams, Lueg, & LeMay, 2008) 48,49.
The perception of risk is often what guides management and practitioners in
their decision making and prioritization. Perceived risk can be quite different than
statistical (objective) risk based on actual occurrences and trends. (C. S. Tang, 2006b;
Vanany, Zailani, & Pujawan, 2009). Every decade has its highly publicized catastrophes,
whether natural or man-made. Surveys of practitioners performed in the year 2012
typically list the more general supplier risk as the number one perceived risk. 50 A
recurring “risk-of-the-month” phenomenon illustrates our reactive nature and how our
perception of reality is shaped by recent or close events. Gail Dutton remarks that
“supply chain managers who focus on the most recent threat will be blind-sided by
something else” (Dutton, 2013). Tversky and Kahneman wrote an important article on
cognitive biases that stem from people’s reliance on judgmental heuristics, especially
when making judgments under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Despite our
instinctive inclination to be reactive and focus on recent events, it seems the literature
on risk management has now arrived at a more balanced, “all-risk” perspective
emphasizing the importance of being prepared for any eventualities. Several books on

48

Williams et al. uses a definition from Closs & McGarrell (2004): “The application of policies, procedures,
and technology to protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, information and personnel)
from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people or
weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain” (Closs & McGarrell, 2004; Williams et al., 2008)
49
Autry & Bobbitt describe a security breach as something that contaminates, damages or destroys
products and/or supply chain assets.
50
Avoiding suppliers that will ship bad or unsafe products or use hazardous production methods, for
example.
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SCRM written over the past couple of years seem to reflect this more comprehensive
perspective of risks (O. Khan & Zsidisin, 2012; Kouvelis, Dong, Boyabatli, & Li, 2012;
Olson, 2012; Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012; Trent & Roberts, 2010). Tang and Musa
did an extensive literature review and found that the field of SCRM since 2000 has
“evolved from passively reacting to vague general issues of disruptions towards more
proactively managing supply chain risk from system perspectives” (O. Tang & Musa,
2011).
Stage 3: Supply Chain Risk Management
As pointed out by Sodhi and Tang, supply chain risk management (SCRM) is a
nascent field, going back only to the early 2000’s (Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012).
Several authors have carried out extensive and useful literature reviews on SCRM, and it
is evident that this is an area of research and practice that is still in a relatively early
stage (Ghadge, Dani, & Kalawsky, 2011; Jüttner et al., 2003; Rao & Goldsby, 2009;
Vanany et al., 2009). Overlapping fields such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and
Emergency & Disaster Preparedness have been around a bit longer, and for these there
exists an older body of literature (Hale & Moberg, 2005; Olson & Wu, 2010). ERM
embraces a broader and more general area of the risks that a company could run into,
and can be defined as “… the discipline by which an organization in any industry
assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose
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of increasing the organization’s short- and long-term value to its stakeholders.” (CAS,
2007)51
Organizations often discuss ERM in the context of financial and strategic risk
(Handfield, 2007). Supply chain risks overlap with other risks experienced by
organizations, and what is damaging to a company’s supply chain will usually slop over
and cause negative financial and marketing consequences. Based on a 2006 survey of
financial executives that revealed that their greatest worry was supply chain risks, Harris
Interactive advised that it is all too easy to look at risk in silos (Smyrlis, 2006). A 2009
survey by Sodhi et al. revealed that nearly three quarters of the respondents believed
SCRM to be a subset of ERM or an extension of it (Manmohan S. Sodhi et al., 2012).
The definitions given in Table 8 reveal that we now have moved into the solution
stage of organizational processes. What can managers do to the supply chain to
anticipate and handle the inevitable risks? The literature seems to center around the
following predicaments:




We have this supply chain structure and we need to get this product to the
customer!
What can possibly go wrong or has gone wrong?
How do we fix it and prevent it from happening again?
The SCRM literature is, therefore, quite prescriptive in its way of analyzing and

recommending processes and solutions to the management. As Harland et al.

51

A slightly different definition of ERM is offered by Wikipedia: “The methods and processes used by
organizations to manage risks and seize opportunities related to the achievement of their objectives.”
Chapman is credited with this definition: “ERM as a set of coordinated actions about protecting and
enhancing share value to satisfy the primary business objective of shareholder wealth maximization” (Yee,
2009)
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Table 8: DEFINITIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SCRM)
Definition
The identification and management of risks within the
supply chain, and risks external to it, through a
coordinated approach amongst supply chain
members, to reduce supply chain vulnerability52 as a
whole.
The identification and management of risks within the
supply chain and risks external to it through a coordinated approach amongst supply chain members
to reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole.
Aims to identify the potential sources of risk and
implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain
supply chain vulnerability.
Effective supply risk [management] requires the
identification and monetization of risk events,
probability of occurrence, and the firm contingencies
for alternative sources of supply.
A company manages risk in order to protect its assets
and profits, and stay in business.
Risk management is primarily concerned with
removing the degree of ambiguity or uncertainty
concerning the task environment and the decision
specific variables.
To collaboratively with partners in a supply chain
apply risk management process tools to deal with
risks and uncertainties caused by, or impacting on,
logistics related activities or resources.
Focusing on their supply chains in order to reduce
uncertainty and increase customer satisfaction, with
the ultimate aim of generating greater levels of
productivity, profitability and competitiveness.
The management of supply chain risks through
coordination or collaboration among the supply chain
partners so as to ensure profitability and continuity.
The organizational routines or regular and predictable
patterns of activity and sequence of coordinated actions that, when bundled with rent-yielding resources, enhance the abilities of the supply chain to recover expediently from a manifested disruption and to
create awareness of a pending or realized disruption.
52

Author
(Chapman et al., 2002) p. 61

(Christopher, 2002) p.2

(Jüttner et al., 2003) p. 9

(Barry, 2004) p. 695

(Finch, 2004) p. 194
(Brindley, 2004) p. 70

(Norrman & Lindroth, 2004) p. 14

(P. J. Singh et al., 2005) p. 3375

(C. S. Tang, 2006a) p. 453

(Craighead et al., 2007; Grant, 2002)

Vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which people, property, resources, systems and
cultural, economic, environmental and social activity is susceptible to harm, degradation, or destruction
on being exposed to a hostile agent or factor” (Prakash, 2011). Also, vulnerability is a latent condition
which becomes manifest if a disruptive event occurs (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). Not wearing a bicycle
helmet is not a problem until you fall off your bike.
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The goal of risk management is to empower senior
decision makers with a rational basis for determining
which risk mitigation measures to enact versus how
much and where to accept other risks.
Risk management involves developing strategies for
reducing the probabilities of negative events and/or
their consequences should they occur.
Having the objective to control, monitor and evaluate
supply chain risk. The core activity of SCRM is the
systematic identification, assessment and
quantification of potential supply chain disruptions.
The identification and evaluation of risks and
consequent losses in the global supply chain, and
implementation of appropriate strategies through a
coordinated approach among supply chain members
with the objective of reducing one or more of the
following – losses, probability, speed of event, speed
of losses, the time for detection of the events,
frequency, or exposure – for supply chain outcomes
that in turn lead to close matching of actual cost
savings and profitability with those desired.
Management controls create supply chain
capabilities, or attributes that enable an enterprise to
anticipate and overcome disruptions.
To evaluate, control and monitor risk in order to
safeguard supply continuity and maximize
profitability, and … the process of planning,
organizing, leading and controlling the activities of an
organization in order to minimize the effects of risk
on an organization’s capital and earnings (includes
financial, strategic, operational, accidental losses and
other risks).
SCRM can be seen as the capacity to be agile.
Supply chain solutions that ensure supply continues
to meet demand in case of a disruption or soon after
the occurrence of such a disruption.
Process to identify the likelihood of potential losses,
the impact on the business revenue, and mitigation
plans to reduce potential losses.
The practice of managing the risk of any factor or
event that can materially disrupt a supply chain,
whether within a single company or spread across
multiple companies. The ultimate purpose of SCRM is
to enable cost avoidance, customer service, and
market position.
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(Ritter, Barrett, & Wilson, 2007), p.
86

(Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007)

(McCormack et al., 2008) p. 8 and p.
10

(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b) p. 205

(Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010)

(Trent & Roberts, 2010)

(Lavastre, Gunasekaran, &
Spalanzani, 2012) p. 830
(Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2012)
p. 303
(Dow_Chemicals, 2012)

(SCRLC, 2012)

observed, the combined, messy, intertwined effects of increasing product and service
complexity, globalized outsourcing and e-business have resulted in more complex and
dynamic supply networks (Harland et al., 2003). They recommend a variety of risk
management tools to deal with this, including scenario planning53, expert panels, Delphi
studies and statistically based forecasting methods. In addition, they stress the
importance of contracting with and developing trustworthy suppliers. More
importantly, they were the first to outline a step-by-step “supply network risk tool” that
has become a conceptual framework for a lot of the prescriptive work in the SCRM field
(we have tweaked this model, relabeled it “MIAMI”, and used it as a framework later in
this thesis):
1. Map supply network (structure, key measures, ownership)
2. Identify risk and its current location (type, potential loss)
3. Assess risk (likelihood of occurrence, stage in life cycle, exposure, likely triggers,
likely loss)
4. Manage risk (develop risk position, develop scenarios)
5. Form collaborative supply network risk strategy
6. Implement supply network risk strategy
Arben Mullai outlines a risk analysis process that consists of nine steps: 1)
System definition, 2) Analytical process, 3) Hazard identification, 4) Exposure analysis, 5)
Consequence analysis, 6) Exposure evaluation, 7) Consequence evaluation, 8) Risk
characterization and presentation, and 9) Sensitivity analysis (Mullai, 2004). Kessinger
and McMorrow are industry practitioners who stress the importance of having a

53

Also called “what if” analysis by some authors (Simchi-Levi, Snyder, & Watson, 2002). “Whatif” scenarios are often used in stress-testing exercises (Jayashankar M. Swaminathan & Tomlin, 2007)
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comprehensive and systematic process of prevention, preparedness, mitigation,
response and recovery. They outline three crucial abilities:
1. Collect, communicate and respond
2. Assess the impact of uncertainty
3. Quantify supply chain performance and design supply strategies across uncertain
business outcomes (Kessinger & McMorrow, 2012)
As for studies pertaining to SCRM strategies and practices, one stream of
research over the past decade has focused on developing mathematical models for
supply chain issues, while another stream of research has tried to empirically establish
relationships between supply chain practices and performance (Hendricks & Singhal,
2012). Almost without fail, all of these papers have based their logical construct on the
simplified Identify – Assess – Mitigate framework (What can go wrong, how can it
impact us, and what can we do about it?) Trying to uncover definitional, process and
methodology gaps in the SCRM literature, Sodhi et al. separated recent academic
journal articles into four main elements of identification, assessment, mitigation, and
responsiveness to operational and catastrophic risk incidents (Manmohan S. Sodhi et
al., 2012). Most of the articles were of conceptual nature (framework building rather
than empirical), and 45% of them covered identification, 58% assessment, 61%
mitigation, and 19% responsiveness (several articles covered more than one element).
While Jüttner et al. distinguish four basic constructs (supply chain risk sources, risk
consequences, risk drivers and risk mitigating strategies) (Jüttner et al., 2003), we find
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the following five-step progression to be particularly meaningful, both conceptually and
practically:54
1. Define (map) the company’s supply chain
2. Identify relevant risks to which the company might be exposed
3. Assess these risks in terms of probability of occurrence and potential severity of
impact
4. Mitigate the risks through prevention and damage control (contingency plans)
5. Monitor the risks and learn from past incidents, implying continuous
improvement55

c. The “MIAMI” Template
An easy way to remember this five-step methodology could be to label it with
the acronym MIAMI: Map, Identify, Assess, Mitigate and Improve!
1. Mapping
Mapping the supply chain is surprisingly challenging for many companies doing
global sourcing and dealing with third party logistics providers (3PL’s). This is a process
that takes quite a bit of diligent detective work, and it can be hard to get reliable
information from the first tier suppliers about their next level (second tier) of suppliers
and their supply chain practices. However, going through a thorough process of defining
and mapping the upstream supply network has several benefits and may reveal
inefficiencies, redundancies and, of course, risks.

54

Manuj and Mentzer present a similar five-step process that consists of risk identification, risk
assessment & evaluation, selection of appropriate risk management, implementation of supply chain risk
management strategies, and mitigation of supply chain risks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a)
55
There are some similarities here to the DMAIC (define-measure-analyze-improve-control) cycle found in
the Six Sigma quality management theory. Lee and Whang wrote a paper on how to use Six Sigma to
obtain higher supply chain security with lower cost (Lee & Whang, 2005)
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In this early stage it also makes sense to recognize the risk drivers that the
company operates under (Jüttner et al., 2003). These drivers tend to increase the risk
exposure of the company. Examples are single sourcing, lean practices with low
inventories and tight deadlines56, short product cycles, long transportation routes and
complex products with suppliers scattered all over the world. Before worrying about
what can go wrong we need to know who we are, how we operate and what our supply
network looks like. As Jüttner points out, the supply chain structure and practices can be
a risk factor and amplifier by themselves (Jüttner, 2005).
Mapping the flow of materials, information and money also involves describing
who is doing what and how and where it is done. Producing in India involves incoming
raw materials and supplies, and the analyst needs to know the layers of suppliers, the
source of the raw materials, and the logistics steps that are necessary to get the
merchandise in and out of the production facilities. A thorough analysis also looks at the
internal production processes, and the logistical flow of the factory must be mapped
out. The analyst needs to know where the product is coming from, how it is transported,
how it is stored, how it is processed, and how it leaves the production facilities. Is the
business power or water intensive? Does the business rely on unionized labor? Only
through an intimate knowledge of the internal supply chain processes can the analyst
start focusing on the identification and assessment of the risks and possible disruptions
that can affect the specific supply chain. Although the risk identification and assessment

56

Typical of Just-in-Time (JIT) type procurement and manufacturing practices.
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processes themselves serve as filters, elimination of irrelevant scenarios and
simplification at the mapping stage make it easier to focus in on proper situational and
circumstantial risks instead of spending time on hypothetical risks that the company will
never fall victim to57. The process of mapping that we are describing here can be done in
a structured fashion similar to the key steps recommended in a logistics/supply chain
network design process. Such systematic processes - that often include audits to provide
a comprehensive perspective on the company’s logistics processes - are well described
in many modern supply chain textbooks (J. J. Coyle et al., 2013). We are concerned with
creating an initial system awareness (Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk, 2004).
The Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council (SCRLC) recommends the risk
management process begins with identifying internal and external environments
(SCRLC, 2011). At this mapping stage, it is appropriate to give some thought to the
organization’s own forms, structures and processes, as these may relate to the
operating environment. Because risks or risky situations often occur at the intercept of
the firm’s characteristics and the external environment in which it chooses to operate,
the firm’s own attributes or impediments may indeed contribute and add to the overall
risk exposure. For example, an inability to adapt could be a sustainability problem and a
risk factor on its own (Carter & Rogers, 2008). It makes the firm more vulnerable.
Deciding to source from or operate in India may consequently not be the ideal choice

57

“Never say never” is of course a valid objection to this simplification approach, as there is
always a chance that the “unknown unknowns” will rear their ugly heads and surprise us. So we don’t
want to simplify too radically.
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for a company that suffers from various forms of inertia, unless it is able and willing to
modify many of its operating practices, and thereby reduce its vulnerability.
2. Identification
Identifying relevant risks is perhaps the most important step. Kern et al. note
that superior risk identification supports the subsequent risk assessment and this in turn
leads to better risk mitigation (Kern, Moser, Hartmann, & Moder, 2012). Several
researchers have classified supply risks into operational (internal) risks58 and disruption
(external) risks (Kouvelis, Chambers, & Wang, 2006; C. S. Tang, 2006a). The operational
risks can be internal to the company or internal to the extended supply chain (or
network), while the disruption risks primarily consist of environmental and man-made59
hazards. Environmental risks can be remediated through “business continuity planning”,
while man-made attacks can be prevented with “supply chain security management”.
(Markmann, Gnatzy, von der Gracht, & Darkow, 2011).60 Some authors use a finer filter
to categorize risks. For example, Manuj & Mentzer divide risks into eight categories:
Supply, Operational, Demand, Security, Macro, Policy, Competitive, and Resource risks
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a). Regardless of the method used to categorize the relevant
risks, the target of risk identification is to identify all potential threats and all relevant
vulnerabilities within the upstream part of the supply chain (Kern et al., 2012). A
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Kleindorfer and van Wassenhove call them coordination (supply/demand matching) risks (Kleindorfer &
Van Wassenhove, 2004)
59
By “man-made” we include risky behavior by women, too!
60
That many of these terms are used interchangeably is exemplified by this definition of business
continuity planning (BCP) by Rice and Caniato: “BCP means developing plans to be resilient – that is, to be
prepared to respond to and restore operations after an unexpected, major disruption occurs” (Rice &
Caniato, 2003)
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necessary systems perspective forces the individual company and its management to
adopt both a company perspective and a supply chain perspective, simultaneously
(Paulsson, 2005). Christian Verstraete defines ‘operational’ risks as internal to the
supply chain and which can be addressed through appropriate operational adjustments,
while ‘structural’ risks are more environmental (exogenous) in nature and requires
companies to change the way they operate. The latter type of risk requires a supply
chain or network to be flexible enough to transform itself (Verstraete, 2008). What is
particularly interesting about Verstraete’s article is the impact various risks might have
on the company’s competitors or competing supply chains. Not only do managers need
to worry about operational and structural risks in their own supply chains, but also in
competing supply chains, as an integral part of the greater business environment and
industry “system”.
SupplyChainDigest’s tri-annual listing of “The Top Supply Chain Disasters of All
Time” (Gilmore, 2009) provides a glimpse of the severity of operational risks. Of the
sixteen costly episodes listed, at least eleven of them pertain to disastrous transitions
and implementations of new and ambitious operating processes, such as production or
warehouse management systems. In fact, of the sixteen top-ranked disasters, none of
them are external disruptions like natural or man-made disasters. Two take-aways from
this exposé may be that 1) “change is risky”, and 2) “the enemy is within (the supply
chain)”.
Monroe et al. wrote a whole article on cataloguing the various sources of risks
recognized in the supply chain literature between 2003 and 2010 (Monroe, Teets, &
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Martin, 2012). They looked for general categories of risk sources, finding that the five
most mentioned were supply risk, demand risk, process risk, environmental risk and
control/business controls. All-in-all they spotted 39 different sources covered in 20
journal articles, and proceeded to condense these into three general categories:
demand-side risk, internal processes risk, and supply-side risks. Each of these was given
sub-categories of physical, informational, financial and relational. Taking a less abstract
tack, a dissertation written by Oehmen identified four specific risk scenarios when
sourcing in China: ‘total cost too high’, ‘insufficient delivery reliability’, ‘insufficient
quality’, and ‘damage to reputation’ (Oehmen, 2009).
Based on the structured interview technique61, Oke & Gopalakrishnan performed
a study of supply chain disruptions in the retail sector (Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 2009).
They asked many of the same questions we did in our electronic survey: the company’s
background, the type of risks the company and entire supply chain have been exposed
to or perceived as potential risks, the impacts of those risks, and the mitigation
strategies that are in place to cope with them. They were also concerned with placing
the identified risks into a likelihood versus impact matrix, thus being able to separate
the risks into four distinct corners or classes: low likelihood/low impact, low
likelihood/high impact, high likelihood/low impact and high likelihood/high impact. As it
turned out, many of the identified risks clustered in the middle as medium
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Basically asking the same questions, the same way and at the same time in the interviewing
process (Shank, 2006)
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likelihood/medium impact62, while the ones found to be low likelihood and high impact
were man-made disasters and natural disasters. The high likelihood but low impact risks
(“irritants”) were climate and delays due to the Chinese New-Year’s celebration. These
risks are predictable, annual occurrences that can easily be prepared for.
Correctly identifying plausible risks is a challenging process. Each supply chain
has different attributes and exposures. The increased complexity of global supply chains
relying on outsourcing and offshoring has added new levels of risk and interdependence
that are sometimes not evident until disaster strikes, exposing hidden vulnerabilities
and leading to large economic losses (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007; Kleindorfer & Van
Wassenhove, 2004). Producing lists of plausible risks involve internal and external
sources of information, both tapping into the institutional memory bank (what
colleagues and supply chain partners remember) and using a variety of published
sources such as annual reports by insurance underwriters, government agencies,
industry associations and consulting firms specializing in risk tracking and analysis.
With respect to sourcing and operating risks in India, there exists quite a bit of
statistical and anecdotal material. Table 9 contains recent rankings by eight global
organizations comparing the BRIC-M countries.63 These are all large, developing
production economies that can be reasonably compared to India. Table 9 shows that
India has an average composite score on par with Russia. Brazil, China and Mexico have
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Examples of these mid-range supply risks were loss of key supplier, gas prices, regulations and socioeconomic factors.
63
Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico.
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Table 9: VARIOUS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INDICES
BRIC-M
average

Source:

2011

183

95

73

143

75

100

97

64

International
Finance
Corporation
(World Bank)
Heritage
Foundation
World
Economic
Forum
Legatum
Institute

Doing
Business

2012

183

132

126

120

91

53

104

65

Economic
Freedom
Global
Competitiven
ess Report
Legatum
Prosperity
Index
Human
Development
Index

2012

179

123

99

144

138

54

112

66

2012

144

59

48

67

29

53

51

67

2011

110

91

42

59

52

53

59

68

2011

187

134

84

66

101

57

88

69

Global
Integrity
Property
Rights
Alliance

Integrity
Indicators
International
Property
Rights Index

2011

100

70

76

71

64

68

70

70

2012

130

62

62

97

57

76

71

71

Average
score

The lower the
better

95.8

76.3

95.9

75.9

64.3

81.6

United
Nations

Mexico

Corruption
Perceptions

China

Countries
ranked

Transparency
International

Russia

Year

Brazil

Index

INDIA

Organization

better composite scores. India is the worst scoring country of the five in the categories
“Doing Business”, “Prosperity”, and “Human Development”. It scores only better than
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http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india
66
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/india
67
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/CSI/2012-13/GCR_Rankings_2012-13.pdf
68
http://www.prosperity.com/country.aspx?id=IN
69
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
70
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/India/2011
71
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ranking
65
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average in the “Corruption Perceptions” and “International Property Rights” indexes.
Apparently India still has a macro and socio-economic environment that breeds many of
the risks faced by companies operating there. It is still a poor country (see Table 10),
with problems such as corruption, crime and insufficient infrastructure. Sourcing from
this country will be made attractive only if the many potential risks are more than
compensated for by cheaper production, access to resources (labor and raw materials),
proximity to the markets, and an expectation that conditions will keep improving.

Table 10: THE ECONOMIST’S EXPECTED GDP PER CAPITA IN 2013, SELECT ASIAN
COUNTRIES
Country
Population
Bangladesh
171 million
China
1.34 billion
India
1.24 billion
Indonesia
251 million
Malaysia
29 million
Pakistan
184 million
Philippines
106 million
Sri Lanka
21 million
Thailand
69 million
Vietnam
90 million
Source: (Economist, 2012b)

GDP per capita
$695
$6,890
$1,770
$3,890
$11,580
$1,410
$2,650
$3,150
$5,800
$1,800

The South Asian cluster of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has many
shared socio-economic and climatic impediments. The region is prone to natural
calamities such as typhoons, heavy monsoon flooding and earthquakes, and a poor and
dense population causes social ills and deprives the governments the revenues they
need to build infrastructure. Other problems include ethnic and religious animosities
that frequently bubble up in the form of terrorist actions, riots and armed attacks.
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The Heritage Foundation in its “2012 Index of Economic Freedom” points out
that despite India’s economic growth, the foundations for long-term economic
development remain fragile because of:






An absence of an effectively functioning legal framework, where property rights
are not protected effectively
Serious corruption, especially in government procurement and defense contracts
Government meddling in economic activity
Restrictive and burdensome regulatory environment, where licensing takes too
long and trade barriers are erected
Inflationary pressure (Heritage_Foundation, 2012)
The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, in their “Doing

Business 2012” report, give India very low scores in three categories, relative to 183
nations ranked (World_Bank, 2012):




Starting a business (166 out of 183)
Dealing with construction permits (181 out of 183)
Enforcing contracts (182 out of 183)







India also scores worse than the average in:
Getting electricity (98 out of 183)
Resolving insolvency (128)
Registering property (97)
Paying taxes (147)
Trading across borders (109)
Doing Business measured the time and steps needed to legally build a

warehouse in Mumbai, and found that it requires 34 procedures, takes 227 days and
costs 16 times more than the average income per capita. The “Enforcing contracts” item
was based on the set of procedural steps and time required to resolve a standardized
commercial dispute through the courts. The main reason India placed second worst in
the world on this measure was that filing such a case requires 46 procedures, an
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average of almost four years and an expense of 40% of the claim.72 Under “Trading
across borders”, obstacles such as excessive document requirements, burdensome
customs procedures, inefficient port operations and inadequate infrastructure were
listed as factors leading to extra costs and delays for exporters and importers. However,
the time it takes to import or export has come down considerably over the past six
years.
Natural Disasters
Appendix B contains tables, figures and maps showing frequencies and examples
of the most typical natural disasters occurring in South Asia. Considering earthquakes
and flooding, it turns out that India is not severely affected by the former. Almost every
country in the vicinity tends to have more frequent and severe quakes than India.
Flooding is a greater concern for India. Flash floods, as well as widespread and
destructive flooding from monsoonal rains (June – September) are a clear threat to
people and property (Central_Intelligence_Agency, 2012). There are two types of
flooding: flooding induced by excessive rainfall, and flooding as a result of rising sealevels. A 2008 analysis sponsored by the OECD predicted that India’s port cities will be
some of the worst affected by rising sea-levels by the year 2070. A “perfect storm”
combination of population and economic growth, global sea-level rise, more intense
storms and higher storm surges, and human-induced subsidence will cause severe salt
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Another example of a slow court system was reported by Global Integrity in its “India Notebook 2011”:
In June of 2010, a court in Bhopal sentenced each of eight Indians to two years in jail for death by
negligence in the Union Carbide gas plant leak, where thousands of people died. This verdict came down
26 years after the disaster (Global_Integrity, 2012).
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water flooding in coastal areas and port cities in India, including Chennai, Kolkata and
Mumbai (Nicholls, 2008). Swiss Re identified India as one of the top ten countries in the
world for flooding risk (Swiss-Re, 2012). Major flooding is most prevalent in the northern
states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Assam, the
eastern states of West Bengal, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, and the southern state of
Kerala (MapsOfIndia.com, 2012).
Lonely Planet writes that, generally speaking, India’s climate is defined by three
seasons – the hot, the wet (monsoon) and the cool (S. Singh & Bindloss, 2007). The hot
season (April – June) can bring with it periods of damaging draught, with sustained
temperatures above 100 degrees F. In the middle of the winter, temperatures can get
very cold in the areas north of Delhi, and people freeze to death every year. Destructive
and deadly cyclones tend to form between April and December, with peaks in May and
November. An average of four to six major cyclones takes place in the North Indian
Ocean every year.
India’s worst natural disaster since the year 1900 in terms of casualties was an
epidemic in 1920 that claimed 2 million lives. Droughts in 1942 and 1965 claimed
approximately 1.5 million lives each. The natural disasters that affected the most people
were droughts in May of 1987 and July of 2002, affecting more than 300 million people
each event. The costliest event was a flood in July of 1993 that caused damages
estimated at $7 billion.73
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It is amazing how “inexpensive” disastrous events are in India in comparison with disasters of
similar severity in the developed world. The starkest example is perhaps the 2004 tsunami, which claimed
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Compared to China and the United States, India cannot be characterized as
particularly disaster-prone, although its preponderance of man-made disasters seems
high (CIA, 2012; Swiss-Re, 2012):
Table 11: INDIAN DISASTERS VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE U.S. (% share of world totals)
Description
India % of global
China % of global
USA % of global
Natural disasters
5.1%
10.3%
20.0%
Man-made disasters
8.7%
6.0%
2.0%
Population
17.0%
19.2%
4.5%
Land area
2.0%
6.4%
6.5%
GDP, nominal
2.6%
10.4%
21.4%
Exports
1.7%
10.6%
8.3%

In 2012, the British consultancy Maplecroft published an Asian Natural Hazards
Risk map that depicted the economic exposure of natural disasters. The map, which was
compiled in cooperation with the UN, identifies Japan, China and Taiwan as having the
highest economic exposure to natural hazards in absolute terms. India did not show
areas of high or extreme risk on this map, except in the far north, where there is high
risk of earthquakes (Maplecroft, 2012b).
Man-made Disasters
Another major source of disruptions is man-made (human induced) disasters, or
“technological disasters” as EM-DAT labels them (EM-DAT, 2012). As Appendix C shows
in more detail, these consist of industrial accidents such as chemical spills, structure
collapses, explosions, fires, gas leaks and poisonings, in addition to a variety of

16,000 lives on the Indian east coast, but had damages assessed at only a little more than a billion dollars.
The 2011 tsunami that hit Japan claimed about 20,000 lives and cost more than $210 billion, the highest
global damage estimate ever (Asian_Disaster_Reduction_Center, 2012). The reasons Indian disasters
might seem financially cheap are a combination of cheap construction and low casualty insurance
coverage.
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transportation accidents. Between the years 1900 and 2012, 658 such technological
disasters caused the deaths of more than 32,000 people. The worst man-made disaster
was the gas leak from Union Carbide’s plant in Bhopal on December 3, 1984. An
estimated 2,500 people perished, and 300,000 were affected. On August 11, 1979, the
town of Morvi in Gujarat was flooded by a broken dam, killing 1,335 people and
affecting 150,000 others. Poor quality infrastructure and high population density can be
a deadly mixture. Major disasters are now being tracked closely by a variety of
organizations, whether insurance underwriters or international aid agencies.
There is little evidence to support the contention that catastrophic events are
becoming more frequent. The annual number of reported disasters has shown a
downward trend since the year 2000 (Guha-Sapir, Vos, Below, & Ponserre, 2012)74.
With increasing development, there is, however, a trend that the economic damage is
getting higher75. L. Coleman writes, “the probability of any event impacting on people
and assets has risen significantly because of the doubling of the world’s population since
about 1970, and a trend to locate assets – often of high value – in more hazardous areas
such as coastlines” (Coleman, 2006). Wagner and Bode point out that “the vulnerability
of supply chains to disturbance or disruption has increased” (S. Wagner & C. Bode,
2006), because of a combination of factors such as more single and global sourcing.
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Official statistics show, however, that there was a steady increase in reported disasters during
the 25-year period from 1975 to 2000.
75
The three most expensive disasters (Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and the 2011 Japanese
tsunami) have all happened within the past seven years. Note that they happened in the developed
countries of the U.S. and Japan.
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Asia is the most disaster prone continent. From 2001-2010, 40% of the natural
disasters happened there, 90% of the victims (fatalities or affected) lived there, and 38%
of the monetary damages happened there. Hydrological disasters (floods) usually have
many victims, and this is a major reason for the high proportion in Asia. Flooding
combined with population density76 is a dangerous combination. About half of the
reported natural disasters that happened in Asia between 2001 and 2010 were
hydrological (floods and mudslides).
Terrorism
Supply chains are often susceptible to property damage and interruptions
caused by terrorist attacks, either directly because assets have been destroyed, or
indirectly through transportation delays and security measures in the aftermaths of
events. Although the timing and severity of global terrorist attacks are quite random,
the locations of such attacks are mostly concentrated to a few areas. Unfortunately,
India is one of those areas. Out of 158 nations, the publisher of the Global Terrorism
Index - the Institute for Economics and Peace (IFEC) - ranked India as the country that
was the fourth most impacted by terrorism in 2011. This was behind Iraq, Pakistan and
Afghanistan (Humanity, 2013; IFEP, 2012).
So while many Middle Eastern countries are torn apart from sectarian violence
and civil war, India has a somewhat different situation. IFEC writes that attacks on
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Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are three of the most densely populated countries in the
world. According to Wikipedia, Bangladesh has a density of 1,034 people per square kilometer, India’s is
368, and Sri Lanka’s is 345.
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Indian soil can be divided into foreign and home grown terrorism. The foreign breed has
religious (Islamic vs. Hindu) overtones and is related to the conflict with Pakistan over
Kashmir. The home grown one has to do with the Naxalite-Marxist insurgency in eastern
India. It is notable that the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is responsible for 45% of
all attacks in the country. IFEC points out that the vast majority of terrorism which
occurs in India is by politically motivated nationalists and separatists. Overpopulation
may be one underlying cause of these tensions. As noted by Mother Jones Magazine,
”India, where the dynamics of overpopulation and overconsumption are most acute,
where the lifelines between water, food, fuel, and 1.17 billion people — 17% of
humanity subsisting on less than 2.5% of the globe's land — are already stretched
dangerously thin” (Whitty, 2010). The size of India is less than a third of the United
States, but the population is almost four times higher. From a business and supply chain
standpoint, this dense population creates an abundant labor pool and promising sales
opportunities, but downsides are the risk of congestion, delays and interruptions from
terrorist attacks, riots or civil unrest.
Supply chain risk managers must be mindful of the potential interruptions from
terrorism in India. Foreign owned or export oriented companies do not seem to be
specifically targeted. Most of the attacks have been against soft targets, such as crowds
of people, often in connection with public transportation. There does not seem to be a
pervasive anti-western or anti-foreign sentiment in India, as the terrorism has mostly
been of religious or domestic nature.
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Risk managers must stay informed about what trends may affect the countries
they are operating in, such as India. For example, a recent report by the British
consultancy Maplecroft warned that India’s massive population and increasing demand
for scarce resources make it (and Bangladesh) particularly sensitive to climate change.
They recommend that “understanding climate vulnerability will help companies make
their investments more resilient to unexpected change” (Guardian_The, 2010). The
combination of high economic exposure and weak resilience make several Asian
economies, including India, vulnerable to the fallout of large natural disasters. “These
would not only include disruptions to their domestic economies, but also to the
operations and supply chains of many of the world’s largest corporations who invest in
these locations because of their significant growth opportunities” (Maplecroft, 2012a).
Risk Taxonomies and India
Based on an in-depth review of the business related risk literature, Rao and
Goldsby developed a detailed typology of supply chain risk (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). They
broke supply chain risk into five main factors, each with several sub factors as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Environmental risk (Political, Policy, Macroeconomic and Social)
Industry risk (Input market, Product market and Competitive)
Organizational risk (Agency, Credit, Liability and Operating)
Problem specific risk (Risk interrelationship, Objectives and constraints, Task
complexity)
5. Decision maker risk (Knowledge/Skill/Biases, Information seeking, Rules and
procedures, Bounded rationality)
The typology is useful for managers in their identification and assessment of
various operational risks. Companies should develop suitable typologies and
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breakdowns that fit their products and operating environments. For example, another
useful listing of supply-related risks are provided by Sodhi and Lee (they also broke
these risks into whether they needed strategic or operational decisions to be mitigated)
(M.S. Sodhi & Lee, 2007):









Mergers-and-acquisitions threat (i.e. a competitor buying a major supplier)
Acts of God and Acts of man (natural disasters, war, terrorism, sanctions)
Political risk
Capacity risk (too much or too little)
Single sourcing (relying on too few suppliers)
Intellectual property risk
Supplier delays
Inventory risk (obsolescence, space, cost)
In addition, they include these as “contextual” risks:








Environmental risk and compliance
Regulation compliance
Exchange rates
Financial risk
Systems risk (information infrastructure and networks)
Cultural differences
In comparing and ranking Chinese, Ukrainian and Brazilian suppliers, Reuven

Levary chose to separate risks into four criteria: Supplier reliability, country risk,
transportation company reliability, and reliability of the suppliers’ suppliers (Levary,
2007)77. Mahendran et al. presented a paper in 2011 where they categorized numerous
risks relevant for the Indian market. These were extracted using a case study and semi-

77

Hereafter, reliability is defined as “the ability of a system or component to perform its required
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time, or even resist failure” (Schmitt & Singh,
2012)
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structured interview of executives in the Indian pharmaceutical industry (Mahendran,
Narasimhan, Nagarajan, & S, 2011):


















A. Supply Risks:
Imports: Transport delays, customs delays, holiday delays, striking laborers
Inferior quality of supply
Non-availability of resources: raw materials, packaging materials
Natural disasters (floods, earthquakes), Monsoon season
Man-made disasters (terrorism, insurgencies, political rallies, protests)
Selection of supplier
Cost risk (increase in fuel cost, taxes, packaging materials)
B. Production risks:
Malfunction of machinery
Human risks (negligence, ignorance, labor unrest)
Wrong packaging
Power shutdown
C. Demand risks:
Forecasting errors
D. Miscellaneous risks:
Transportation risks (delays, does not reach destination, hazardous materials )
Quality risks
Storage risks
Information sharing risks
Government safety regulations

The Boston Consulting Group’s India office recently confirmed that Indian
pharmaceutical companies continue to grapple with “a plethora of local challenges”, for
instance, poor infrastructure, paucity of skilled manpower, or the policy framework
(Nandgaonkar & Sebastian, 2012). Tang notes that outsourced manufacturing makes a
supply chain more vulnerable to disruptions such as natural and man-made disasters.
He suggests that the supply network design, including supplier selection, supplier order
allocations and the structure of the supply contracts are important factors in reducing
the overall supply management risk (C. S. Tang, 2006a).
66

It is often not the damage from the disaster itself that impedes and slows down
supply chain operations. If an explosion destroys train tracks or a highway, it will have a
direct impact on that transportation route, but the indirect effects can be more severe,
such as lengthy delays and intrusive security measures. Mishaps happening within
supply chains can also have wide ranging consequences for other parts of a company’s
supply chain. In 2008, the Indian pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy was barred by the
U.S. Food & Drug Administration from shipping into the U.S. more than 30 different
drugs made at factories in India. There had been quality lapses at Ranbaxy factories and
the company lost the confidence of the main U.S. regulator. It is currently selling in the
U.S. under a consent decree which requires the company to improve manufacturing
procedures, ensure accurate product data, and undergo extra oversight and review by
an independent third party for five years (L. A. Johnson, 2012).
In Tang and Musa’s 2011 paper they separated 138 journal articles written
between 1995 and 2008 into how they catalogued risk issues. Analyzing the foci of the
articles, they conveniently organized them into a flow (material, financial and
information) versus activity (source, make and deliver) perspective. The articles they
studied contained suggested mitigation solutions (either qualitative or quantitative) for
each risk issue listed (O. Tang & Musa, 2011).
Another very comprehensive list of risk categories and their risk triggers is given
by Tummala and Schoenherr in a 2011 paper. They provide a table of ten risk categories
and dozens of affiliated risk triggers. For example, under what they label “sovereign
risks” they include regional instability, communication difficulties, government
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regulations, loss of control, and intellectual property breaches as the risk triggers
(Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). Their listing is a smorgasbord for researchers and
practitioners looking for suitable risk categories to use in their analyses and risk
management processes.
Thun and Hoenig, as well, divided supply chain risks into external and internal
risks when they surveyed German automotive executives on vulnerability. Their
conclusion was that internal supply chain risks were regarded as more likely to occur
and that such risks would have a greater impact on the supply chain (Thun & Hoenig,
2011). They identified internal and external risks as follows:




Internal: Supplier failure, Malfunction of IT system, Supplier quality problems,
Transportation failure, Delivery chain disruptions, Increasing raw materials
prices, Change in customer demand, Machine breakdowns, Technological
change.
External: Accident (e.g. fire), Strike, Terrorist attack, War, Increasing customs
duty, Import restriction, Natural disaster, Oil crisis.

Some of these risks are overlapping or compounded. Looking at Thun & Hoenig’s
dichotomy, it appears that the risk element ‘transportation failure’ could be either
internal or external. The 2010 volcanic eruptions in Iceland caused transportation
interruptions and failures, but such geophysical phenomena can hardly be regarded
“internal” risks. However, if the company’s truck breaks down, this would be an internal
risk. Looking at the underlying cause should help us in cataloguing the risks and doing
root-cause analyses. (Elkins, Handfield, Blackhurst, & Craighead, 2005). Root cause
analyses can reveal wicked problems, characterized by contradictions, ambiguities,
constraints and conflicting interests, and complex enough to defy simple solutions.
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There are many challenges in managing risks within interdependent networks (Heal,
Kearns, Kleindorfer, & Kunreuther, 2006). Viewed as systems of interacting and
interlocking networks, Helen Peck offers these reasons why supply chain risk is a wicked
problem (Peck, 2005, 2009):







Multiple stakeholders
Competing interests and value sets
No single common definitive goal
No clarity of mission
No universal solution
To understand the problem you must understand the context
Related to the internal vs. external risk debate is the perspective given by

Trkman and McCormack. They look at endogenous risk as having its source within the
supply chain and it can lead to changing relationships between the focal firm and the
suppliers. Market and technology turbulence are mentioned as the most notable
endogenous risks (Trkman & McCormack, 2009). Exogenous risks originate from outside
the supply chain. They divide these risks into discrete events such as terrorist attacks,
epidemics and workers’ strikes, and continuous risks such as inflation and price changes.
They point out that mitigation of endogenous risks involve working with the suppliers,
while exogenous risks cannot generally be reduced but be minimized through a level of
preparedness and resilience. Most contextual, exogenous risks are beyond the control
of the company or its supply chain and are less manageable than endogenous risks
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007)78.
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Ritchie and Brindley also use the terms unavoidable or systematic for exogenous risks.
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Wagner and Bode prefer to classify risks into the three major sources of
demand-side, supply-side and catastrophic (S. M. Wagner & C. Bode, 2006). (Later they
added two more classes: regulatory (including legal and bureaucratic) risks and
infrastructure risks (Wagner & Bode, 2008)). In several ways the risks associated with
the classic business processes of “source, make and deliver” are intertwined (Yuan et al.,
2012)79.
From the recent literature we also considered problems such as misaligned
incentives, moral hazards, adverse selection, lack of accountability, agency relationships
and goal congruency, and found these issues somewhat useful in preparing our
empirical survey (World_Economic_Forum, 2012a; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003; Zsidisin &
Smith, 2005). Many of Zsidisin’s papers focus on uncovering and reducing supplier risk,
suggesting proactive supply management tools to improve supplier quality and
performance and preventing interruptions (Zsidisin, Ellram, et al., 2004). The supply
risks he specifically identifies as relevant to in-bound supply are business (financial) risk,
supplier capacity constraints, quality risk, technological change risk, product design
change risk, and disasters (Zsidisin et al., 2000). Andreas Norrman points out that as
agents, suppliers often have different objectives, information and risk attitudes, causing
the classic pitfalls in agency theory of opportunism, self-interest and asymmetric
information. He recommends well-specified contracts, including risk-sharing contracts,
to prevent this and promote more cooperative, long-term and trusting exchange
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The material flows of “source, make and deliver” are sometimes expressed as “supply,
conversion and distribution” (Sheffi & Rice, 2005).
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relationships (Norrman, 2008). Instead of just pushing risk onto the suppliers, risk and
gain sharing contracts are encouraged.
The following classification of risks constitutes a preliminary framework for the
survey questionnaire used in the empirical portion of this study. The risks eventually
included in the survey were a distillate of these:
Table 12: CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS AND EXAMPLES RELEVANT TO INDIA
 Examples

Internal
or
External

Controlable?

Source,
make or
deliver

Literature
source

Geophysical

 Earthquake,
tsunami
 Wind storm
 Flood
 Drought, heat &
cold waves
 Epidemics,
pandemics
 Road
 Rail
 Air
 Water
 Fire
 Explosion
 Spills, leaks
 Collapses
 Terrorist attacks
 Mass murder
 Warfare
 Riots
 Sabotage

External

No

S, M, D

(GuhaSapir et
al., 2012)

External

Some

S,M,D

(EM-DAT,
2012)

Natural disasters80

Type

Subtype

Meteorological
Hydrological
Climatological
Biological

Man-made disasters

Transportation
accidents

Industrial
accidents

Human
misdeeds

Can be
both

External
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It is easy to envision that compound, multifaceted disasters often happen. In tropical areas, a
classic domino effect may be an earthquake that sets off a tsunami that causes severe flooding that
triggers looting and riots and eventually starvation and a cholera epidemic. Later effects may be political
and fiscal crises. In the words of the World Economic Forum, “the initial event results in a cascading
disruption or failure across regions or industries” (World_Economic_Forum, 2012b). That organization
separates the risks into environmental, geopolitical, economic and technological.
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Violent crimes

Security

Property
crimes

Financial
crimes
Product crimes
Governmental
regulations

Institutional

Politics
Labor
regulations
Court system
Transportation






























Infrastructure


Utilities




Communications




Murder & assault
Kidnapping
Theft, robbery
Cargo theft
Vandalism
I.P. violations
Piracy
Blackmail
Corruption
Bribery, kickbacks
Contamination
Counterfeiting
Restrictions
Licenses &
permits
Red tape81
Tax laws
Customs delays82
Instability
Unpredictability
Conflicting,
confusing
Restrictive
Slow
Discriminatory
Bad roads
Slow rail
Congested
seaports
Congested
airports
Poor public
services
Insufficient
capacity
Unsatisfactory
water supply
Unstable power
supply
Internet
Telephone

Internal

Some

S,M,D

(Burges,
2011)

No

S,M

Multiple

Some

S,M,D

(World_E
conomic
_Forum,
2012a)

Internal

Internal

Internal
Can be
both

External
Can be
both
Can be
both
Can be
both

Can be
both

Internal

81

“A bureaucracy known for delays, dithering and lack of accountability” in the words of The
Washington Post (Lakshmi, 2010)
82
According to APCAC, Customs is still the primary chokepoint for supply chains (APCAC, 2011)
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 Equipment
failure
 Contamination,
adulteration83
 Capacity
shortages
 Quality problems
 Facility problems
Logistics
 I.T. problems
 Transportation
delays
 Transport
damage
 Storage
problems84
Education,
 Skills
training
 Language
Quality
 Productivity
 Poor work ethic
 Absenteeism
 High labor
turnover
Cultural
 Misunderstandings
 Miscommunication
Macro Inflation
economic
 High interest
rates
 Unstable
exchange rates
 Banking system
 Bankrupt
Microeconomic
suppliers
 Access to
financing

Financial

Human resource

Operational

Manufacturing

Internal

Yes

S,M,D

Multiple

Yes

M

(Kumar &
Sethi,
2005)

External

No

S,M

Multiple

Internal

Some

Internal

Internal
Internal

Internal
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The 2013 European horse meat scandal is bound to become a classic SCRM story (Wise, 2013)
The country’s inefficient cold chain network results in spoilage of almost 40% of its total
agricultural production (Subin, 2011), while 7% to 15% of wheat and rice stocks are lost each year largely
due to poor pick up and distribution by the government run Food Corporation of India, FCI (Sen, 2012).
84
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3. Assessment
Risk assessment (estimating the likelihood of occurrence and the possible
impact) aims at evaluating and understanding each risk in detail for its relevancy (Kern
et al., 2012). Conventionally, the assessment phase of risk management involves
comparing the probability of a given negative event to the impact such an event may
have on the organization. The main purpose of such a binary comparison is to help
managers identify the risks factors that may need more attention and resources to
mitigate. Risks with both a high probability of occurrence and a high potential impact on
the firm are obviously not desirable, and some sort of management action will be
necessary to avoid serious disruptions or catastrophes. As stated by Sheffi and
Blackhurst et al., the impact of disruptions on a system (i.e. an organization) varies
depending on the level of resiliency within the supply chain (Blackhurst, Dunn, &
Craighead, 2011; Sheffi, 2005). Supply chain resilience is the firm’s ability to recover
from disruptive events (Rice & Caniato, 2003)85. A firm’s resiliency enhancers are
defined as attributes that increase the ability to quickly and efficiently recover from a
disruptive event (Blackhurst et al., 2011). These attributes are the resources and
capabilities that the firm can muster to prevent and recover from unexpected
disruptions. Jüttner and Maklan found that the four capabilities of flexibility, velocity,
visibility and collaboration are the most frequently mentioned in the literature (Jüttner
& Maklan, 2011). Blackhurst et al. use systems theory to regard firms or supply chains
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Christopher and Peck define resilience as “the ability of a system to return to its original state
or move to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004)
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that dynamically interact with their environments, and a resource-based view to study
how firms use a variety of their resources to enhance their defenses against disruptions
and maintain a desirable resilience for quick recovery. Their research looked at
resilience enhancers, such as the company’s many resources, vis-à-vis resiliency
reducers, which mostly came about as a result of the supply chain’s construction and
operating environment (e.g. complexity, volatilities, constraints, or regulations).
According to this, the key to sustained success is to find an optimal (or at least a
dynamic86) way to activate and mobilize the firm’s resources to neutralize or reduce the
detrimental elements inherent in the supply chain.
Risk assessment is the third phase of a structured risk management process. In a
2005 empirical study focusing on supply risk, Blackhurst et al. found that executives felt
they needed a tool for quantitative assessment applied to the supply chain that could
identify high probability “nodes” for disruptions. This would possibly give them the tools
needed for disruption discovery, recovery and eventual supply chain redesign
(Blackhurst et al., 2005). The executives were looking for models (“dynamic risk index
tools”87) that could provide early warning signs of potential or increasing supply risks.
Through a thorough literature search, Vanany et al. found that a variety of assessment
approaches were used, including brainstorming, process mapping, risk impact analysis,
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Blackhurst et al. state rather curtly that “the optimization model is no longer valid – it is a
brittle model. Therefore, dynamic supply-chain models are needed.” (Blackhurst, Craighead, Elkins, &
Handfield, 2005)
87
Such an index could contain elements such as location, global calendar, strike negotiations,
volume and capacity, weather patterns, supplier health measures, etc.
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scenario planning and a method called FMEA (failure mode and effect analysis) (Vanany
et al., 2009).
Assessing probabilities becomes a process of weighing statistical likelihood
against subjective, experience based “guesstimates”. Unless the estimation of
probability is a mathematical absolute (like rolling a fair dice, where by necessity the
long term occurrence of any number is one sixth), any assignment of probability is a
subjective process. The estimator’s thinking is influenced by perception, mood,
experience, information access and quality, traditional methodology, and recent events.
Statistically we may find that India experiences an average of four or five deadly
terrorist attacks every year, providing an analyst with a certain indication of probability
for that type of a risk. However, unless you are a passenger on the train system or live
in a northwestern state, the impact of such an attack may be minimal, especially on the
typical supply chain. The difficulty is to assign probabilities to the risk factors identified,
so as to gauge the possible impact. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that global
sourcing often causes the firm to unwittingly be subjected to a greater risk for natural
disasters, lower safety standards and less reliable legal systems, among other risks
(Bosman, 2006). The more control and/or visibility the analyst has over the global supply
chain, the easier it becomes to do the research and assign more realistic disruption
probabilities and impact assessments. Having good information and understanding risks
in quantifiable terms provide a roadmap that is crucial for risk management and
continuity planning (Braun, 2012).
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While suggesting five generic risk management strategies (accept, avoid, reduce,
transfer or share), Andersson and Norrman look at sourcing risks through four
definitional steps: scenario, cause, effect and business impact (Andersson & Norrman,
2004). Looking at the chain of cause and effect is useful in understanding risks and their
sources, although to operationalize this it will be necessary to add some measure of
probability of occurrence. According to Ellis et al., behavioral research suggests that
perceptual rather than objective assessments of risk tend to guide decision-making
behavior (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 2010; March & Shapira, 1987). Ellis et al. define
overall supply disruption risk as an individual’s perception of the total potential loss
associated with the disruption of supply of a particular purchased item from a particular
supplier. This appears to be a very pragmatic way of handling the risk analysis: assess
each product (or at least product category) by each supplier. Various products will face
different risk scenarios, as will the various suppliers, depending on their operating
practices, experience, size, financial situation and geographic location. Ellis et al. define
probability of supply disruption as the perceived (judged) likelihood that a supply
disruption will occur and the magnitude of supply disruption as the perception of the
severity of losses that may result from a disruption. The manager judging probabilities
and severities is influenced by several factors, including the person’s position, age,
education, expertise, experience, cognitive ability, mood, the immediacy of disruption,
risk preference, problem framing, and prior success (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).
Giunipero et al. add two more situational factors that determine and influence
the company’s level of investment in risk management systems: degree of product
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technology, and need for security (Giunipero & Eltantawy, 2004). They state that the
distinguishing characteristics of each purchasing situation are expected to have a
differential impact on the need for risk management. The degree of product technology
relates to the item characteristics, such as overall product complexity. High tech
markets require more extensive risk management than low-tech markets with a slower
pace of technological change. Up to this point in time India has been a source of
relatively low tech products (at least merchandise, maybe not services). Under this
theory an increased technological sophistication will compound the overall risk from
producing there. For India, the key to capturing more technological manufacturing
might be to work to reduce the other major risk factors that straddle the country. As for
the need for security, Giunipero and Eltantawy point to products with high security
requirements, such as high tech products, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and weapons
systems. China has had problems with the security of its food supply chain, while India
has recent, published examples of problems with pharmaceutical products (L. A.
Johnson, 2012).
The severity or impact on a company can consist of anything from a short-term
inconvenience to apocalyptic, “Black Swan” events that put the company under.
Frequent, high probability, low impact disruptions can be dealt with through good
management practices, while the scarier disruptions are the ones that have relatively
low probabilities but high and devastating impacts should they happen, and made worse
if the company is unprepared. Kouvelis et al. suggest that “normal business risks” can be
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dealt with by possessing robustness88, while disruption risks require resilience (Kouvelis
et al., 2012). Risks pose threats to the company’s bottom lines (in a triple bottom line
sense), as well as brand reputation and stock value. In a 2012 report, IHS divided
supplier risks into two categories, resting risks and reactive risks. They claimed that the
resting risks are of the more predictable business-as-usual kind and can be analyzed:
supplier bankruptcy, lack of supply due to high demand, cost risks, regulatory
compliance, obsolescence, and counterfeit parts. The reactive risks cannot be predicted
in advance and include unforeseen economic conditions, natural disasters like floods
and earthquakes, and product recalls (IHS, 2012). Such a division between resting risks
and reactive risks may make sense, although the examples IHS provided did not seem
overly convincing: In India, annual floods are probably more predictable than supplier
bankruptcies, for example. In the same report, IHS makes the sensible observation that
it is seldom one single incident or failure that causes a catastrophe, but a confluence of
events that in combination leads to significant problems. Events often have a domino
effect with unpredictable and perhaps exponential consequences.
Kleindorfer and Saad highlight a few statistically based methodologies used in
the industry to aid in the “SAM” process (Specifying, Assessing and Mitigating risks).
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). There are many similar models offered in the literature, all
stressing the importance of a systematic and quantitative approach to risk assessment
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Robust supply chain strategies 1) enable the company to manage supply and demand
fluctuations efficiently in the typical supply chain management context, and 2) help the company sustain
operations at some basic level during a disruption and restore operations soon after (Manmohan S. Sodhi
& Tang, 2012)
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(Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009). Some authors advocate combining the frequency data
with expert judgments, scenario planning and subjective probabilities. Some infrequent
but high impact disasters seem to follow a power law distribution89, while chaos theory
may also be useful in dispelling notions of linearity, predictability and controllability of
events (M. Mitchell, 2009). Chaotic systems are sensitive to the initial or starting
conditions, so while it may be difficult to predict where a disaster will go as soon as it is
unleashed, it may be useful to study what conditions might trigger such cascading
events. As Knemeyer et al. point out, while a supply chain manager does not know
exactly when and where a tornado will strike, he can find out information about what
conditions typically lead to their occurrence, when and where they are most frequent,
and their likely paths. Because a chaotic system is not totally random, awareness of the
initial conditions help in confining a “chaotic” string of events to within a certain range.
For example, heavy Indian monsoon rains in the month of June will inevitably lead to
flooding somewhere at some near point in time. The “somewhere” portion can be
pinpointed fairly accurately by using observed data from previous seasons.
The consequences of certain major disruptions could be severe. Empirical
research by Hendricks and Singhal and published over several articles demonstrated
how major supply chain disruptions negatively affected corporate performance
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2012; Hendricks, Singhal, & Zhang, 2009).
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Instead of a normal or poisson distribution, a power law follows an exponentially declining
path (practically a straight line on a log-log plot), implying a much higher probability of an extreme event
happening than if a normal bell shaped distribution was used as a guide (Watts, 2003). Occasional huge
failures are more likely to happen than one might think (Banker, 2009).
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Publicly announced supply chain disruptions had an immediate negative effect on share
prices (about a 7% drop), but the long term (two years following the announcement)
damage to shareholder value was much worse, with an almost 40% drop90. They also
were able to show that firms that suffered from disruptions experienced a lower growth
rate in revenues, more variable returns, higher total costs, and were regarded as riskier
by the investors, thus requiring higher returns. Hendricks and Singhal separated what
they labeled “glitches” from supply chain disruptions, where they found that even
glitches caused an abnormal decrease in shareholder value of more than 10%.
Compared to the more dramatic external disruptions such as natural disasters, glitches
were defined as arising from within the supply chain, and could be a symptom of
unreliable and unresponsive supply chains. From production or shipment delays,
glitches91 caused mismatches between supply and demand, and were met with
punishment by the financial markets.
Pyke and Tang describe the many and substantial costs incurred in connection
with a product recall, both during the recall process and in the aftermath of it (Pyke &
Tang, 2010). They cite Intel Corporation’s loss of $500 million from a 1993 recall of 5.3
million Pentium microprocessors with calculation flaws. Problems with lead paint in
products sourced in China prompted toy maker Mattel to recall 967,000 toys, losing two
Christmas seasons and experiencing a 50% decline in its stock price from 2007 to 2009
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This was adjusted compared to the market, so that an abnormal return is the difference
between the return on a stock and the return on an appropriate benchmark (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005b)
91
Examples of these internal glitches were inaccurate forecasts, poor planning, parts shortages,
quality problems, production problems, equipment breakdowns, capacity shortfalls, and operational
constraints (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003)
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(Dunn, 2011)92. After a series of problems that plagued its global operations over the
last three years93, Toyota announced in December of 2012 that it was recalling 7.43
million cars worldwide (NBC, 2012). This particular recall was related to a potentially
defective power window switch which could cause fires. Although this is as much a
manufacturing problem as a supply chain problem, the supply chain will be suffering
mightily from all the costly activities in connection with the recall processing and
repairs. In addition to bad PR possibly causing loss of market share, Toyota executives
had to testify in front of the U.S. Congress in 2010, a $17.35 million fine was levied on
them at the end of 2012, and the Wall Street Journal reported in 2010 that the financial
impact of the recalls that year could cost Toyota more than $5 billion94. Based on a
survey of supply chain executives, the Aberdeen Group reported in 2008 that 58% of
companies suffered financial losses as a result of supply chain disruptions (Sadlovska,
Spinks, & Shecterle, 2008). One company surveyed in a 2003 study by MIT’s Center for
Transportation and Logistics estimated a $50 million to $100 million cost impact for
each day of disruption in its supply network (Rice & Caniato, 2003).
The last example in Table 13 illustrates a typical compound risk, or domino
effect. When the Indian partner was suspected of engaging in corruption to obtain
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It should be noted here that 2007 to 2009 was a period with generally big declines in the stock

markets.
93

The Economist Magazine reported that Toyota suffered through a series of major safetyrelated recalls in 2009-10. The underlying causes were lean production methods, unrealistic sales goals
and overwhelmed (often single source) suppliers. The negative impacts included negative PR, slumping
sales and market shares, and executives being forced to testify to the US Congress (The_Economist, 2010)
94
March 9, 2010:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704145904575111341893725992.html
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licenses (an internal risk), the Supreme Court arguably over-reacted by cancelling the
licenses, thereby causing the foreign investor to lose hundreds of millions of dollars.
Foreign investors obviously don’t cherish this type of uncertainty.
A classic tool in risk assessment is to use a probability versus impact matrix.
Figure 3 depicts one example that we used in a recent article on supply chain disasters
Table 13: WIDELY PUBLICIZED DISASTERS 2010 – 2012 AND THEIR IMPACT
Disaster
Underlying cause
1) Internal to the supply chain:
Operational: Multiple Toyota
Pressures to increase
auto recalls
production rates and
market share leading to
rushed production.
Operational and H.R.: E-coli
Contaminated water or
outbreak in Germany from
seeds; ideal growing
bean sprouts from an organic
condition for bacteria,
farm (Fox_News, 2011)
possibly unhygienic
practices.
2) External (environmental) risks:
Geophysical natural disaster:
Severe earthquake and
Hundreds of Japanese
tsunami off Japan’s east
factories shut down for several coast.
days or weeks (Ramsey &
Moffett, 2011)

Institutional: Cancellation of
joint venture Uninor’s mobile
licenses by India’s Supreme
Court.

The Indian partner was
involved in corruption in
connection with the award
of the licenses (arguably an
internal risk, too)

Impact
Customers hurt or killed;
several billion dollars in
financial losses.
About 30 deaths; farm shut
down; Spanish farm sector
initially suspected lost millions
of Euros, Russian import
embargo.
Besides loss of 20,000 lives
and the most expensive
natural disaster ever ($300
billion), worldwide plant
closures due to lack of
Japanese parts, especially in
the auto sector (Guha-Sapir et
al., 2012; McClory, 2012)
Telenor (the Norwegian
partner) had to write off $721
million on the joint venture;
loss of market share (Source:
Bloomberg.com)

and externalities. The disruptions or risks to be concerned about are found in the
“management zone”, while companies cannot operate for long in the “unsustainable” or
“insignificance” zones. (Udbye, 2013). The main usefulness of this two-dimensional
plotting (aka Vulnerability Map) is that risks can be easily compared.
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Vulnerability maps will vary from supply chain to supply chain, and risks may be
added or subtracted as the circumstances prescribe. The results of our survey should
enable us to imagine an aggregate and current vulnerability map for India, keeping in
mind that such a “map” will only be an average of the interpretations of risk by the
companies and managers responding to the survey.
Figure 2: THE PROBABILITY (LIKELIHOOD) VS. THE IMPACT (CONSEQUENCES) OF
DISRUPTIONS

Rather than ‘light’ and ‘severe’, Tummala and Schoenherr use four levels to
categorize the consequence severity: catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible. And
instead of ‘low’ and ‘high’, they use these risk probability categories: often, infrequent,
rare and extremely rare (Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). It is problematic to find a
smooth, ordinal scale when using words to describe degrees of anything. These authors,
did, however, provide qualitative descriptions of their scale, so that catastrophic was
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defined as a plant closure of more than a month, critical was more than a week,
marginal was decreased service levels, and negligible was no impact to service levels.
‘Often’ was defined as once per week, infrequent was once per month, rare was once a
year, and extremely rare once every ten years. In Tummala and Schoenherr’s research,
the four consequence levels and four risk probability levels were assigned index scores,
so that, for example, the catastrophic level would get a 4, while negligible was given a 1.
Similarly, on the probability scale an ‘often’ was assigned a 4, while ‘extremely rare’ was
given a 1. By multiplying the scores for the consequence and the probability, they got
what they called a “risk exposure value of risk factor”, obviously with a range of 1 to 16.
By assigning estimated monetary losses to these risks, they were able to compare them
to the risk control costs (again using an index) and suggest a tool for prioritizing control
efforts or investments.
With respect to India, the pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy that shipped out
Lipitor with glass particles was barred from selling many of its products in the U.S. This
obviously caused a substantial loss of revenue in addition to legal costs. The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration also sanctioned another Indian drug maker (Claris), and the
U.S. giant Pfizer recalled a veterinary antibiotic from its Pune-based supplier Emcure
Pharmaceuticals due to contamination (K. Singh, 2010). As India gains prominence as a
manufacturer to the world, it is likely that the public will hear more about product
recalls from there over the next few years. Greater investments and more modern
factories should help reduce the overall incidences of product quality problems. Of the
grand total of 14,076 product recalls registered with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
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Commission between 1985 and June of 2012, as many as 2,412 were for products from
China, while only 70 were for products from India95. On the surface this sounds
promising until one realizes that 70 recalls was still the third highest in Asia (after China
and Thailand), and that merchandise imports from India are still very low compared to
China.
Except for negative effects on the people and businesses directly affected by the
November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the economies of Mumbai and India were
not set back significantly after these attacks. Columbia University professor Arvind
Panagariya wrote in Forbes Magazine in the days after the attack, “the large part of the
measurable economic costs of the attacks will consist of: the cost of restoring the
damaged structures of Hotel Taj, Hotel Oberoi and Nariman House; lost income earnings
for those who lost their lives; expenditures on the care of those injured and suffering
trauma due to lost family members; and increased expenditures on anti-terrorist
measures and security precautions… A slight temporary drop in tourist activity and
foreign investment may also occur” (Panagariya, 2008).

4. Mitigation
All the activities of mapping our supply chain, identifying relevant risks, and
assessing the likelihood and impact of these risks give managers suitable information to
help them figure out what to do about disruptions before and after they happen. Risk
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Source: www.saferproducts.gov
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mitigation covers the activities of prevention and continuity management. This section
of the dissertation will focus on severe risks, including Indian risk factors and how to
prepare for and avoid the various supply chain disruptions encountered there. In
general, companies or supply chains can take steps to eliminate risks, reduce risks,
transfer risks, or decide to assume the risks (Aliahmadi, Jafari, & Amiri, 2006). There is a
fifth option, and that is to defer the risk – or at least the impact of the risk – to enable
further analysis and processing. “Kicking the can down the road” may be a justified
approach if it enables better decision making. A deferment96 strategy may work well to
avoid rash and expensive decisions, provided there is enough time.
In order to be effective, risk management strategies require participation of all
supply chain partners (Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009). Cooperation97 within the supply
chain is crucial for a coordinated approach to all the upstream and downstream
processes, including the physical, information and monetary flows. Sourcing represents
a particular challenge in this respect, where inherent disparities and competing interests
within the supply chain often result in disappointment. The interest of one supply chain
participant may not be 100% aligned with the other participants, and this divergence
leads to friction.98 Choosing suppliers solely on price may generate short term
improvements in profitability, but will often backfire in the form of inferior quality. This
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We deliberately use the word deferment here, as a possibly better word, postponement, has a
different and very specific meaning in supply chain management (i.e. delaying the completion of a
product to enable flexibility)
97
Bakshi and Kleindorfer made a case for “co-opetition” in their 2009 paper.
98
This particular wording was adopted from an article about Facebook in the New York Times,
12-19-2012.
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can be regarded a risky strategy in itself (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). Building on earlier
articles, Christopher et al. write that any sequences of activities and the control
mechanisms that support them are potential sources of risk, and they label these
“process and control” risks (Christopher et al., 2011; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Manuj &
Mentzer, 2008a). Mismatched, hapless or inappropriate management strategies and
practices would fit under this category, as would more structural problems such as lack
of visibility, lack of risk management strategies, dependencies and mistrust.
Zsidisin et al. suggest four major activities for ensuring supply continuity: 1)
Creating system awareness, 2) Preventing supply discontinuity, 3) Remediating supply
interruptions, and 4) Managing knowledge (Zsidisin, Ragatz, et al., 2004). Many authors
are discussing the merits of creating a resilient supply chain, or one that can withstand
disruptions, learn from them, and bounce back even stronger (Ball, 2012; Blackhurst et
al., 2011; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sheffi, 2005; Zsidisin
& Ritchie, 2008) The Aberdeen Group defines four foundational pillars for a resilient
supply chain: 1) visibility, 2) planning and measurement (e.g. having contingency plans),
3) sourcing and supplier management (e.g. having multiple suppliers in multiple
locations), and 4) timely execution (Ball, 2012). Resilience is something the supply chain
exhibits after an event or disruption has taken place. It can be enhanced by having
redundancies, flexibilities and agility. Prior to a possible event, it is important to have
processes in place that reduce the likelihood of being victimized by a disruption (Sheffi
& Rice, 2005). A workable definition of supply chain visibility it provided by Barratt and
Oke: “the extent to which actors within a supply chain have access to or share
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information which they consider as key or useful to their operations and which they
consider will be of mutual benefit” (Barratt & Oke, 2007). Having good visibility up and
down the supply chain means that the uncertainties and risks are lowered. The company
will save money by allowing lower buffer inventories, ordering more accurate
quantities, using more economical transportation methods, etc. A recent Ph.D.
dissertation by Hung Vu Nguyen used empirical survey results to conclude that visibility
is the critical relationship-specific capability that needs to develop for buying firms to
mitigate supplier risk proactively (Nguyen, 2011). Visibility is enhanced by promoting
and ensuring collaborative behavior within the company and within the extended supply
chain. Such collaboration and communication help break down functional silos and can
be, for example, between the internal departments of logistics and marketing, or
externally between important suppliers and the procurement department (Ellinger,
Keller, & Hansen, 2006). Visibility is primarily accomplished through information sharing,
and Lee et al. found that both inventory reduction and cost reduction are achieved
through this (Lee, So, & Tang, 2000). Moberg et al. expand on this and claim that the
sharing of information and the coordination of activities among firms in supply chains
can both reduce total logistics costs and enhance value delivered to the customer,
leading to sustainable competitive advantage for the firm (Moberg, Cutler, Gross, &
Speh, 2002). Bode et al. use the word “bridging” for these relationship building
activities, while “buffering” is the term they use for building slack resources such as
safety inventories, redundant suppliers and flexible production processes (Bode,
Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011). Bridging is quite dependent on close relationships
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and trust, so to be on the safe side, companies often engage in buffering activities as
additional assurance.
Another term often seen around the concepts of collaboration and coordination
is “integration”. According to Frankel et al., the “phenomenon of integration may be
considered supply chain management’s focal concept of interest” (Frankel et al.,
2008)99. In a 2006 empirical survey, Germain and Iyer found that to achieve better
supply chain performance through external integration, a company should start with
internal (inter-departmental) integration first (Germain & Iyer, 2006). They concluded
their research by stating that “the key for managers is to understand that integration
should be undertaken both internally and downstream”. We assume that similar
benefits will be derived from upstream integration, i.e. towards the company’s suppliers
and logistics providers. As summarized by Richey et al., barriers to successful integration
efforts include lack of trust, failure to understand the importance of supply chain
integration, fear associated with losing control, misaligned goals and objectives, poor
infrastructure systems, short-term as opposed to long-term focus, and supply chain
complexity issues (Richey Jr., Roath, Whipple, & Fawcett, 2010). For a variety of reasons,
it is likely that most of these challenges will be present in the process of establishing
successful supplier relationships in India.

99

They used a definition of integration provided in Webster’s 1966 edition: “the unified control
of a number of successive or similar economic or especially industrial processed formerly carried on
independently”.
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Two other ubiquitous terms in modern supply chain management are flexibility
and agility. Rice and Caniato stress that an important distinction between flexibility and
redundancy is that redundancy adds capacity, while flexibility entails redeploying
previously committed capacity (Rice & Caniato, 2003). Swafford et al. define supply
chain agility as the supply chain’s capability to adapt or respond in a speedy manner to a
changing marketplace environment (Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy, 2006). They regard
flexibility as being an antecedent of agility, where agility is seen as an externally focused
capability and flexibility as an internally generated competency.
Swafford et al. describe adaptability as the ability to change from one state to
another state in a timely and cost effective manner. Organizations or supply chains can
be looked upon as “agents” in complex systems, but to survive in dynamic environments
the capabilities and decision rules of the agents have to evolve over time. Learning from
experience is part of this adaptation process (Bowser & Balasubramaniam, 2009;
Sterman, 2004). Lee writes about the “Triple-A Supply Chain”, where he advocates
agility, adaptability and alignment as all being integral to sustained competitive
advantage. Alignment deals with information exchange, collaboration and the division
of labor among the customers, suppliers and service providers in the supply chain
network (Lee, 2004). Tang and Tomlin are concerned with “how much flexibility do we
need?” They use calculus to find that to reduce supply chain risks, only a certain degree
of flexibility is all it takes. Looking at various flexibility strategies, they show analytically
that there is no need to go overboard with too much flexibility and too many suppliers
(C. Tang & Tomlin, 2008).
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The 2011 paper by Christopher et al. (“Approaches to managing global sourcing
risk”) was based on fifteen case studies (in-depth semi-structured interviews) with UK
based companies, and provides four excellent high-level (generic) strategies for dealing
with typical sourcing risks in several industry sectors (Christopher et al., 2011): network
re-engineering, collaboration, agility, and a risk management culture.
Craighead et al. found that the severity of supply chain disruptions appears to be
positively related to the supply chain density, where density is a measure of the
geographic proximity of entities within a supply chain (Craighead et al., 2007). When
something happens to clusters of suppliers, there is potential for more severe
disruptions. The remedy for this would be to disperse the suppliers geographically. It
would also make sense to broaden the concept of density to include non-geographic
variables such as concentration of ownership and even foreign exchange rates. Onesidedness may provide simplicity and certain economies of scale in the short run, but
can be risky if something serious disrupts the clusters. This goes for suppliers located in
one area, transportation modes owned by the same company or goods purchased in the
same currency.
In the same article, Craighead et al. found that complexity and the severity of
supply chain disruptions also appear to be positively related. This has to do with
interdependencies among the nodes and flows of the supply chain, and how disruptions
tend to spread within the network when these nodes are tightly connected. While
simplifying the supply network may be a good mitigation strategy, the supply chain
manager ought to be mindful of too much simplification, like ending up with only one
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supplier and one transportation provider. An optimal level of supply chain complexity
would appear be found in the “sweet spot” between rigidity and “chaos”100. A third
problem highlighted in Craighead et al.’s article pertains to node criticality. If certain
nodes (e.g. suppliers or major distribution centers) are highly critical in the supply chain,
then disruptions to these would naturally have a major negative impact. A critical path
analysis will help in identifying such critical nodes, and should enable management to
take actions to reduce risky dependencies. Interventions such as substitute sources and
rerouting are typical tools to recover capability after disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007).
To be effective in the recovery efforts, communication and cooperation with the
suppliers and logistics providers are also needed. To this we must add the importance of
good internal communication and collaboration, which is especially critical in
multinational companies.
In June of 2012, Dow Chemicals presented a paper at a CSCMP conference in
Mumbai, where they listed the following examples of mitigation actions they are
applying in markets like India (Dow_Chemicals, 2012)








Change specifications to industry standard
Qualify new suppliers
If single sourced, qualify that supplier’s products which are produced in other
geographies or plants for backup
Concentrate business with suppliers who view Dow as “core”
Place more spend under contract
Utilize suppliers in “safe” zones (away from hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.)
Only do business with suppliers who have net worth over $ 10 million
100

We are dealing here with a version of what George Klir calls the reconstruction problem and
the basic simplification principle: “a sound simplification of a system should minimize the loss of relevant
information with respect to the required reduction of its complexity. …the loss of information is measured
here by the increase in uncertainty” (Klir, 2001), p.465.
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Do business with suppliers who have short lead times
Pick suppliers where Dow is small % of total capacity
In a 2005 article, Elkins et al. listed eighteen “best practices” for SCRM, based on

the authors’ own experience and interviews with supply chain executives. The eighteen
practices were tied to four key functions; 1) Strategic sourcing and advanced
procurement; 2) Supply-base management; 3) Real-time operations management; and
4) Enterprise risk management/strategic supply chain design. One important finding
from this project was that adopting SCRM practices can yield continuous improvement
of supply chain operations and help staff members gain a better understanding of the
supply chain structure and interdependencies (Elkins et al., 2005). The process itself is
useful in getting to know your supply chain. The act of qualifying suppliers is part of the
important process of supplier development, which includes efforts undertaken by the
firm to enhance the supplier’s product quality, reliability and financial performance.
Such efforts include technical assistance, direct investments into supplier operations,
paying visits to supplier plants, and training their personnel (Matook, Lasch, &
Tamaschke, 2009).
In the process of transforming a company to be able to see the big picture and
think long term, Peter Senge’s famous disciplines to create a true “learning
organization” may be valuable. In a process of training the supply chain organization to
be better informed and grasp a more global picture, the five disciplines of personal
mastery, mental models, building shared vision, team learning and adopting a systems
perspective can be productive as a starting point for instigating congruence and
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developing end-to-end visibility within the supply chain organization (Senge, 2006).
Based on a Marsh Insurance Co. survey, Enslow calls for company-wide strategic risk
management, which entails process consistency, cross-functional teams and assessment
procedures (including analytics and risk metrics) for plants, warehouses, stores,
suppliers, second-tier suppliers, and logistics and transportation providers (Enslow,
2008). Michael Hammer extends this internal process to encourage the coordination
and streamlining of intercompany processes for both cost reduction and risk mitigation
(Hammer, 2001). In 2012 the Aberdeen Group wrote the following conclusion after
surveying 128 companies about their supply chain visibility status: “It is important that a
standardized and structured system roadmap is developed to integrate these system
events and data flows as companies bring on line new capabilities and new event
tracking” (Heaney, 2012). They find that companies now look further upstream into
their supply chains to address visibility “blind spots”, and that companies also seem to
be moving towards centralized supply chain management organizations and moving to
visibility under centralized control. The Aberdeen Group makes the interesting
statement that “companies with shared, centralized, and more fully integrated
information systems tend to be more successful in their connectivity and visibility
improvement initiatives”. Based on research comparing supply chain resilience to
vulnerability and SCRM, Jüttner and Maklan suggested that centralized supply chain
planning with decentralized local capacity could be one of the overarching principles for
achieving the necessary flexibility, visibility, velocity and collaboration (Jüttner &
Maklan, 2011). In practical terms this means that a company with operations in India
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would institute a company-wide SCRM strategy, but still leave several operational
problem solving decisions to the managers on the ground. Kinder recommends making
every employee a risk manager by empowering them to proactively manage risk (Kinder,
2008).
Adding credence to this, the Boston Consulting Group’s India office writes that
“deploying risk management more broadly requires simple, foolproof, and easy-to-use
systems that make risk transparent to people at the frontline, provides them a toolkit for
risk mitigation and defines escalation thresholds” (Nandgaonkar & Sebastian, 2012). A
counterpoint to this view is provided by Swaminathan and Tomlin, who write “if you
allow the risk attitudes and planning horizons of individual managers to determine
resiliency, you cannot expect to have a consistent and coherent policy across your
organization” (Jayashankar M. Swaminathan & Tomlin, 2007). To ensure consistency
they recommend standardized risk-assessment and risk management procedures across
the organization. With respect to Indian operations, it may be beneficial to rely on a
mixture of expatriates and local management in a crisis situation. Being somewhat
ambivalent to Indian management skills, Kumar and Sethi write that “in circumstances
where bold and aggressive action needs to be undertaken fast, with full backing of the
[foreign] head office, expatriates can provide that extra edge” (Kumar & Sethi, 2005).
We believe that the nationalities of the management employees are less important than
providing proper training and internal communication. If branch operations are left to
their own devices, it is hard to know what might happen in a crisis situation. Corporate
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procedures and good training and preparation should make any disaster response more
predictable, thereby reducing the overall risk101 for the corporation.
Lavastre et al. identified and ranked 21 risk mitigation methods used by French
managers to “effectively and efficiently” minimize risk (Lavastre et al., 2012). The top
five were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Communication and information exchange
Accompanying providers/suppliers in improving their performance
Forecast accuracy
Long term continuity in relations with partners
Safety stocks (e.g. vendor-owned inventory or in-house)
The top four methods were based on close collaboration and the availability of

solid information. The old “standby”, safety stocks, was only number five on this list.
The AMR study contained in Table 14 below does not even list safety stocks among its
top ten mitigation methods. Again, closer collaboration was ranked number one.
There should be a match or at least a compromise between strategies to
alleviate supply uncertainties and adjust to demand uncertainties. The ideal scenario is
alignment between the interests of the customers and the upstream risk mitigation
methods. Lee writes about such matched strategies (Lee, 2002). Supply chain managers
also need to tailor the mitigation methods to the prevailing competitive landscape on
the supply side. For example, there are definite risks in outsourcing that creates
unilateral dependencies or exposure to supplier opportunism or complacency (Lonsdale,
1999). It takes two to tango, and collaboration must be based on mutual trust and

101

In this case, the risk of an inappropriate or wrong response to a disruption.
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shared objectives. Based on interviews with supply chain executives, Manuj and
Mentzer suggest several appropriate strategies (e.g. postponement, speculation,
hedging, control/share/transfer, security and avoidance) depending on the supply and
demand side uncertainty levels. They adopt a systems perspective by including team
composition, supply chain complexity and inter-organizational learning into this
formula, thus being mindful of the dynamics between the actors, the proper actions and
the salient supply chain conditions (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b). In addition, business
conditions change, supply chains evolve, and new risks emerge over time (Melnyk et al.,
2005). Even though risk management protocols can handle localized disruptions, some
high-profile events have such cascading and unintended consequences that they plainly
cannot be mitigated by just one organization alone, as pointed out by the Supply Chain
Risk Leadership Council (SCRLC, 2013). Adding to this, the World Economic Forum writes
that “systemic risks are created or magnified by the way supply chain systems are
configured”, making then not easily solved by individual actors (Bhatia, Lane, & Wain,
2013).
The expenses of protecting against a possible event can exceed the expected
negative impact of the disruption. It is worth spending to protect human lives, but
when it comes to potential economic losses from supply chain activities, restraint is
often in order. As Norrman and Jansson point out, “to safeguard logistics processes too
much could be both counteractive to current practice in logistics as well as too costly”
(Norrman & Jansson, 2004). The cost of prevention may exceed the cost of interruption.
Measures such as inventory buffers, longer lead times, extra suppliers and physical
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safeguards often run counter to the prevailing necessity of leaner and more agile supply
chains. Modern data harvesting and processing make collaboration, visibility and
flexibility more achievable and popular, partially replacing the need for high levels of
inventory and many suppliers. Inventory was the primary buffer against uncertainty for
decades. Pettit et al. warn against a potential state of “unbalanced resilience”, where
low vulnerabilities are fought with high capabilities, subsequently eroding the firm’s
profitability (Pettit et al., 2010). However, to assure supply chain security, such as
protection against criminal actions, there is a definite trade-off between up-front
security costs versus the potentially catastrophic costs represented by a significant
discontinuous event (Ritter et al., 2007). In global trade, there is no avoiding the extra
expenses of physical security and compliance, although determining the “optimal” level
of investment and supply chain interruption102 is always up for discussion, political
debate and budgetary constraints. In other words, some disruptions should be
prevented through regulation while others we just have to take and pay for (Shavell,
1984). In a world where we know that supply chain disruptions are not a question of if,
but when, the issue is always how much time, money and effort should be allocated to
prevention versus response (Robinson, 2012).
Using buffers such as inventory and lead time are obvious and uncomplicated
measures to assure fulfillment. For that reason, the customers and sales force usually
love inventories. In 2012 Schmitt and Singh published a paper wherein they used a

102

Interruption in terms of compliance requirements, delays for inspections and scanning,
reporting, etc.
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discrete simulation program (Arena) to show the benefits of quick responses and buffer
inventories. Indeed, they showed it was better to have the ability to quickly mobilize
small buffer quantities than waiting longer for larger quantities. This implies being
flexible and keeping moderate inventory buffers throughout the supply chain (Schmitt &
Singh, 2012). The “Theory of Constraints” supports this view of strategically placed
buffers (Goldratt, 1992). In support of keeping some inventory throughout the system,
Schmitt and Singh stated that “while minimizing inventory is an important and moneysaving endeavor, it should not be undertaken without consideration that it has a direct
bearing on increasing both demand side risk and supply chain risk”. Both Tomlin and
Sodhi & Tang have published articles applying mathematics and statistics to model and
show how both theoretical risks and inventory levels can be reduced with independence
and randomness of key variables (Manmohan S. Sodhi & Tang, 2009; Tomlin, 2006).
Regardless, as the granddaddy of risk mitigation tools, inventory will continue to have a
place in the toolbox.
Table 14 presents an interesting comparison to some of the results our own
research will uncover with respect to the most prevalent Indian supply chain
disruptions. The four surveys in the table are not focused on India.
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Table 14: HOW RECENT SURVEYS RANKED SOURCES OF DISRUPTION
Survey
“Supply Chain
Resilience
2012” by The
Business
Continuity
Institute.
International
survey of
more than
530
organizations
from over 65
countries.

McKinsey
quarterly
(2006) global
survey of
business
executives

Source and
notable finding
(Glendon, 2012)
73%
experienced at
least one
disruptive
supply chain
incident103 in the
past 12 months,
with an average
level of five
incidents.

(Enyinda et al.,
2008;
Muthukrishnan
& Shulman,
2006)
Two out of three
executives said
they face
increasing risks
to their ability to
supply their
customers with
goods and
services
effectively.

Top ranked disruptions
1. Unplanned IT or telecom
outages
2. Adverse weather
3. Outsourcer service
provision failure
4. Earthquake/tsunami104
5. Currency exchange rate
volatility105
6. Energy scarcity
7. New laws or regulations
8. Fire
9. Insolvency in the supply
chain
10. Loss of talent/skills

1. Availability of quality
labor
2. Regulatory concerns
3. Reliability of suppliers
4. Commodity shortages or
price fluctuations
5. Fluctuations in foreign
exchange rates
6. Intellectual property
theft
7. Obsolescence of product
inventory or technology
8. War, terrorism, other
geo-political concerns
9. Problems with supply
chain infrastructure

103

Consequences of
disruptions
Loss of productivity;
Increased cost of
working; Service
outcome impaired; Loss
of revenue; Customer
complaints received;
Product release delay;
Delayed cash flows;
Damage to brand
reputation & image;
Stakeholder &
shareholder concern;
Expected increase in
regulatory scrutiny;
Product recall or
withdrawal; Payment of
service credits; Fined
for non-compliance;
Share price fall
Inability to supply
customers.

In this dissertation, “incident” is synonymous with “disruption”, as well as “event”. Some
authors also use the word “glitch” (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a), although this is usually used for an
operational (internal) disruption.
104
This is unusually high because of the wide impact of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami in
March of 2011.
105
The fact that this financial problem pops up in a supply chain survey illustrates the
interconnected nature of risks and how difficult (and futile?) it is to put risks in functional silos.
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Marsh and
Risk
Insurance
Magazine
survey of 110
North
American
supply chain
risk managers

AMR study
looking at
real impact of
risks, with a
global sample
of 503
respondents.

(Enslow, 2008)
Risks perceived
as having grown
more significant,
complex and
costly since
2005, and many
firms feel
unprepared to
deal with the
elevated
exposures. Only
18% of firms had
consistent,
company-wide
processes for
SCRM.
(Kelly, 2011)
45% of firms
experienced a SC
disruption that
impacted ability
to meet demand
in the past 12
months.

10. Plant breakdowns or
mechanical failures
11. Natural disasters
1. Pricing risks (55%)
2. Risks and delays with
suppliers (50%)
3. Risks with own plants,
warehouses, stores (41%)
4. Logistics delays and
disruptions (40%)
5. Natural disasters (40%)
6. Customer-facing risks
(e.g. demand volatility)
(36%)
7. Brand reputation risk
(product recalls, fair
labor) (29%)
8. IP theft, counterfeiting,
gray market (26%)
1. Supply failure (41%)
2. Product quality failures
(29%
3. Natural disasters (29%)
4. Commodity price
volatility (27%)
5. Lower consumer
spending (23%)
6. Volatile transportation
costs (22%)
7. SC security breaches
(21%)
8. IT risks (21%)
9. Regulatory compliance
(20%)
10. Volatile labor costs (19%)
11. Intellectual property
infringement (19%)
12. Volatile energy costs
(19%)
13. Shortage in managerial
talent (17%)
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Fragmentation of risk
management
responsibilities within
the firm, poor
coordination and kneejerk reactions.

Most successful
mitigation methods:
1. Closer
collaboration
(17%)
2. Multi sourcing
(12%)
3. Vertical
integration of SC
(12%)
4. Outsourcing (10%)
5. Near-shoring
(10%)
6. Performancebased contracts
(9%)
7. Business
continuity
planning (8%)
8. Increased IT &
visibility (7%)
9. Commodity
hedges (6%)
10. Using modeling
tools (6%)
11. Third party
intelligence (4%)

5. Improving
The last step in the “MIAMI” progression (Map-Identify-Assess-MitigateImprove) is crucial to allow the company and extended supply chain to learn from their
experiences and adapt their operating procedures to the changing environments. It is
not necessary to view this as a linear or chronological process, as learning, improvement
and adaptation should be permeating the whole risk management area. As Closs and
McGarrell put it, “supply chain security is a journey, not a destination” (Closs &
McGarrell, 2004). While Lean Six Sigma has its DMAIC106 wheel, our MIAMI wheel’s
improvement step has similarities to the Six Sigma Improve and Control steps in that it
deals with improving the operational metrics and procedures, including optimization
and sensitivity analyses where practical (Martin, 2007).
Supply chain risk management often entails ”learning the hard way. A painful
and expensive ($400 million) experience with a supply chain accident made Swedish
telecommunications giant Ericsson realize the importance of proactive SCRM and taking
prompt and localized action when incidents are experienced (Norrman & Jansson,
2004).
After interviewing 20 companies, Rice and Caniato found that the survey
respondents with the most progressive security and resilience initiatives had already
suffered meaningful losses from previous disruptions. Subsequently these companies

106

DMAIC = define, measure, analyze, improve, control
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wised up and developed business continuity plans and more secure and resilient
operations (Rice & Caniato, 2003). They could no longer rely on luck.
“If you can't measure it, you can't manage it” is a quote accredited to several
people107. Tracking and monitoring should enable management to review both the
effectiveness and efficiency of the risk management efforts. There is high utility from
such monitoring and subsequent tweaking of the risk management practices for both
frequent operational glitches, and infrequent low probability, high impact disruptions.
Even though disasters play out differently each time, they represent learning
opportunities for future improvement, both with respect to warning systems,
prevention efforts and business continuity programs. The ability to learn and improve
will build greater supply chain resilience. Closs and McGarrell’s guiding thesis in a 2004
paper is that both security and supply chain efficiencies can be maximized, but to
achieve this will require changes in thinking, sustained leadership, and continual
learning (Closs & McGarrell, 2004). Having an internal way of detecting and
communicating potential hazards – a warning capability – is an important step towards
agility and the ability to not only avoid and deflect disruptions, but also recover from the
ones that the company cannot escape from.
Implicitly or explicitly, cost-benefit considerations are part of a SCRM monitoring
process. Aiming for a risk free existence is expensive and erodes the profitability of the
firm. Being better than the competitors in managing the various risks is what is needed

107

See, for example http://www.quotationspage.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=225
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for sustained profitability. Being better at risk management entails excelling at
identifying and mitigating the risks that could really cause severe damage. The
monitoring, controlling and improving processes involve the estimation of the cost
impacts (efficiencies) of the mitigation efforts. Several methods are used, including
balanced scorecards (Olson, 2012), TCO and NPV108 calculations, as well as optimizations
comparing the marginal cost of disruption to the marginal cost of mitigation. Most of
these types of calculations involve using estimates or forecasts, making them subject to
statistical errors and only as good as the assumptions and data used.
For newcomers to a country like India it will take some time to get used to the
various risk scenarios encountered there, and it will take time to figure out which
mitigation efforts are most useful and economical. It is likely that Indian companies or
foreign companies that have been there for a while will have better evolved systems for
evading and handling risks. They have adapted to the Indian business and supply chain
risk environments. As one of its aims, this dissertation attempts to check whether Indian
domicile and/or longevity in the country have any bearing on the negative impacts
experienced by supply chain disruptions, and whether there are significant differences
in the mitigation methods.

108

TCO = Total Cost of Ownership; NPV = Net Present Value
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY:
In our investigation of which sourcing and production risks are currently
encountered in India, what the operational impacts of these risks may have been, what
mitigation methods may have been deemed useful, and what the risk expectations are
for the future, we performed primary research on the ground in India. A survey
questionnaire to a targeted group of at least four thousand high level managers, incl.
supply chain professionals, was distributed109. The processes of defining risks in a supply
chain management context and of refining the MIAMI framework were useful in
extracting the right questions to ask and structuring our questionnaire. We also received
useful feedback from industry experts practicing in India, as well as the Indian diaspora
residing in Seattle.
By running a search on either India supply chain risk or Indian supply chain risk in
Google Scholar110, the top twenty111 search results produced the following works,
summarized in Table 15 and roughly in order of appearance (“relevance”).
With one exception, all of the twenty papers were conceptual articles that
mostly mentioned India as an example to illustrate a point. The paper by Sutton was
based on surveys of car manufacturers in China and India, and only six companies in
India were polled. Empirical or survey based supply chain management articles based
on Indian data are in limited supply, and even more scarce when it comes to the
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This is an estimated number, as the four supporting organizations guard their membership
information closely and were not willing to share exact numbers with us.
110
Done on January 14, 2013
111
Top twelve from each, but four of them were the same
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emerging field of SCRM. Of the over 400 articles and books we reviewed, quantitative
surveys were used only in the papers cited in Table 16. These results are in line with
Table 15: ARTICLE SEARCH RESULTS FOR “INDIA(N) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK”:
Author:
Faisal, et al.

Chopra & Sodhi
Manuj & Mentzer
Manuj & Mentzer

Swaminathan, et al.

Wu & Olson

Trkman &
McCormack

Humphrey

Giunipero &
Eltantawy
Waters

Faisal, et al.

Seuring & Müller

Title:
Supply chain risk
mitigation: modeling the
enablers
Managing Risk to Avoid
Supply-Chain Breakdown
Global supply chain risk
management
Global supply chain risk
management strategies

Modeling supply chain
dynamics: A multiagent
approach
Supply chain risk,
simulation, and vendor
selection
Supply chain risk in
turbulent environments A conceptual model for
managing supply chain
network risk
Globalization and supply
chain networks: the auto
industry in Brazil and
India
Securing the upstream
supply chain: a risk
management approach
Supply chain risk
management:
vulnerability and
resilience in logistics
Mapping supply chains
on risk and customer
sensitivity dimensions
From a literature review
to a conceptual
framework for

Type:
Conceptual

Conceptual
Conceptual
Conceptual and
qualitative study
(14 interviews in
the US)
Conceptual and
modeling (not
risk focused)
Conceptual and
simulation

Citation:
(M. N. Faisal, D. K.
Banwet, & R.
Shankar, 2006)
(Sunil Chopra &
Sodhi, 2004)
(Manuj & Mentzer,
2008a)
(Manuj & Mentzer,
2008b)

(J.M. Swaminathan,
Smith, & Sadeh,
1998)
(Wu & Olson, 2008)

Conceptual

(Trkman &
McCormack, 2009)

Case studies (not
risk focused)

(Humphrey, 2003)

Conceptual

(Giunipero &
Eltantawy, 2004)

Book

(Waters, 2011)

Conceptual,
modeling

(M. N. Faisal, D.
Banwet, & R.
Shankar, 2006)
(Seuring & Müller,
2008)

Conceptual, not
risk related
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Laeequddin, et al.

Harland, et al.
Ellram, et al.

Sutton

Faisal, et al.

Rahman

Jiang, et al.

Chopra, et al.

sustainable supply chain
management
Supply chain partners'
trust building process
through risk evaluation:
the perspectives of UAE
packaged food industry
Risk in supply networks
Understanding and
managing the services
supply chain
The Auto-component
Supply Chain in China
and India-A Benchmark
Study
Supply chain risk
management in SMEs:
analysing the barriers
Use of internet in supply
chain management: a
study of Indian
companies
An analysis of job
dissatisfaction and
turnover to reduce
global supply chain risk:
Evidence from China
The importance of
decoupling recurrent and
disruption risks in a
supply chain

Conceptual
framework and
survey in United
Arab Emirates

(Laeequddin,
Sardana, Sahay,
Waheed, & Sahay,
2009)

Conceptual, 4
case studies
Conceptual, not
risk focused

(Harland et al., 2003)

Surveyed six car
manufacturers in
India

(Sutton, 2004)

Conceptual and
model
development
Not risk related

(Faisal, Banwet, &
Shankar, 2007)

Empirical study
in China

(Jiang, Baker, &
Frazier, 2009)

Conceptual,
mathematical

(S. Chopra, Reinhardt,
& Mohan, 2007)

(Ellram, Tate, &
Billington, 2006)

(Rahman, 2004)

recent and extensive literature reviews performed by several authors (Ghadge et al.,
2011; Monroe et al., 2012; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; Singhal et al., 2011; Manmohan S.
Sodhi et al., 2012; O. Tang & Musa, 2011; Vanany et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2008).
32 papers published since 1999 describe empirical research studies pertaining to
supply chain risk management (summarized in Table 16 in chronological order). All of
these studies considered were survey (questionnaire) based. Another 30 papers
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described studies based on qualitative research techniques, such as case studies,
structured interviews and the Delphi technique.

Table 16: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STUDIES (SURVEY BASED)
Authors & Year
(Laios &
Moschuris, 1999)
(Svensson, 2002)

(Zsidisin &
Ellram, 2003)

(P. J. Singh et al.,
2005)

(Jüttner, 2005)

(Hendricks &
Singhal, 2005a,
2005b)

(Blackhurst et al.,
2005)

(Fitzgerald, 2005)

Purpose
Assess the risk of making erroneous
make or buy decisions.
Develop a set of dimensions of
vulnerability in firms’ inbound
logistics flows from their first-tier
suppliers, and the vulnerability in the
firms’ outbound logistics flows to
their first-tier customers.
Uses agency theory to assess
management behavior in response to
supply risk and the impact of
detrimental events.
Exploratory study with a view to
articulate contemporary supply chain
issues organizations in the industry
face.

Sampling frame
Senior executive with companies
in Greece. 85 respondents (28%)
Triangulation through 2 phases:
Interviews with 17 Volvo
executives and survey to
managers in the Swedish
automobile industry. 418
responses (83.2%)
U.S. purchasing professionals
associated with the Institute for
Supply Management (ISM). 261
responses (28%)
Managers from the Australian
automotive industry. 18 semistructured interviews with 28
managers, then follow-up
seminars.
Explore the state of knowledge and
Members of the UK-based
current practices of SCRM, and
Chartered Institute for Logistics
examine the business requirements
and Transport with an interest in
for assessing and managing SC risks.
SCM. 137 respondents (8%)
Investigate the long term stock price
Qualifying companies trading on
effects and equity risk effects of
U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE,
supply chain disruptions.
AMEX, and NASDAQ). The effect
of 827 disruption
announcements between 1989
and 2000.
Seeks insights into issues within
U.S. automotive supply chain
global sourcing and supply-chain
executives (case studies),
disruptions, incl. disruption
executives from various
discovery, recovery, and supply chain industries (semi-structured
redesign.
interviews), and focus groups.
Survey the low-cost country sourcing U.S. procurement and supply
strategies (incl. risk mitigation) supply chain executives who source in
management executives prioritized
low cost countries. 187
for the next 3 years (Aberdeen Group enterprises.
study)

109

(Sahay et al.,
2006; Sahay &
Mohan, 2003)

(Smyrlis, 2006)

(S. Wagner & C.
Bode, 2006;
Wagner & Bode,
2008)

(Kocabasoglu,
Prahinski, &
Klassen, 2007)
(Ferrer, Hintlian,
& Karlberg, 2007)
(Accenture)

(Sadlovska et al.,
2008)

Assessing whether Indian companies
have aligned their supply chain
objectives with their business
objectives. Found that Indian
companies carry huge inventories.
Harris Interactive survey of financial
executives on how they perceive and
address risks, including supply chain
disruptions.
Study SC characteristics as drivers of
SC vulnerability and the relationship
between these drivers and negative
impacts experienced by firms as a
result of SC disruptions. Also,
examine link between SC risk sources
and SC performance.
Assess the linkages between reverse
supply chain investments,
organizational risk propensity and
business uncertainty.
Explore whether corporations have
implemented integrated global
operations strategies and capabilities
(i.e. risk control) while taking
advantage of low-cost sourcing and
manufacturing.
An Aberdeen Group survey to assess
degree of SCRM resilience among
companies.

(Enslow, 2008)

Asking whether perception of supply
chain risk has increased, whether
financial impact has grown, and
whether firms are prepared.

(Jiang et al.,
2009)

Identify root causes of job
dissatisfaction leading to turnover
and labor-related supply chain risks
in Chinese factories.
Examines whether operational slack,
business diversification, geographic
diversification, and vertical
relatedness influence the stock
market reaction to supply chain
disruptions.
Investigates the impact of market
orientation and learning orientation,

(Hendricks et al.,
2009)

(Braunscheidel &
Suresh, 2009)
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Senior management of large
member organizations of CII and
ASSOCHAM in India. 156 valid
responses (9%)
600 financial executives from
around the world.

Top-level German executives in
logistics and supply chain
management. 760 responses
(15.4%)

Plant managers in Canadian
manufacturing companies.
126 respondents (27%)
Corporations with revenues of
$500 million or more and with
global operations. 300 phone
interviews resulted in 100 usable
responses.
Online and interview survey of
executives with 138 companies,
worldwide, but 63% in North
America.
Survey of 110 North American
risk managers.

Chinese migrant workers from
different industries and factories
in Guangzhou. 634 responses
(21.3%)
Qualifying companies trading on
U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ). The effect
of 307 disruption
announcements between 1987
and 1998.
Executives who were members of
the Institute of Supply

(Laeequddin et
al., 2009)
(Ellis et al., 2010)

(Arntzen, 2010a,
2010b) (Arntzen,
2010c) through
MIT’s CTL.

(Speier et al.,
2011)
(Bode et al.,
2011)

(Rizzon, 2011)

(Nguyen, 2011)

(Gualandris &
Kalchschmidt,
2011)
(Thun & Hoenig,
2011)

(Markmann et
al., 2011)

and three organizational practices on
firms’ SC agility for risk mitigation
and response.
Assessing whether to build trust to
reduce supply chain risk, or reduce
risk to increase supply chain trust.
Investigate the causal relationships
amongst situation, representations of
supply disruption risk, and decision
making within purchasing.
Survey business and supply chain
managers on their opinions about the
importance of risk prevention
compared to response preparedness,
frequency and importance of internal
and external risks, and whether they
have SCR managers or practices.
Investigate the security actions taken
by firms and the resulting response
to possible disruption threats.
Assessing why, how and under what
conditions firms respond to
disruptions, looking for buffering and
bridging strategies.
A.T. Kearney’s 2011 Assessment of
Excellence in Procurement to survey
sourcing and purchasing
performance, incl. risk management
(vulnerability, supply surety,
transportation network frailty,
supplier monitoring, crisis planning
and management)
Link key relationship-specific
capabilities (e.g. visibility) to
proactive supplier risk mitigation.
Assess the relationships among risk
conditions, postponement and firm
perception of supply risks.
Analyze the supply chain risk
management practices and
measuring differences between
reactive and preventative SCRM.
Identify the most relevant topics and
dimensions (changes and challenges)
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Management (ISM), mostly U.S.
218 responses (7.4%)
Senior managers in the UAE
packaged food industry. 102
respondents.
U.S. purchasing managers and
buyers of direct materials (ISM
members). 223 respondents
(7.1%)
1,461 valid responses from 70
countries, including 65 in India.

Survey of executives from the
U.S. food industry. 199 usable
responses (14%)
Survey of sr. supply chain
managers in 3,945 firms in
Germany, Austria and
Switzerland. 455 usable
responses (11.5%)
Executives from more than 200
companies worldwide, incl. more
than 20 in Australia, from a
variety of industries.

U.S. manufacturing firms
sourcing abroad. 66
respondents.
Supply chain managers in
medium-sized Italian
manufacturing companies. 54
respondents (18%)
Supply chain and logistics
managers at companies in the
German automotive industry. 67
responses.
Security experts (industry,
academia, public sector &

in SC security management until
2030.
(Vilko & Hallikas,
2011)

Illustrate the network relationships
and centrality of different actors in
SCRM.

(Kern et al.,
2012)

Assessing whether supply chain risk
identification, assessment, mitigation
and continuous improvement
activities have a positive impact on
supply chain risk performance.
Assess attitudes toward risk, tools
used to understand risk, and the
ways in which decisions are made.

(Lavastre et al.,
2012)

(Manmohan S.
Sodhi et al.,
2012)
(Heaney, 2012)

Survey supply chain management
researchers on definitional, process
and methodology gaps in the SCRM
literature.
Aberdeen Group survey of supply
chain visibility practices.

associations) from 25 countries.
80 experts participated in online
Delphi survey.
Managerial practitioners in SCM
in Finland. Structured interviews
with 27 experts, plus panel
discussion.
Senior supply chain executives of
medium to large German
manufacturing companies. 162
responses (14.1%).
General managers and logistics
and supply chain managers in 50
different French companies. 142
respondents.
Supply chain management
researchers from worldwide
attending 2009 INFORMS
meeting. 133 responses.
Surveyed 128 enterprises in
North America (64%), Europe
and Asia-Pacific.

Only two of the 32 papers in Table 16 performed any sort of empirical survey in
India (highlighted above). One, Arntzen and MIT’s global risk management practices
study, included 65 responses from India out of more than 1,400 valid responses worldwide. The other, Sahay and Mohan’s survey, was conducted more than ten years ago,
and analyzed whether Indian companies had aligned their supply chain objectives with
their business objectives. Their research was less risk oriented, although a byproduct
was a finding that Indian companies kept large physical inventories as a precaution.
In February of 2013, the Indian office of the consulting firm AT Kearney
published a report summarizing the results of interviews with nearly thirty C-level
executives and senior supply chain professionals. This useful report touched upon the
complexities and challenges of operating in India, but did not specifically address the
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many supply chain risks and their mitigation (Madhavan, Doshi, Chandra, & Pansari,
2013).
The Sample Population
India now has a large enough population of supply chain managers that a
questionnaire-based survey would be appropriate. After traveling to Mumbai at the end
of February 2013 and visiting with relevant organizations, the author received
commitments from the following trade associations and chambers to participate in this
study:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI)
The Indian Merchants’ Chamber (IMC)
The Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC)
Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) India
All India Association of Industries (AIAI)
AmCham India
World Trade Centre Mumbai
U.S. India Importers' Council (USIIC)
The first four organizations (BCCI, IMC, IACC and CSCMP), with a combined

membership of several thousand companies, eventually participated fully in the study
by sending out e-mail broadcasts to their memberships (or portions of their
memberships), containing links to the electronic questionnaire. These four organizations
have members that are involved in international trade (sourcing and producing in India),
most of whom constitute a highly relevant sampling frame for this study. We feel the
target population of managers in India working with upstream supply chain
management issues is very well represented with a sampling frame consisting of the full
or partial membership rosters of these four organizations. It was not deemed critical
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that the respondents were all supply chain managers, as acceptable and informed
answers could also be obtained from people within the organizations involved in general
management or the finance function, for example. The mailing lists of the supporting
organizations contain mostly top executives of the member companies, ensuring that
the questionnaires reached personnel with a strategic and big-picture perspective.
The e-mails sent out by the four supporting organizations contained a brief
explanation of the project followed by a link (button style) to the actual questionnaire.
In an attempt to standardize the introductory explanations, we provided the
organizations with appropriate content that they could copy and paste into their emails. The introductory comments contained no statements or claims that could
potentially bias the responses.
The four Indian trade associations sent the e-mail broadcasts out to their
members in May and June of 2013. They each sent one reminder out after a few
weeks112. We closed the survey by the middle of July, 2013.
The Survey Instrument
The electronic survey instrument (questionnaire) was administered using
Qualtrics Survey Software, to which Portland State University is a subscriber. When the
Indian managers and potential respondents clicked on the link embedded in the e-mail
from one of the trade associations mentioned above, they were automatically routed to
our questionnaire lodged on Qualtrics’ server. For added credibility, the questionnaire
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When we requested a second reminder be sent out, a couple of the associations balked.
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contained the logos of Portland State University and the supporting organization in the
top banner. We feel the overall sample design was very appropriate and effective in
reaching out to relevant professionals and practitioners dealing with supply chain
management issues in India. The responses were completely anonymous. We had no
intention or desire to track or identify individual respondents.
A full copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A to this dissertation.
The first sixteen questions established the profile of the respondent. These questions
answer some of the “MAPPING” concerns (who, what, where, when, etc.) Several
options were offered for each question.
Q1. Is your company sourcing in India or producing goods or services in India?
Q2. What is your organizational level?
Q3. What is your functional area within the company?
Q4. What is your company's general sector(s)?
Q5. In which country is your company's global headquarters located?
Q6. What is your company's ownership?
Q7. The company... [Owns and operates its own production or development facilities in
India] or [Sources from Indian companies] or [Other or none of the above]
Q8. Which businesses are your company involved with globally (incl. India)?
Q9. What are your company’s annual global sales in U.S. dollars?
Q10. What kind of activity does your company do in India?
Q11. Which categories of goods or services does your company source or produce in
India?
Q12. What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or
developing (incl. services) in India, in Indian Rupees?
Q13. How many persons does your company directly employ in India?
Q14. What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in
India is exported out of India (i.e. sold abroad)?
Q15. Where are the locations of your major Indian suppliers and/or your major Indian
production facilities (incl. services)?
Q16. For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India?
After the initial profiling questions, the respondents encountered a string of four
questions meant to measure their recent supply chain disruption experience, the impact
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of the disruptions, whether certain mitigation methods were useful, and which
disruptions they expected to experience the next three years:
1. How many times the past three years (since early 2010) was your Indian supply
chain affected by the following supply chain disruptions? (thirteen alternatives
were offered here, plus two write-in options)
“IDENTIFYING”
2. Please indicate the operational impact of the disruptions you checked in the
previous question (the choices offered were no, minor, moderate, major and
catastrophic)
“ASSESSING”
3. In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or
limiting the negative impact on your supply chain of the [disruption chosen]? (the
mitigation methods we stipulated were buffering, redundancy, flexibility,
visibility and insourcing)
“MITIGATING”
4. How frequently do you expect the following disruptions will affect your supply
chain in India over the next three years (as compared to the previous three
years)? (the same thirteen alternatives were offered here, plus two write-in
options)
“IMPROVING”
Questions 2 and 3 (impact and mitigation methods) were only asked for the
disruptions the respondents checked in question 1. In structuring this survey and
formulating the questions, the methodologies and suggestions outlined in Robert
Groves et al. (Groves et al., 2009) and the “Improving Survey Questions” book by Floyd
Fowler were found to be useful (Fowler, 1995). The questionnaire went through many
iterations and tests before we arrived at the final version.
Beginning with the disruptions discussed in the literature review and listed in
Table 12, for our survey instrument the disruptions were limited to thirteen types, as
shown in the first column of Table 17. This table also shows how the mitigation
methods were simplified based on a careful evaluation of risks reported in India and
feedback from experts and practitioners. Five categories of mitigations were included in
the survey: buffering, redundancy, flexibility, visibility/collaboration, and insource.
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Insource

Vertical
integration

Qualify, certify,
train suppliers

More visibility

More
collaboration

Postponement
(modularized)

Standardize or
simplify specs

Add flexibility

Add suppliers
or providers

Add lead time

Add inventory

Disruption:

Add capacity

Mitigation:

Add more sites

Table 17: DISRUPTION AND MITIGATION MATRIX

Flooding and
weather related
Major
Accidents
Terrorism, riots
Transportation
infrastructure
Logistics
infrastructure
Utilities
infrastructure
Property or
violent crimes
Intellectual
property crimes
Corruption or
bribery
Bureaucracy
and red tape
Labor problems
Tax system
problems
Supplier
problems
BUFFERING
Simplified to:

REDUNDANCY

FLEXIBILITY

VISIBILITY

INSOURCE

Guidelines were provided in the questionnaire regarding the five categories
presented:
Buffering:
Have safety inventories, extended lead times or excess capacity
Redundancy: Have multiple suppliers, sites or equipment
Flexibility:
Have suppliers or facilities that can quickly respond, adjust or change over
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Visibility/
collaboration: Collaborate with and get timely information from trusted suppliers,
customers and service providers
Insource:
Produce and source internally instead of relying on outside suppliers or
sources; or integrate vertically

An early version of the questionnaire was reviewed by students in a graduate
class at the Engineering & Technology Management Department of Portland State
University. They provided critical remarks and very useful feedback for improving the
questionnaire and making it less ambiguous. Travels to India in the spring of 2013 were
useful in pretesting and obtaining feedback on the survey instrument. We attended a
two-day conference of the Indian chapter of CSCMP (Council of Supply Chain
Management Professionals), and after many constructive conversations further changes
to the survey were made. About twenty of the conference delegates received draft
versions of the questionnaire to review. Also, managers with the supporting trade
associations were helpful in providing suggestions and feedback. All of these executives
were based in India and presumably had a good grasp of the operational realities there.
All-in-all, the feeling is that the questionnaire was well vetted before the final version
was sent out113.
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It was suggested by the author’s Indian contacts that there is “survey fatigue” in India, and
that attention needed to be paid to how the questionnaire was presented to potential respondents. First
of all, it should be endorsed by one of more of the organizations, and there should be a way to reward
people who completed the questionnaire with something. One of the Indian contacts (a board member of
two of the organizations) suggested using live telephone surveyors – for example, Indian college students
– to produce a higher response rate. This was an option that was considered, but eventually rejected with
the expectation that the e-mail broadcasts went out to a sufficient number of people.
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Statistical validity refers to how well the data measure what they are supposed
to measure (Triola, 2008). Using direct and unambiguous questions, we asked the
managers to self-report about the construct we are measuring (Indian supply chain risk
management, as manifested through risk factors, frequencies, impacts, remedies and
expectations). Because of the difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of obtaining objective
data on risk severities and mitigation, asking a representative sample of managers about
this is an excellent way to measure the underlying risk environment. The assumption is
that what is reported is what was experienced. The questionnaire struck a balance
between a level of detail and the time demanded of the respondents. We feel that the
questionnaire integrated the crucial areas of the construct we intended to measure, and
both construct and content validity were achieved.

119

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH
The survey structure resembled the MIAMI template we utilized and discussed in
the main body of the dissertation (it is not a perfect resemblance, but very useful as a
logical and chronological framework):


Mapping:



Identifying:



Assessing:



Mitigating:



Improving:

Developing a respondent profile, e.g. ownership, size, industry,
etc. (questions 2 - 16)
Respondents chose relevant risks and how frequently these
were encountered the past three years (a measure of disruption
probabilities) (question 17)
To measure impact, respondents indicated how seriously they
were affected by the chosen risks (question 18). The frequencies
and impacts were subsequently combined into a “severity” score
Respondents let us know which of five methods were useful in
mitigating the identified risks (question 19)
Respondents let us know which risks they expect to encounter the
next three years, and whether these would occur with greater
frequency than in the recent past (from an improving/monitoring
standpoint, this may imply that they are somewhat prepared)
(question 20)

Based on information from the four cooperating associations, we estimate the email broadcasts went out to 4-5,000 people (but possible more)114 (see footnote 109.)
119 people started the survey, but usable responses were only 43. This is a relatively
low number115, but because of the length and detail of the questionnaire, we find that
the sample still yields a rich amount of valid and high quality information. A total of
4,020 “data points” were collected, which is an average of 93.5 per respondent.
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BCCI had 4,539 members as of 3-31-2013; IACC reported “more than 2,000”, CSCMP said “almost 1,000
people”, and IMC claims more than 3,000. Only a portion of these were engaged in supply chain activities.
115
An article by Hoskisson et al. discusses various difficulties with sampling and data collection in
emerging economies, but we feel that corporate India anno 2013 is fully up to speed in terms of
communications and research sophistication. Our problem may have been the length and detail of the
self-administered questionnaire, in addition to the issue brought up in the previous footnote (Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000).
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This was an exploratory survey, so no pre-survey hypotheses were postulated.
Besides descriptive statistics, the results lent themselves to a certain amount of
statistical manipulation such as pairwise comparisons of means, ANOVA (group
comparisons) and factor analysis. There was no discernable difference between early
and late responses. Of the 43 usable responses, 22 of them submitted their responses in
the month of May, and the remaining 21 between June 3 and July 14. We ran an
independent samples t-test, where the two groups (early and late responses) were
compared with respect to equality of means and homogeneity of variances. We ran this
against the responses to the six most frequent disruptions. Table 18 shows that none of
the means or variances were significantly different at the 95% confidence level.

TABLE 18: OUTPUT FROM SPSS SHOWING NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EARLY AND LATE
RESPONSES

Frequencies of six highest
ranked disruptions:
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
F_Logistics
assumed
Equal variances
F_Utilities
assumed
Equal variances
F_RedTape
assumed
Equal variances
F_Labor
assumed
Equal variances
F_Suppliers
assumed
F_Transport

Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2Mean
Std. Error
tailed) Difference Difference

.314

.579

.038

40

.970

.018

.480

.553

.461

-.490

39

.627

-.224

.457

.000

.996

1.361

39

.181

.646

.474

.214

.646

-.584

39

.563

-.261

.447

2.235

.143 -1.253

40

.217

-.577

.461

2.310

.136

41

.737

.156

.461

.338
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Because some of the supporting organizations sent out the links to the
questionnaire later than others, it is impossible to know whether the late responders
acted upon the first e-mail, or whether they started the survey after receiving
reminders.
When tabulating the results and to obtain high enough sample sizes for
meaningful group comparisons, we decided to compress seven of the profile categories
asked in the beginning of the survey. We can call these descriptors predictor variables.
The first sixteen questions asked factual information about the respondents and the
companies. Appendix D shows a summary of the responses to the profile questions. The
two questions regarding types of business and categories of products offered up to 22
alternatives, but the responses were too scattered to provide enough observations to
perform meaningful analyses of group differences. However, seven of the other
questions provided us with answers that could sensibly be lumped into two main
groups, with the number of responses shown below in Table 19. When doing this
simplification, we tried to arrive at a fairly equal number of respondents in each group,
within reasonable bounds.
Possible co-linearity between any of the remaining predictor variables was a
concern. For any two variables very closely correlated – for example with coefficients of
0.8 or higher – it makes sense to prune one of them away. It would not add much value
to the ensuing statistical analysis and the remaining variable can serve as its “proxy”.
Using Kendall’s tau (for non-parametric data) and running a correlation matrix
with all of the eight variables, it was evident that location of the headquarters and
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ownership were closely and significantly related. The correlation coefficient was .813
and significant at the 0.01 level. We consequently decided to ignore the variable
location and let the variable ownership represent both in the subsequent analysis. None
of the remaining seven predictor variables were more closely correlated than about .48,
and we decided to retain all seven116. While working on simplifying the predictor
variables, we also ran them through a factor analysis to look for underlying components.
It was not surprising that two components were identified: 1) a cluster consisting of
sales, value of Indian sourced, number of employed, years in India, and to a lesser
extent percentage exported; and 2) a cluster consisting of location and ownership. The
former can be dubbed “size” and the latter “Indian”. They had eigenvalues of 2.24 and
2.09 respectively, for a cumulative variance explanation of 61.7%. However, we found
that the ANOVA and comparison of means gave more meaningful information.

Table 19: SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SEVEN PREDICTOR VARIABLES
1.






Question 4: What is your company’s general sector(s)?
Non-durable goods or consumables
8
Durable goods
10
Capital goods
7
Natural resources
6
Services, incl. IT
16

2.




Question 6: What is your company’s ownership?
Fully Indian
28
Fully foreign
5
Mixed, with majority Indian owned
4
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SIMPLIFIED INTO:
Goods
31
Services
16

SIMPLIFIED INTO:
Indian owned
32
Mixed, with majority
foreign owned
6

In Table 32 we added back the “Industry” question to take a closer look at the service sector.
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3.







Question 9: What are your company’s annual global sales in US dollars?
Less than $1,000,000
9
$1,000,000 - $10,000,000
14
SIMPLIFIED INTO:
$10,000,000 - $100,000,000
7
Small (< $10 mill) 23
$100,000,000 - $1,000,000,000
3
Large (> $10 mill) 17
$1,000,000,000 - $10,000,000,000
1
More than $10,000,000,000
6

This grouping compared roughly to the categorization used by the Small & Medium Enterprise
Chamber of India, which defines SME’s as companies with an annual turnover less than 25 crore, or about
US$ 4.2 million at current exchange rates.

4.







Question 12: What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or
developing in India?
Less than 10 lakhs
0
10 lakhs to 1 crore
6
SIMPLIFIED INTO:
1 crore to 10 crores
11
Low (<10 crores) 17
10 crores to 100 crores
10
High (>10 crores) 23
100 crores to 1,000 crores
6
More than 1,000 crores
7

5.








Question 13: How many persons does your company directly employ in India?
None
1
1 – 10
4
SIMPLIFIED INTO:
11 – 100
14
Few (< 100)
19
101 – 1,000
11
Many (> 100)
23
1,001 – 10,000
8
10,000 – 100,000
2
More than 100,000
2

6.







Question 14: What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in
India is exported out of India?
100%
7
75 – 99%
2
SIMPLIFIED INTO:
50 – 74%
8
High % (25% +) 24
25 – 49%
7
Low % (< 25%) 19
1 – 24%
12
0%
7

7.





Question 16: For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India?
Less than 3 years
6
SIMPLIFIED INTO:
3 – 10 years
6
Short time (<20) 20
10 – 20 years
8
Long time (>20) 22
More than 20 years
22
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In this research we are dealing with categorical variables, and in some cases
ordered (“ordinal”) categorical data.
Summary of Results

In this section we will review and discuss the findings related to:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Frequency of disruptions
Impact of disruptions
Severity of disruptions
Mitigation of disruptions
Expected disruptions

a) Frequency of Disruptions
We asked how many times the past three years the Indian supply chain had been
affected by thirteen different categories of disruptions. In addition, responders could
write in additional disruptions they may have encountered. Table 20 lists these other
disruptions. Many of them we safely reclassified to one of the existing categories, as
noted in the last column.
Table 21 lists the thirteen disruptions in the order they appeared on the
questionnaire. For most of the disruptions, the “Zero times” alternative was chosen, as
those risks were presumably not encountered the past three years. For tabulation, the
“10+ times” presents a bit of a dilemma, as the actual number could be from 10 to
infinity. For the rest of this analysis, we have chosen a very conservative approach,
where “10+” has been interpreted as 10 times.
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TABLE 20: WRITE-INS WITH RESPECT TO FREQUENCIES OF DISRUPTIONS.
OTHER DISRUPTION (verbatim)
Machine Breakdowns
Draught

REPORTED
FREQUENCY
10+ times
1-3 times

Fluctuating fuel cost.
7-9 times
Miscommunication between different logistics 4-6 times
providers (wrong deliveries since no tracking
method provided)
Qualified human resources
No frequency given
Strike due to Telangana issue in Andhra 10+ times
Pradesh State
Strikes by vendors
4-6 times
Uttarakhad flood this time.
No frequency given
Within Department Coordination
Lack of proper packaging care taken (different
materials have to be handled differently)
Rising Inflation
Strikes at ports/ IT failure at customs
Spare parts Non Availability

4-6 times
4-6 times
7-9 times
4-6 times
No frequency given

WE RECLASSIFIED IT
AS
None
Flooding & weather
related
Supplier related
Supplier related

Labor related (1-3
times)
Labor related
Supplier related
Flooding & weather
related (1-3 times)
None
None
None
Supplier related
Supplier related (1-3
times)

Table 22 ranks and summarizes the frequency information in the form of a total
number of reported occurrences of each risk, and the weighted average of each. For
example, 4.35 times is the average per respondent frequency of disruptions due to
insufficient transportation infrastructure over the past three years. To be able to
calculate sums and averages, the following logical conversions were applied (keeping in
mind the “10+” dilemma):
Zero times =
1-3 times =
4-6 times =
7-9 times =
10+ times =

0
2
5
8
10
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Table 21: FREQUENCY OF DISRUPTIONS (in the same order as in the questionnaire):
Disruption:

Valid

Missing

Zero
times

1-3
times

4-6
times

7-9
times

10 +
times

Flooding and weather related
events

40

3

14

23

2

1

0

Major accidents, incl. fires,
explosions, structural collapses,
or spills
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

40

3

25

13

2

0

0

40

3

30

8

2

0

0

Inadequate or slow
transportation infrastructure
(road, rail, ports or air)
Inadequate logistics
infrastructure (distribution,
warehousing, or cold storage)
Inadequate utilities
infrastructure (electricity, water,
sewer, telephone or internet)
Property or violent crimes
(theft, robbery, hijackings,
vandalism, computer viruses or
fraud)
Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright
violations, or hacking)
Corruption or bribery

42

1

11

10

7

4

10

41

2

14

6

10

5

6

41

2

14

8

7

4

8

40

3

31

6

1

1

1

39

4

36

2

1

0

0

41

2

21

10

6

1

3

Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions or
regulations)
Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence,
turnover, absenteeism)
Tax system (burdensome,
arbitrary, or inconsistent)
Supplier problems (quality,
reliability, timeliness, or
financial strength)
Other disruptions written in
(before redistribution)

41

2

14

10

8

3

6

42

1

12

14

3

4

9

41

2

19

14

3

4

1

43

0

13

10

6

5

9

12

31

5

1

3

1

2
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TABLE 22: RANKING, SUMMARY AND AVERAGE OF OCCURRENCES:
Disruption:

Total
reported
occurrences
187 times

Average
occurrences
(n=43)
4.35 times

180

4.19

165

3.84

163

3.79

162

3.77

144

3.35

88

2.05

Tax system (burdensome,
arbitrary, or inconsistent)
Flooding and weather related
events
Major accidents, incl. fires,
explosions, structural collapses,
or spills
Property or violent crimes (theft,
robbery, hijackings, vandalism,
computer viruses or fraud)
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

85

1.98

64

1.49

36

0.84

35

0.81

26

0.61

Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright
violations, or hacking)

9

0.21

Inadequate or slow
transportation infrastructure
(road, rail, ports or air)
Supplier problems (quality,
reliability, timeliness, or financial
strength)
Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence,
turnover, absenteeism)
Inadequate utilities
infrastructure (electricity, water,
sewer, telephone or internet)
Inadequate logistics
infrastructure (distribution,
warehousing, or cold storage)
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions or
regulations)
Corruption or bribery
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b) Impact of Disruptions:
The next step in traditional risk assessment and analysis is to estimate the
operational and financial impact of the disruptions experienced. The respondents were
asked to indicate the operational impact of the disruptions they checked on the
question about frequencies. In Table 23, the numbers of respondents in the third
column, “Missing”, are high because impact data was not asked for disruptions that
were not checked (the electronic questionnaire automatically skipped those). In
addition, some respondents who checked frequencies did not follow through by
indicating the impacts of those disruptions. However, the disruptions with the highest
frequencies (Table 21) are also the ones with the highest valid counts in Table 23.
The various impacts were given categorical scores from zero to 4, as follows:
No impact =
Minor impact =
Moderate impact =
Major impact =
Catastrophic impact =

0
1
2
3
4

Table 24 provides a ranking of the impacts, showing average impact scores and
an interpretation of these. The calculated scores show the average impact for the
respondents who provided impact data (so n varies from 1 to 25). In the table, an
average impact score of 1.91 is close to 2.0, which is equivalent to “Moderate impact”
on our scale.
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Table 23: IMPACT OF DISRUPTIONS (in the same order as in the questionnaire):

Disruption:

Valid

Missing

Impact:
No
Minor

Flooding and weather
related events

18

25

0

Major accidents, incl.
fires, explosions,
structural collapses, or
spills
Terrorism, riots or civil
unrest
Inadequate or slow
transportation
infrastructure (road, rail,
ports or air)
Inadequate logistics
infrastructure
(distribution,
warehousing, or cold
storage)
Inadequate utilities
infrastructure (electricity,
water, sewer, telephone
or internet)
Property or violent crimes
(theft, robbery, hijackings,
vandalism, computer
viruses or fraud)
Intellectual property
crimes (counterfeiting,
copyright violations, or
hacking)
Corruption or bribery

12

31

6

Bureaucracy (red tape,
unclear, inconsistent
restrictions or regulations)
Labor problems (strikes,
skills shortages,
incompetence, turnover,
absenteeism)
Tax system (burdensome,
arbitrary, or inconsistent)

Major

11

Moderate
5

2

Catastrophic
0

1

5

4

2

0

37

2

3

0

1

0

25

18

2

8

7

8

0

22

21

0

7

10

5

0

21

22

1

9

7

4

0

9

34

0

5

2

2

0

1

42

0

1

0

0

0

15

28

1

4

9

1

0

22

21

1

5

11

5

0

24

19

1

8

8

6

1

15

28

2

5

6

2

0
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Supplier problems
(quality, reliability,
timeliness, or financial
strength)
Other disruptions written
in (before redistribution)

23

20

2

7

9

5

0

13

30

0

1

4

8

0

TABLE 24: RANKING AND SUMMARY OF IMPACT SCORES
Disruption:

Average
impact

Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage)

1.91

Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions or regulations)

1.91

Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air)

1.84

Supplier problems (quality, reliability,
timeliness, or financial strength)

1.83

Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages,
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism)

1.80

Corruption or bribery

1.69

Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone or
internet)
Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions,
structural collapses, or spills
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or
inconsistent)
Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery,
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or
fraud)
Flooding and weather related events

1.67

Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

1.29

Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, or
hacking)

1.00

Interpretation of average
score

Moderate impact

1.55
1.53
1.50

Minor to moderate impact

1.45
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Minor impact

As can be seen from Table 24, the seven highest ranked impacts represented the
same disruptions as the seven highest ranked frequencies, albeit in a slightly different
order. They consist of the three infrastructure related risks, labor and supplier problems,
the bureaucracy/red tape risk, and corruption/bribery. Figure 4 shows how these cluster
on a frequency versus impact chart (“vulnerability map”). The diameter of the circles
indicates the number of responses under those risks (the bigger the circle, the more
responses were provided under the impact question). The frequency of corruption is
low enough that it falls into the “medium” risk cluster, joining the other four risks of
taxes, flooding/weather, accidents and crimes. Located in the lower left hand corner,
terrorism and intellectual property crimes are not deemed very severe to the
participants in this study.
Figure 4 shows a distinct relatively high severity cluster consisting of six risks: the
three infrastructure risks (transportation, logistics and utilities), the two risks related to
labor and supplier problems, and bureaucracy/red tape.
c) Severity of disruptions (“risk assessment score”):
In this dissertation, severity is the multiplication of two factors, the individual
frequency score multiplied by the individual impact score. The “Sum of individual
severity scores” in Table 25 is the sum of these multiplications for the respondents
where we had both frequency and impact data. The main usefulness of this information
is that it signifies how much more the companies have been affected by the top half of
the risks than the bottom half. For example, there is an enormous difference in
aggregate severity between supplier problems and intellectual property violations,
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FIGURE 3: FREQUENCY VERSUS IMPACT CHART FOR EACH DISRUPTION
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the latter of which in our sample affected only one company. The average scores are
calculated for the companies reporting both frequency and impact on any one risk (n
varies from 1 to 25). Naturally, the six top risks (shaded) are the ones we recognize from
the cluster in the upper right hand corner of Figure 4.
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Table 25: COMPOSITE SEVERITY OF DISRUPTIONS
Disruption:

Sum of
individual
severity
scores:

Supplier problems (quality, reliability, timeliness, or financial
strength)

325

Average
severity
(frequency x
impact)
score:117
14.13

Inadequate logistics infrastructure (distribution,
warehousing, or cold storage)

296

14.10

Inadequate or slow transportation infrastructure (road, rail,
ports or air)
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages, incompetence,
turnover, absenteeism)

344

13.76

324

13.50

Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent restrictions or
regulations)

254

11.55

Inadequate utilities infrastructure (electricity, water, sewer,
telephone or internet)

235

11.19

Corruption or bribery

133

8.31

Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or inconsistent)

90

6.00

Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery, hijackings,
vandalism, computer viruses or fraud)

47

5.88

Intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting, copyright
violations, or hacking)

5

5.00

Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions, structural collapses,
or spills
Flooding and weather related events

57

4.75

76

4.00

Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

21

3.00

Not surprisingly, there is a statistically significant difference between the severity
of utilities infrastructure (ranked No. 6) and corruption (No. 7). A paired samples t-test
produced a t-score of 2.77 and a significance level of 0.02 with 10 degrees of freedom.

117

The reason these scores are not equal to the product of the average frequency and average
impact scores is they were calculated with pairwise data, as well as different denominators (43 for the
frequency averages, and from 1 to 25 for the impact averages)
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The top six, as reported, are significantly more severe than the bottom seven
disruptions.
When considering the reported frequencies and impacts, we find that some
companies report more frequent and severe disruptions than others. The histogram
(density function) in Figure 5 shows a concentration of companies with severity scores
of less than 50, while some reported a variety of risks and accumulated scores of up to
about 200. Five companies which reported frequencies of particular risks did not
indicate their impacts, resulting in severity scores of zero.
Figure 4: HISTOGRAM OF SEVERITY SCORES

Histogram of Individual Severity Scores
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We looked at the profiles of the four respondents with the highest severity
scores (the last bar in figure 5), but the characteristics of the four varied a lot. In a later
section we will take a closer look at group differences.
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d) Mitigation of disruptions:
This section takes a look at the findings pertaining to the mitigation methods
that respondents may have found beneficial or useful in preventing or limiting the
supply chain disruptions they previously reported. The discussion around Table 17
explains how we arrived at the five general methods we offered as alternatives.
The question we asked was: “In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation
methods in preventing or limiting the negative impact on your supply chain of the [one
of 13] problem?” The choices were:
Not useful at all
Somewhat useful

0
1

Useful
Very useful

2
3

The electronic questionnaire only asked for mitigation methods for risks that the
respondents had earlier marked with a frequency. Also, some respondents who
indicated frequency did not follow up with a responses on the mitigation methods, or
gave only partial responses to these questions.
Table 26 summarizes the mitigation method responses by listing the average
scores (on the usefulness scale from 0 to 3) on each of the five methods offered. The
highest score for each disruption is in bold print.
The highest score (2.10 in the first row) was given to redundancy in fixing
supplier problems, and can be interpreted as an average usefulness of a tad more than
“useful”. The average of the weighted average scores was 1.11, or a smidgen higher
than “somewhat useful”. The last line shows that on average, buffering and redundancy
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were considered about the same, while flexibility and visibility also had practically
identical average scores. Insourcing scored quite far behind the others.
Table 26: USEFULNESS OF MITIGATION METHODS

Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary,
or inconsistent)
Flooding and weather related events
Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions, structural collapses, or spills
Property or violent crimes (theft,
robbery, hijackings, vandalism,
computer viruses or fraud)
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest
Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright violations,
or hacking)
WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF
MITIGATION METHODS

Insourcing

Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone
or internet)
Corruption or bribery

Visibility

Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence, turnover,
absenteeism)
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions / regulations)

Flexibility

Supplier problems (quality, reliability,
timeliness, or financial strength)
Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold
storage)
Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air)

Respondents
affected by
this
disruption (n)

Redundancy

Disruption:

Buffering

Average Mitigation Score

20

1.85

2.10

1.60

1.55

1.20

22

1.77

1.48

1.25

1.33

1.14

24

1.67

1.43

1.43

1.57

0.83

25

1.13

1.29

1.28

1.21

1.16

21

0.62

0.67

0.76

0.76

0.57

21

1.38

1.24

1.14

1.05

0.65

14

0.31

0.50

0.36

0.43

0.21

16

0.69

0.63

0.63

0.63

0.38

21

1.52

1.20

1.35

1.15

0.50

14

1.50

1.85

1.83

1.50

0.83

9

0.44

0.63

0.75

1.14

0.50

8

1.50

1.13

0.88

1.13

0.75

2

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

1.25

1.22

1.15

1.14

0.77
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For the top cluster of six risks, the following methods were found to be the most
useful:
TABLE 27: SUMMARY OF MITIGATION USEFULNESS FOR TOP SIX RISKS
Disruption:

Mitigation:

Score:

Usefulness

Supplier problems
Inadequate logistics infrastructure
Inadequate transportation
infrastructure
Labor problems
Bureaucracy

Redundancy
Buffering
Buffering

2.10
1.77
1.67

Useful
Useful
Useful

Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility
Buffering

1.29
0.76
0.76
1.38

Somewhat useful
Somewhat useful
Somewhat useful
Somewhat useful

Inadequate utilities infrastructure

Another way to look at the popularity of mitigation methods is to separate the
respondents who found them useful or very useful (i.e. gave them scores of 2 or 3).
Table 28 shows what percentage of the total respondents found the various methods
useful or very useful for the six top ranked risks (top score for each in bold print):
Overall, redundancy has a slight edge on the other five methods, with insourcing
in a clear last place. Buffering, redundancy, flexibility and visibility/collaboration are all
solidly established and recognized methods for handling supply chain risk. In the survey
we asked how useful the various mitigation methods were in preventing or limiting the
negative impact of particular risks, and we tend to believe that the answers reflect
experiences the respondents have actually had, and not just what they thought might
be useful methods.
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Table 28: MITIGATION METHODS DEEMED USEFUL OR VERY USEFUL FOR THE TOP SIX RANKED
DISRUPTIONS
Mitigation Method:
Deemed useful
Disruption:
or very useful:
Supplier problems (quality, reliability,
Buffering
65%
timeliness, or financial strength)
Redundancy
76%
Flexibility
55%
Visibility/Collaboration
57%
Insourcing
35%
Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages,
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism)

Buffering
Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

24%
44%
42%
28%
28%

Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air)

Buffering
Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

58%
52%
48%
61%
22%

Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage)

Buffering
Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

64%
52%
45%
52%
36%

Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent
restrictions or regulations)

Buffering
Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

14%
24%
33%
33%
24%

Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone or
internet)

Buffering
Redundancy
Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

43%
38%
43%
38%
15%

Average “useful” or “very useful” scores Buffering
Redundancy
for the six top ranked disruptions

Flexibility
Visibility/Collaboration
Insourcing

139

45%
48%
44%
45%
27%

e) Expected disruptions
The last portion of the survey asked the respondents to indicate the frequency of
supply chain risks they expect to experience over the next three years. Asking what risks
to expect implies that the managers are aware of potential upcoming disruptions and
that they have somehow taken implicit or explicit steps to minimize them. This fits into
the “Improvement” part of the MIAMI template. If nothing else, thinking ahead of which
risks may occur should trigger some sort of preparatory moves by management. Of
course, the level of preparedness and proactivity vary a lot between firms. As evident
from Table 29, of the 43 respondents, between 30 and 33 elected to provide answers to
each of our questions about upcoming risks.
While many of the respondents chose to indicate that they did not expect
specific risks to happen, the remaining provided risks estimates of frequency (less, same
or more). We chose to scale this as follows:
Less frequent than previously =
Same frequency as previously =
More frequent than previously =

-1
0
+1

This will give us a feel for how far from zero (same frequency) the average
consensus is for each disruption118. The lower the number, the less frequent the risk is
expected, relative to the current situation. The disruptions offered are the same
thirteen we have used throughout this survey. In addition, respondents could write in
additional disruptions they expected.

118

The average of the “less”, “same” or “more” responses, excluding the “does not expect”.
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Don’t
expect

Less
frequently

Same
frequency

More
frequently

Average
score

Table 29: EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF DISRUPTIONS THE NEXT THREE YEARS
Disruption:

Flooding and weather related events 30

13

9

7

2

-0.39

Major accidents, incl. fires,
explosions, structural collapses, or
spills
Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

31
31

17
20

12
9

2
3

1
0

-0.73
-0.75

33

11

15

6

1

-0.64

32

12

15

6

0

-0.71

31

13

11

7

0

-0.61

31

23

6

3

0

-0.67

31
31

23
16

6
7

2
8

1
1

-0.56
-0.38

30

12

7

11

1

-0.32

32

11

10

10

2

-0.36

32

12

14

3

3

-0.55

32

12

12

6

2

-0.50

n

Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or
air)
Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold
storage)
Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone
or internet)
Property or violent crimes (theft,
robbery, hijackings, vandalism,
computer viruses or fraud)
Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright violations,
or hacking)
Corruption or bribery
Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions or
regulations)
Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence, turnover,
absenteeism)
Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary,
or inconsistent)
Supplier problems (quality,
reliability, timeliness, or financial
strength)

On average, all thirteen risks were expected to occur less frequently the next
three years compared to the past three. But there are differences in the degree of
optimism, as Table 30 shows. This lists the disruptions in order of expectation:
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TABLE 30: EXPECTED DISRUPTIONS BY RANK
Disruption:
Average
score:

% of Respondents who
expect it same or more:

Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent
restrictions or regulations)

-0.32

40%

Labor problems (strikes, skills shortages,
incompetence, turnover, absenteeism)

-0.36

38%

Corruption or bribery

-0.38

29%

Flooding and weather related events

-0.39

30%

Supplier problems (quality, reliability,
timeliness, or financial strength)

-0.50

25%

Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or
inconsistent)

-0.55

19%

-0.56

10%

-0.61

23%

-0.64

21%

-0.67

10%

-0.71

19%

Major accidents, incl. fires, explosions,
structural collapses, or spills

-0.73

10%

Terrorism, riots or civil unrest

-0.75

10%

Intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting,
copyright violations, or hacking)
Inadequate utilities infrastructure (electricity,
water, sewer, telephone or internet)
Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports or air)
Property or violent crimes (theft, robbery,
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or
fraud)
Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold storage)

The risks making up the cluster of six are scattered throughout this ranking. The
three least expected to improve (bureaucracy, labor problems, and corruption) are all
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related to human behavior (or misbehavior). For example, as many as 40 per cent
expected bureaucracy/red tape to continue at the same or higher frequency. We
already found that bureaucracy and labor problems exhibited high severity (frequency x
impact), and the expectations are that supply chain managers will continue to be
affected by these two risks to a high degree over the next three years. The
infrastructure risks (utilities, transportation, logistics) are ranked quite a bit better with
respect to future expectations, perhaps reflecting a belief that these impediments are
easier to fix through anticipated investments and construction.
Table 31 shows which disruptions the respondents did not expect to experience
or expected to experience less over the next three years, ranked in order of the “don’t
expect” gauge of optimism. The visible disruptions covered by the media (i.e. crimes,
terrorism, accidents and to an extent flooding/weather) are apparently not the ones
that supply managers expect to encounter or suffer from. The more mundane risks that
typically are not written about in the media are the ones that cause operational and
financial worries.
By studying tables 29, 30 and 31 closer, one gets the impression that supply chain
managers are split on the issue of upcoming risks. This is perhaps not so strange, as
every supply chain is different. No firm has the same risk exposure or profile. Future
expectations are shaped by the recent experiences of the subjects and what businesses
they are in, so a great deal of variation would be expected.
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Table 31: RISKS NOT EXPECTED THE NEXT THREE YEARS:
Disruption

Crimes
I.P. crimes
Terrorism
Accidents
Corruption
Flooding/weather
Utilities
Bureaucracy
Logistics
Taxes
Suppliers
Labor
Transportation

% of respondents who
Don’t expect next
three years
74%
74%
65%
55%
52%
43%
42%
40%
38%
38%
38%
34%
33%

Expect less next three
years
16%
16%
25%
35%
19%
27%
35%
20%
43%
43%
37%
28%
46%

Some respondents wrote in further comments as to which risks they expected
the next three years (the comments are cited verbatim):
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Rising Population
Shipping
Debt or finance problems (cost of loans or capital)
India has got many potential ways to improve its supply chain infrastructure. Multifaceted problems are faced today and they cannot be attributed to any one factor
only. India must work hard and subjugate vested personal interests and must think
long-term. Policies to improve infrastructure should be fast-tracked and it must
become easy to invite foreign inflows in India (of course keeping welfare of Indian
people in mind first)
Mitigation methods in preventing or limiting the negative impact MUST BE
REDEFINED.
Better discipline required
Quality human resources
Those companies in the middle of Supply Chain get hammered from both ends of the
Supply chain-the customers as well as suppliers
The impact on our business is not that high. Of course my customers business
sometimes major way gets affected.
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Comment number 5 regarding mitigation methods is interesting because it
illustrates the potential deficiency in using classic supply chain mitigation methods in
fighting socio-economic or cultural impediments such as corruption, bureaucracy and
the tax system. Our five suggested mitigation methods are likely most useful for tangible
challenges such as delays and damage caused by suppliers or infrastructure problems.
Further Statistical Analysis

Our findings lend themselves to some interesting statistical evaluations. We will
look at:
1) Are there group differences with respect to the severity of disruptions? For
example, does it matter whether a company is Indian or foreign owned on
how it reported severity? We will use Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to study
this.
2) Are the predictor (profile) variables related or correlated, so that certain
combinations of factors (Indian/foreign, small/large, etc.) possess a certain
proclivity for severity of disruptions?
3) Can the company profile predict severity of disruptions? We will use multiple
regression to study that. 119
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We attempted a dimension reduction by running a Principal Component Analysis using the
Factor function in SPSS. Our first run with nine of the disruptions resulted in a “non-positive definite”
correlation matrix, due to too few data points for that many variables. We tried again with the top seven
disruptions, which gave us results, but did not properly satisfy the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) measure of
sampling adequacy (the combined measure was only 0.511, and none of the coefficients in the anti-image
matrix exceeded the recommended 0.5 threshold). We therefore decided against factor analysis on this
data.
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1. Group comparisons
In Table 19, we kept seven profile variables, each split into two groups. The two
groups for each predictor variable were:








General sector:
Ownership:
Global sales:
Value sourced:
Employed:
Exported:
Years in India:

Goods or Services
Indian or Foreign
Small or Large
Low or High
Few or Many
High % or Low %
Short time or Long time

In addition, we revisited the data to categorize respondents into two groups:
manufacturing and service. This categorization is somewhat different than the “general
sector” above, and is created by putting firms with activities in the first six categories of
NIC 2008 into one group, and firms in the remaining 15 activities into another group
(see question 8 under Appendix A). Therefore,


Industry:

Manufacturing or Service

Of the 43 respondents, 65% were found to be representing manufacturing, and
the remaining 35% the service industry.
To check for significant group differences, these eight profile (predictor)
variables were compared to the seven disruptions with the most severity, from Table
25, as well as a summarized assessment variable. This last variable is the sum of the
severity scores on all the disruptions for each respondent. The histogram in Figure 5
showed that respondents varied a lot with respect to combined severity over all thirteen
disruptions. We find that it makes more sense to run group comparisons on the
combined severity scores rather than either the reported frequency or impact scores
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separately. As explained, the severity score is a better measure of overall risk. Table 32
displays the significance levels found after running an ANOVA between the seven

.362
.072
Services

.320

.908

.103

Summarized

.792

Corruption

.176

Utilities

Logistics

Labor

Sector:
Goods or
Services
Industry:
Manuf. or
Services
Ownership:
Indian or
Foreign
Sales:
Small or
Large
Sourcing $:
Low or
High
Employees:
Few or
Many
Exported:
Hi % or
Low %
Longevity:
Short or
Long

Supplier

Predictor

Transport

Risk

Bureaucracy

Table 32: CHECKING FOR SIGNIFICANT GROUP DIFFERENCES USING SIGNIFICANCE
SCORES

.909

.235

.253

.110

.094
Services

.931

.298

.984
.033
Services
120

.720
.076
Indian

.728

.383

.089
Indian

.404
.064
122
Indian

.824

.124

.012
Small

.001

.425

.852

.070
Small

124

125

121

.017
Small

.102

123

Small

.697

.920

.331

.238

.853

.680

.207

.751

.679

.947

.714

.330

.698

.881

.427

.975

.508

.077
Low
%

.143

.960

.867

.695

.144

.660

.755

.802

.070
Short

.363

.149

.923

.966

.309

120

This particular group comparison violated the Levene test for homogeneity of variances, with
a significance score of 0.049
121
This particular group comparison violated the Levene test for homogeneity of variances, with
a significance score of 0.022.
122
Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.025
123
Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.011.
124
Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.006.
125
Violation of the Welch robust test for equality of means, with significance score 0.000.
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Explanation: Table 32 shows statistical significance scores, where scores lower than 0.10 are
considered significant at the 90% confidence level. Such scores are shown in the lightly shaded
boxes, in bold print, followed by the direction of the relationship. For example, the interpretation
of the bolded box in the first row is that services sector firms were significantly more affected by
transportation disruptions than firms in the goods sector.

predictors and the eight disruption factors. This analysis checks if there is a significant
difference between the severity scores between two groups, for example between
companies involved in goods versus companies involved in services. As this is a one-way
analysis, values of 0.100 or lower would be statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level. We decided to use the 90% level because combined with the low sample sizes, the
resulting wide confidence intervals give us appropriate guidance for management
purposes.
Table 32 indicates 12 significant group differences at the 90% confidence level:
a) Sector (is the company selling goods or services):
Companies selling services experienced more severe transportation infrastructure
disruptions.
b) Industry (is the company in the manufacturing or services industry):
Companies in the services industry experienced more severe logistics and utilities
infrastructure disruptions.
c) Ownership (is the company Indian or foreign owned):
Companies with Indian or predominantly Indian ownership experienced more severe
supplier problems, bureaucracy/red tape, and utilities infrastructure problems.
d) Sales (does the company have small or large global sales, i.e. less or more than
US$ 10 million p.a.):
Companies with small sales experienced more severe supplier problems, more severe
logistics infrastructure problems, more bureaucracy/red tape, and were more severely
affected overall by supply chain disruptions.
e) Exported (high or low percentage of total sales):
Companies with a low proportion of exports out of India (< 25%) experienced more
severe labor problems.
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f) Longevity (long or short tenure in India):
Companies which have operated in India less than 20 years experienced more severe
transportation infrastructure problems.
As for the “Summarized” (last) column in Table 32, it is noteworthy to look at the
general direction of the relationships, whether the group differences were significant or
not. We already observed that small firms were more prone to disruptions overall (with
93% confidence), while the other seven factors show:
TABLE 33: DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP
FACTOR
GROUP
Sector
Industry
Ownership
Sales
Sourcing $
Employees
Exported
Longevity

Summarized highest disruption
severity experienced by:

Goods or Services
Manufacturing or Services
Indian or Foreign
Small or Large
Low or High
Few or Many
Hi % or Low %
Short or Long

Services
Services
Indian
Small (SIGNIFICANT; sig = 0.070)
Low
No difference (sig = 0.975)
Low %
Short

Perusing tables 32 and 33, one gets the impression that by being small, or being Indian
owned, or being in the services sector will significantly expose such firms to more supply
chain disruptions.
2. Combinations of Predictor Variables?
We ran a correlation matrix with the basic seven predictor variables that we
used, and found statistically significant correlations (at the 95% level) between the
following four126:

126

As a correlation coefficient Kendall’s tau was used, due to the non-parametric nature and
small dataset.
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TABLE 34: SIGNIFICANT CROSS-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTOR VARIABLES
PREDICTOR
Value of items
Employed in India Years in India
sourced in India
Global Sales
.484
.564
.396
Value of items
sourced in India
Employed in India

-

.587

.327

-

-

.510

This means that companies with high global sales also tend to source heavily in
India, have many employees in India, and will have been in India for quite a while. These
four variables have a tendency to move in unison. Comparing these findings to the
group comparisons in Table 32 does not give us much additional information. It showed
that companies with low global sales were more prone to report supply chain problems,
including more severe supplier, logistics infrastructure and bureaucracy disruptions.
Because of the close correlation with value sourced, Indian employment and tenure in
India, it is likely that smaller and younger companies experience more of these
problems. Table 34 shows the whole cross-correlation matrix for the predictor variables.
3. Prediction and Multiple Regression
The seven predictor variables were run against the summarized severity score as
the dependent variable. The purpose was to assess how much of the variability in the
summarized severity could be explained from the seven predictors. The first model
summary in Table 35 includes all seven predictors and show that the explanatory power
(R Square) is 33.9%. However, it is worrisome that the adjusted R square is 17.9%, or
only about half. Only two of the slope (beta) coefficients were significant at the 95%
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TABLE 35: COMPLETE PREDICTOR VARIABLE CROSS-CORRELATION TABLE

Correlation
Coefficient
SECTOR
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
OWNER
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
SALES_2
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
VALUE_2
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
EMPLOYED Coefficient
_2
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
EXPORTED Coefficient
_2
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
YEARS_2
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Correlations
SECT OWN SALES VALUE EMPLO EXPOR YEARS
OR
ER
_2
_2
YED_2 TED_2
_2
1.000 -.021
.074
-.005
.042
.174
-.106
.
42
-.021

.892
42
1.000

.650
39
.263

.974
40
.076

.793
41
-.003

.266
42
.122

.501
41
-.191

.892
42
.074

.
43
.263

.100
40
1.000

.633
40
.484**

.987
42
.564**

.428
43
-.083

.221
42
.396*

.650
39
-.005

.100
40
.076

.
40
.484**

.003
39
1.000

.001
39
.587**

.606
40
-.079

.015
39
.327*

.974
40
.042

.633
40
-.003

.003
39
.564**

.
40
.587**

.000
39
1.000

.621
40
.057

.044
39
.510**

.793
41
.174

.987
42
.122

.001
39
-.083

.000
39
-.079

.
42
.057

.714
42
1.000

.001
41
.100

.266
42
-.106

.428
43
-.191

.606
40
.396*

.621
40
.327*

.714
42
.510**

.
43
.100

.521
42
1.000

.501
41

.221
42

.015
39

.044
39

.001
41

.521
42

.
42

confidence level: global sales had a negative coefficient, and employment a positive
coefficient. In the bottom panel of Table 35 we ran the regression with only the four
relatively highly correlated variables from Table 33. The adjusted R square rose a bit,
and the same two predictors (global sales and employment) had significant slope
coefficients.
With such a low predictive ability, the multiple regression analysis is of limited
benefit, if any. It seems that group comparisons using ANOVA and one-way analysis are
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a better way to predict overall supply chain risk severity, at least predictor by predictor.
It would be hard to imagine a formula where a company could plug in its profile data
and obtain a robust prediction of its supply chain risk exposure. Nevertheless, much of
the information uncovered in the many tables above can be of great use.
TABLE 36: MODEL SUMMARIES OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Model Summaryb
Model

R

R

Adjuste

Std.

Change Statistics

Squa

dR

Error of

R Square

F

re

Square

the

Change

Change

df1

Durbin-

df2

Sig. F

Watson

Change

Estimate
1

.582

.339

.179

51.622

.339

2.125

7

29

.073

1.461

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), YEARS_2, EXPORTED_2, SECTOR, OWNER, VALUE_2,
SALES_2, EMPLOYED_2
b. Dependent Variable: S_Total
Model Summaryb
Model

1

R

.555

Change Statistics

R

Adjuste

Std. Error

Squar

dR

of the

R Square

F

e

Square

Estimate

Change

Change

.308

.222

50.274

.308

3.565

df1

Durbin-

df2

Sig. F

Watson

Change
4

32

.016

1.308

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), YEARS_2, VALUE_2, SALES_2, EMPLOYED_2
b. Dependent Variable: S_Total

It is worth stating that any of the correlations we found do not imply causation. For
example, small firms do not cause supplier problems. All we can observe is that there
are a few statistically significant relationships, as illustrated in Table 32, which may give
us an indication of possible exposure rather than any cause and effect associations.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
This chapter draws some conclusions from the findings in this study. It will also
touch upon additional and supporting information gathered from industry professionals
and people familiar with today’s India.
Table 37 is a helpful comparison of the frequencies, impacts, severity, most
useful mitigation methods, and expected frequency. It is color coded so that the
disruptions can be visually tracked.
Table 37: COMPARISON OF RANKING OF FREQUENCY, IMPACT, SEVERITY, MITIGATION
AND EXPECTED RISKS
Rank Highest
frequency last
3 years

Highest
impact last 3
years

Highest
severity last 3
years

Most useful
mitigation
for most
severe risk

1

Logistics
infrastructure
Bureaucracy

Supplier
problems
Logistics
infrastructure
Transportation
infrastructure
Labor
problems
Bureaucracy

Redundancies Bureaucracy

6

Transportation
infrastructure
Supplier
problems
Labor
problems
Utilities
infrastructure
Logistics
infrastructure
Bureaucracy

7

Corruption

Utilities
infrastructure

2
3
4
5

Transportation
infrastructure
Supplier
problems
Labor
problems
Corruption

Utilities
infrastructure
Corruption

Expected least
likely to fall next
3 years

Buffering

Labor problems

Buffering

Corruption

Redundancies Flooding/weather
Flexibility
Visibility (tie)
Buffering

Supplier
problems
Tax system

Redundancy

I.P. Crimes

Even though supplier problems were not ranked first in frequency or impact, the
combined effect caused this risk to place highest in severity. The pairwise multiplication
of frequency and impact is the reason for this, illustrating clearly that neither frequency
nor impact by themselves are sufficient to fully assess risk. From a management
standpoint, severity is what hurts, and both frequency and impact must be controlled.
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The seven top ranked risks are the ones that grind at managers day in and day
out. Individually, they are undramatic disruptions that hardly get written about in the
newspapers. For supply chain managers, the newsworthy disruptions like terrorism,
major accidents and major crimes do not frequently bother them. Although the impact
of such events could be catastrophic, they are few and far between, and tend to be
insurable. The chronic infrastructure inadequacies, supplier/labor problems, red tape
and corruption are ubiquitous impediments that managers operating in India are forced
to deal with and find appropriate solutions to. Interestingly, a risk that did not rank
highly in the experience ratings – flooding and weather related events – came in fourth
as an expected disruption for the next three years. In conversations with industry
professionals they expressed a general concern that global climate change would start
to affect their operations. Perhaps unease with what is going on with the weather is
what elevates this risk factor.
The seven top ranked risks can be lumped onto three main categories:
1) Operational problems internal to the supply chain (supplier and labor problems)
2) Problems due to inadequate infrastructure (transportation, logistics and utilities)
3) Bureaucracy/red tape and corruption
Problems related to suppliers and labor are usually considered internal to a
company’s extended supply chain, while infrastructure, bureaucracy and corruption
disruptions are primarily externally thrust upon a firm. That said, supply chains are not
closed systems, and some of the underlying causes of labor and supplier problems may
well be problems considered exogenous, such as national labor strikes, road closures
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and shortages of raw materials. The supplier and labor problems embody a complex
web of systems, management, technical, cultural and operational glitches and systemic
impediments. The risks are also intertwined, meaning that the same disruption (for
instance, a late delivery) can be characterized as both a supplier and infrastructure
problem. One company’s labor problem becomes its customer’s supplier problem. The
nature of closely coupled supply chains means that disruptions spread beyond the
borders of the individual firms.
The fact that the three infrastructure related disruptions did not rank highly in
the expectation column either points towards a certain optimism that these are
problems that are being remedied and expected to improve, or at least a certain hope
that they won’t get worse. In a November 2012 statement, India’s Minister for Urban
Development and Parliamentary Affairs, Kamal Nath, said India will spend USD 1 trillion
on infrastructure development in the country over the next five years127. The spending
on transportation, logistics and utilities has historically been low, so perhaps this
represents a bit of a tidal change for the country. Leading business associations,
business executives and surveys like these keep reiterating the fact that the
infrastructure is deficient, pushing for a greater political will, urgency and ability to
allocate more resources to it. Insufficient infrastructure is a substantial drain on the
Indian economy and a competitive disadvantage. Executives with a visiting Indian
delegation felt that infrastructure problems should be listed as the top future concern,

127

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-06/news/34946433_1_kamal-nathindia-house-private-sector
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in particular the insufficient transportation infrastructure. Hopefully, what Stanley
Wolpert calls Indians’ “general lack of action-mindedness” won’t prevail when it comes
to these needed infrastructure improvements (Wolpert, 2009).
The results of this survey were presented to several insightful Indian managers
and practitioners. These experts were invited to comment on the results and
encouraged to contribute background information and suggestions for root causes. The
conversations with these experts confirmed the intertwined nature of risks. For
example, the visiting delegation of Indian business executives128 suggested that labor
problems were related to political problems, meaning that political maneuvering often
results in strikes and work stoppages. One root cause for labor problems may therefore
be political instability and jockeying. In fact, some of the delegates felt that “ineffective
political system” should have been included as a separate choice in this survey.
In November of 2013, we presented the findings to another seven industry
experts129 and asked them to comment on possible root causes and contributing factors.
We were especially interested in learning more about underlying dynamics and details
surrounding the highly ranked risks of supplier and labor problems. These seven experts
on Indian supply chains possessed extensive hands-on experience and knowledge of

128

A delegation of eighteen members of the Mumbai based US-India Importers Council (USIIC)
visited Washington State in early November, 2013.
129
Of the seven, six resided in the Seattle area, and one in Bangalore. Two were owners and
operators of a mid-sized importing company with extensive and frequent sourcing from India, one was a
franchise executive working on setting up U.S. franchises in India, one was an Indian-American software
consultant currently working out of Bangalore, one was a commercial lawyer specializing in U.S.-Indian
business transactions, one was a leader of an U.S.-Indian trade association, and one was the former
Commercial Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Delhi.
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current business conditions in India130. Besides what we already knew and have written
about in this study, the communication with the experts resulted in the following useful
comments and observations, summarized here in bullet point style:















None of the seven were surprised that supplier and labor problems were ranked
as severe
The two problems are intertwined, meaning that labor problems may be behind
the purported supplier problems
Structurally, Indian manufacturing is quite labor intensive, meaning that
relationship and union issues are always at the forefront
Strong growth in sales and orders causes “growing pains”, meaning that
suppliers, especially small and medium sized businesses, are not able to keep up
with customer demand and provide good service
The growth in orders has several negative effects, including difficulty of finding
or retaining qualified labor, corner cutting and lowering of overall quality,
“sacrifice” of smaller customers if somebody bigger comes along with a major
order (smaller importers compete against the large, international buyers, like
chain stores)
Many of these large, international importers negotiate so hard on prices and
terms that quality eventually suffers
Many Indian export articles are still hand-made and produced locally in small
factories. Most of the producers have capacity limits and a hard time scaling up
their operations
It is becoming more difficult for these firms to recruit younger workers willing to
work with their hands in relatively low-paid positions, as many seek white collar
jobs in the cities
The strong growth has caused a lack of managerial experience, skills and talent.
Managers are often not properly empowered, and are frequently distrusted by
workers
Small and mid-sized firms find it difficult to obtain the necessary financing to
expand and automate their operations, including procuring machinery that
would improve output and quality
Infrastructure problems pay a certain role, and the lack of sufficient
warehousing, transportation hubs and other facilities make it harder for
suppliers to deliver
There exists an educational gap in India, with a lack of vocational and trade
programs to educate and prepare workers in emerging and growing industries

130

The main forum was a working luncheon with five of the experts, while the input from the
remaining two were obtained through a personal meeting and a Skype conversation.
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Larger companies are more prone to being affected by politically motivated
labor strikes and other union actions
The definition of “inadequate” (as used to characterize the transportation,
logistics and utilities infrastructure) in our questionnaire is subjective, and raises
the question “compared to what?”
Their suggestions for alleviating some of these risks include maintaining close

relationships with trusted suppliers, ensuring worker loyalty and creating a feeling of
family among employees, making frequent visits to suppliers’ factories, and having a
quality control or inspection mechanism in place before items are exported out of India.
Also, competitive advantage can often be maintained by cultivating close bonds with
suppliers manufacturing unique and high quality niche products. Cost pressures and
commoditization efforts will fuel quality and delivery problems. One expert also
suggested that businesses not focus so much on changing India as on changing their
management and operating procedures when doing business there. India undoubtedly
needs to change to remain competitive in the global business environment. However,
this expert did raise a good point regarding the requisite resilience that is required to
successfully navigate the Indian business landscape. To thrive and survive, businesses do
what they have to do in the environment that surrounds them.
Depending on the nature of “internal” problems such as supplier and labor
disruptions, a piece of good news is that they might be fixable with better management
and internal control systems. Supplier and labor problems are not unique to India, and
more sophisticated management structures and I.T. systems may help in alleviating
them. As one of the experts commented, all companies operating in India are faced with
the same set of supplier and labor problems, and this constitutes a “level playing field”
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amongst competitors. The winners will be the companies best able to manage and
mitigate the various operational risks. However, we have seen from the data in this
survey that there are differences in how categories of companies perceive risk, as
manifested through frequencies and impact. Notably, and as seen in Table 32, Indian
owned companies reported significantly more severe supplier, bureaucracy and utilities
problems, while smaller companies were more severely affected by supplier, logistics,
bureaucracy and overall disruptions. Companies doing services were also more prone to
experience risks. We can only make educated guesses as to why this is so. Somewhat
counterintuitively, being Indian owned does not seem to be of benefit in repelling
problems, and small firms report being bothered more than large firms with respect to
disruption severity. Perhaps the ownership of the firm is of little relevance in managing
local risks, as most of the managers are Indian anyway whether the firm is Indian or
foreign. Whether large and/or foreign firms are able to hire and pay for better managers
remains an issue that our survey cannot answer. Whether foreign firms interpret risks
differently than Indian firms is another interesting question, but we don’t have enough
information in this study to verify whether this implies some sort of cultural difference.
The respondents to this survey suggested that redundancies would be the best
mitigation method for both supplier and labor disruptions. Redundancies imply having
multiple suppliers, sites or equipment, rendering the company with available backup
capabilities. Possessing redundancies is usually costlier than single source, but in the
long run considered economically wiser from a risk management standpoint. The other
stalwart, buffering (holding inventory and adding lead times) was popular for the
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logistics and utilities infrastructure problems. Overall, the four methods of buffering,
redundancies, flexibility and visibility/collaboration ranked very closely in perceived
usefulness (44% to 48% of the respondents ranked them useful or very useful), while
insourcing was not highly ranked. The latter is possibly a more strategic step, which puts
it out of immediate reach for most supply chain managers dealing with operational
issues. It is also worth keeping in mind the feedback we got on the relevancy of our five
suggested mitigation methods with respect to some of the more pesky risks
encountered in India, like bureaucracy, the tax system and corruption. Holding
inventory or having several suppliers are hardly the best methods for circumventing red
tape and bribery. The respondent who added the note did not suggest suitable
mitigation steps for these non-physical problems, but it is evident that the supply chain
manager’s classic tool box may be lacking suitable methods for dealing with such
impediments.
If we check back with Table 14 (“How recent surveys ranked sources of
disruption”), we see that three of those global studies ranked labor and supplier
disruptions on top (the fourth had utilities infrastructure ranked first). The results of our
research, therefore, seem consistent with major global studies performed by
multinational consulting or insurance companies. We are the first study which
specifically looked at India. Paradoxically, the consultancy A.T. Kearney in a 2010 study
gave India the best relative score in “people skills and availability”, which was quantified
as “suppliers’ experience and skills, labor-force availability, education and language
proficiency, and attrition rate” (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2011). The same
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consulting firm, however, this year downgraded India in their bi-annual Foreign Direct
Investment Confidence Index. While holding the second best ranking in 2005, 2007, and
2012, India fell to fifth place in 2013 (Kearney, 2013).
Bureaucracy and corruption placed lower than some of our experts would have
thought. This may have to do with the profile of our respondents, who mostly dealt with
supply chain problems. It is possible that they were less involved with management
situations exposing them to activities typically susceptible to bureaucracy and bribery,
such as bidding processes, sales, licensing and permitting.
As discussed, dramatic, Black Swan events did not flourish in our sample. One
manager commented that the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks did not slow down
business or supply chains at all. It certainly slowed down public transportation for a few
days and tourism for a great deal longer, but from a purely operational supply chain
standpoint, terrorism against soft targets tends to be of lesser concern. It was also
encouraging to see that our sample was not affected by major crimes or intellectual
property (IP) violations. Although IP violations are most commonly associated with
China, India has for several years appeared on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Priority
Watch List for intellectual property violations, with nine other countries (Marantis,
2013). Because IP infringements are not directly physical or necessarily acute problems,
they may not often rise to the attention of supply chain managers.
Some of the visiting delegates felt that the category “flooding or weather related
problems” was a bit too limiting, and suggested a broader label such as “climate change
problems” or “environmental impact”. They speculated that perhaps the responses to
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the flooding question could have been influenced by the timing of the survey. The
presence and immediacy of the annual monsoon season may have colored the
responses. The survey was distributed in May-July, which is usually in the midst of this
season, but flooding was still not listed as a top risk. Thus it appears seasonality was not
a problem with respect to this question.
If there is a silver lining to the fact that supplier, labor and infrastructure
disruptions were found to be the most severe supply chain problems, it may be that
country experience and skillful management practices go a long way in remedying them.
Supply chain managers have to be resourceful, diplomatic and smart when navigating
the every-day business climate and impediments found in India. Companies with
talented local management should be able to succeed and gain competitive advantage
in this environment. In a recent report, the well regarded firm company Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts stated that India would not achieve its full potential until it does at least three
things better, and the first thing listed was “invest more in infrastructure” (KKR, 2012).
The interconnected nature of many of India’s challenges means that a seriously
upgraded physical infrastructure should help reduce other problems, such as supplier
reliability and corruption.
Significance, Contribution and Limitations of this Work
With its resources, India will continue to grow as a supplier of goods and services
to the world. This dissertation has outlined a method for treating supply chain risk
management by applying a template called MIAMI for analyzing risks in India. MIAMI is
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an acronym for mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving. We decided
to use the template in a somewhat modified form to conduct an empirical survey of
supply chain risks in India, with particular emphasis on the upstream portion (sourcing
and operations). While a few international studies were useful in formulating our survey
questions, only three studies partially touched upon our subject area and India (Arntzen,
2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Madhavan et al., 2013; Sahay et al., 2006; Sahay & Mohan, 2003).
These studies kept the emphasis at a more general and strategic level, and did not
specifically drill into supply chain risk frequencies, impacts, mitigation methods or
expectations. Ours is the only study so far to query supply chain managers about these
fairly detailed risk considerations, and is the only study to present a current picture of
supply chain risk severity in India.
The utility of the study is evidenced by the fact that it gives supply chain
managers crucial information on which risks to expect while operating in India, and an
assessment of the severity of these risks. This information will prove useful in preparing
for and managing the day-to-day challenges of this complex business environment.
We set up an empirical survey using the practical MIAMI framework to frame the
questions and ensure construct validity. A significant contribution lies in the fact that we
have uncovered Indian supply chain risks and their severities by querying supply chain
managers on the ground in India. The outcome of the study revealed some unexpected
and also not-so-surprising results. For instance, it is noteworthy that companies are
most severely affected by the chronic, relatively low-grade risks of inadequate
infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and bureaucracy. None of the highly
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publicized risks of natural disasters, terrorism, accidents and serious crimes were ranked
highly overall. The significance of this from a management standpoint is that competent,
day-to-day management will go a long way in remedying the chronic, societal risks.
We had great cooperation from four leading trade associations in India, and they
were willing to send links to our questionnaire out to their members. However, even
after reminders, we were only able to garner 43 usable responses, for a very low
response rate. These organizations guard their membership data closely, and did not
share with us how many people the broadcasts went out to. We believe 5,000 or so may
be a realistic number. 119 people started the survey, but perhaps they discontinued
after realizing the level of detail and the time it would take to complete it properly. A
complete survey would take about 15-30 minutes to do, and that is too long for most
busy practitioners. Regardless, the 43 responses gave us a rich amount of data, and we
feel the sample is representative of the target population of supply chain managers.

On disruption severities, please keep in mind a few dilemmas or limitations:
1) The open-endedness of frequencies of 10+:
If somebody wanted to report that a risk happened 36 times in the past three
years, we were limited to record that as 10 times, thus understating the frequency or
likelihood of any such risks. If a disruption did happen 36 times it would presumably
have a minor or moderate impact, as it would be difficult for any organization to survive
or stomach major or catastrophic disruptions on a monthly basis.
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2) Individual or combined impacts:
Do the reported impacts pertain to each and every of the reported frequencies,
or did the respondents report the aggregate impact? For example, if a company
experienced eight risks within the three-year period, did they all have a moderate
impact, or were they eight minor disruptions that combined produced a moderate or
major impact (“death by a thousand cuts”)? Ideally, a survey would ask for the specific
impact of each and every event, but getting into such detail would require a different
type of investigative tool, probably more akin to an audit.
3) Subjectivity when assessing and comparing impact:
Somebody risk averse with a low threshold may have stipulated “major” on a risk
that another would characterize as “minor”. We did not ask the respondents to provide
monetary impact estimates, which may have given us a more objective comparison (and
an even longer questionnaire to complete). However, as we discussed earlier, risk
assessments are highly subjective by nature, so perhaps leaving the severity estimates
without clear benchmarks is fine after all. Statistical averaging tends to even out
individual proclivities for over or understating.
4) The scaling problem:
How do you compare a catastrophic disruption to a minor disruption? Using our
scale it may seem like a catastrophe is only five times more serious than a minor event,
while in reality it could be thousands of times worse from a financial and operational
standpoint. We elected not to assign arbitrary values to weigh the various impacts, so a
plain ranking from 0 to 4 is what we stayed with. The benefit of not inflating major or
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catastrophic impacts is that we avoid suffocating the rest of the data, thereby making
everyday disruptions seem insignificant. Again, at the risk of too lengthy a survey,
maybe monetary impacts should have been asked for.
Because our survey covers a variety of business sectors and industries, and with
only a few respondents representing each, it is difficult to use the results to detect
differences down to such a detailed level. For example, segments of the Indian I.T.
industry are considered world class, but this survey does not have enough I.T. firms
responding – only 4 – to justify any conclusions. A limitation of this research is its
coarseness, and that only the eight general group comparisons we looked at in tables 32
and 33 would be meaningful.
We suggest that further research on the topic of Indian supply chain risks
attempts to segregate both the industry sectors and the risk categories. Ours is a broad
study, while what seems needed now is detailed research into particular risks affecting
particular sectors. For example, combined with quantitative surveys, qualitative
research such as case studies and interviews can be used to unearth problems relevant
to important sectors of the Indian economy. Case on point: It seems appropriate to
investigate and decipher underlying elements and causes of the intertwined supplier
and labor risks. If this is done in a sectorial context (e.g., I.T.), it would shed important
light on exposures and provide platforms for effective remedies.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation helps fill an information gap regarding supply chain risks in the
emerging nation of India. By performing a quantitative, empirical study we have
established certain traits based on the hands-on experience of Indian supply chain
manager and experts. Focusing on the upstream portion of the supply chain, we
uncovered which disruptions have the highest frequency, impact and ensuing severity.
We have explored which mitigation methods were the most useful in alleviating the
risks. Lastly, we gathered information on which risk factors the supply chain profession
expects to encounter over the coming three years.
We built our research approach on a modified version of a time tested model for
risk management and control. The stepwise and logical methodology of MIAMI –
mapping, identifying, assessing, mitigating and improving – was found immensely useful
in structuring the survey. The questionnaire was built around the MIAMI framework and
roughly asked five main questions:
1. Tell us about your Indian supply chain (Mapping)
2. What went wrong in your supply chain? (Identifying risks)
3. How did this impact your operations? (Assessing)
4. What did you do about it? (Mitigating)
5. Which risks do you expect to encounter in the future? (Improving)
The results showed that Indian supply chains are most severely affected by the
chronic risks of inadequate infrastructure, supplier and labor problems, and stifling
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bureaucracy. We broke the infrastructure risks into three categories – transportation,
logistics, and utilities – and although all three came out as highly ranked problems,
transportation infrastructure was deemed the worst. Potential disruptions that we read
about in the press, such as natural disasters, terrorism and crime, were not ranked as
that severe by our sample of managers. Dramatic episodes and disasters may
individually cause a major impact, but the daily grind of poor infrastructure, labor/
supplier problems and bureaucracy is what relentlessly takes up management time and
chips away at a company’s bottom line.
We learned that certain categories of firms are exposed to different degrees of
severity when it comes to particular disruptions. For example, Indian owned companies
reported greater severity (defined as frequency times impact) in the areas of supplier
problems, bureaucracy/red tape and inadequate utilities infrastructure. Smaller
companies (in terms of global sales) reported significantly more severe disruptions
overall, and specifically in the categories of supplier problems, logistics infrastructure,
and bureaucracy/red tape. Service companies seemed more affected by logistics and
utilities infrastructure risks. Is it possible that foreign owned and/or large firms and/or
manufacturers possess greater resources and perhaps better supply chain talent to
properly manage and fend off these problems? Without more research and
investigation, we just don’t know yet what the underlying causes of these disruptions
are, and why certain categories of companies are more exposed.
As for useful and appropriate risk mitigation methods, our sample ranked
buffering and redundancies on top for problems related to suppliers, labor and
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infrastructure. For bureaucracy, flexibility and visibility/collaboration were found to be
the most useful. Comments from respondents and other industry experts indicated that
the traditional supply chain mitigation methods (buffering, redundancies, flexibility,
visibility/collaboration) were not sufficient to lessen many of the risks experienced in
India. Keeping extra inventories helps little to alleviate corruption, the remnants of the
“permit Raj” and various tax challenges.
The knowledge that most of the serious supply chain risks are either
infrastructure related or internal to the supply chain (supplier and labor problems)
should help companies in prioritizing their efforts and organizational practices. A silver
lining is that such problems are partially fixable through competent management
practices. Resilient companies gradually learn how to successfully navigate the
challenging Indian business environment. This takes resources in the form of superb
managers, robust information systems, and strong internal routines for how to handle
and dissipate disruptions.
Future research should attempt to further dissect the nature of the individual
disruptions. As we suggested, a qualitative study of the supplier and labor problems
would be very valuable in uncovering subcategories, root causes and the intertwined
nature of these serious risks. A qualitative or case based approach will enable
researchers to analyze individual instances of disruptions and limited to specific sectors
of the Indian economy. The financial impact of disruptions should also be explored
further. It would moreover be valuable to investigate which mitigation methods work
best to tackle India’s non-physical supply chain impediments, such as the regulatory
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conditions, corruption/bribery, and the complex and opaque interstate tax regimes. The
purpose of all of this research is to make managers better prepared and to suggest
realistic venues for policy makers.
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APPENDIX A: COPY OF THE SURVEY
Indian Supply Chain Risks Survey
Q1. Is your company sourcing in India or producing goods or services in India?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
Q2. What is your organizational level? (Choose one)
 Chair, Owner, CEO, President (1)
 Managing Director, VP, General Manager, C-Level Executive (2)
 Director, Senior Manager (3)
 Manager (4)
 Analyst, Specialist, Coordinator, Consultant (5)
 Other (6)
Q3. What is your functional area within the company? (Choose all that apply)
 General management (1)
 Supply chain management (incl. procurement, logistics, transportation) (2)
 Financial management (incl. accounting and I.T.) (3)
 Sales and marketing management (4)
 Production and manufacturing management (5)
 Engineering and product development (6)
 Human resource management (7)
 Other (8)
Q4. What is your company's general sector(s)? (Choose all that apply)
 Non-durable goods or consumables (1)
 Durable goods (2)
 Capital goods (buildings, machines, heavy equipment, etc.) (3)
 Natural resources (4)
 Services, incl. software, IT, education and government (5)
Q5. In which country is your company's global headquarters located? (Write in)
 India (1)
36
 Other than India (write in): ________________________________
Q6. What is your company's ownership? (Choose one)
 Fully Indian (1)
 Fully foreign (2)
 Mixed, with majority Indian owned (4)
 Mixed, with majority foreign owned (5)
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Q7. The company... (Choose all that apply)
 Owns and operates its own production or development facilities in India (1)
 Sources from Indian companies (2)
 Other or none of the above (3)
Q8. Which businesses are your company involved with globally (incl. India)? (Choose all that
apply) [The categories correspond to the National Industrial Classification 2008]
 A. Agriculture, forestry or fishing (1)
 B. Mining or quarrying (2)
 C. Manufacturing (3)
 D. Electricity, gas, steam or air conditioning supply (4)
 E. Water supply, sewerage, waste management or remediation activities (5)
 F. Construction (6)
 G. Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles (7)
 H. Transportation or storage (8)
 I. Accommodation or food service activities (9)
 J. Information or communication, incl. software or IT services (10)
 K. Financial or insurance activities (11)
 L. Real estate activities (12)
 M. Professional, scientific or technical activities (13)
 N. Administrative or support service activities (14)
 O. Public administration or defense; compulsory social security (15)
 P. Education (16)
 Q. Human health or social work activities (17)
 R. Arts, entertainment or recreation (18)
 S. Other service activities, incl. trade associations (19)
 T. Activities of households as employers, indifferentiated goods- and services producing
activities of households for own use (20)
 U. Activities of extraterritorial organizations or bodies (21)
Q9. What are your company’s annual global sales in U.S. dollars? (Choose one) Approximate
exchange rate is 50 INR to the dollar.
 Less than US$ 1,000,000 (1)
 US$ 1,000,000 – 10,000,000 (2)
 US$ 10,000,000 – 100,000,000 (3)
 US$ 100,000,000 – 1,000,000,000 (4)
 US$ 1,000,000,000 – 10,000,000,000 (5)
 More than US$ 10,000,000,000 (6)
Q10. What kind of activity does your company do in India? (Choose all that apply)
 Production or development, incl. goods or all kinds of services (1)
 Marketing and Sales (2)
 Sourcing (3)
 Other (4)
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Q11. Which categories of goods or services does your company source or produce in
India? (Choose all that apply) [The categories correspond to the official ones used by Reserve
Bank of India and the International Monetary Fund]
 Agricultural and allied products (incl. meat, fish) (1)
 Ores and minerals (2)
 Leather and manufactures (3)
 Chemicals and related products (incl. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics) (4)
 Engineered goods (incl. transportation equipment, machinery) (5)
 Textiles and textile products (6)
 Gems and jewelry (7)
 Handicrafts (8)
 Other manufactured goods (9)
 Petroleum products (10)
 Electricity, gas or water supply (11)
 Other products (12)
 Transportation services (goods or passengers) (13)
 Travel, hospitality, tourism (14)
 Telecommunications, computer or information services (incl. IT, software, BPO, ITES,
media) (15)
 Construction services, incl. architecture (16)
 Insurance services (17)
 Financial services, incl. banking (18)
 Other business services, (incl. accounting, law, consulting, R&D, storage) (19)
 Personal, cultural or recreational services (incl. audiovisual, educational) (20)
 Government goods or services (21)
 Maintenance, repairs or manufacturing services (22)
Q12. What is the annual value of what your company is sourcing, producing or developing (incl.
services) in India, in Indian Rupees? (Choose one)
 Less than INR 10,00,000 (10 lakhs) (1)
 INR 10,00,000 – 1,00,00,000 (10 lakhs to 1 crore) (2)
 INR 1,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,000 (1 crore to 10 crores) (3)
 INR 10,00,00,000 – 1,00,00,00,000 (10 crores to 100 crores) (4)
 INR 1,00,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,00,000 (100 crores to 1,000 crores) (5)
 More than INR 10,00,00,00,000 (more than 1,000 crores) (6)
Q13. How many persons does your company directly employ in India? (Choose one)
 None (7)
 1-10 (1)
 11-100 (2)
 101-1,000 (3)
 1,001-10,000 (4)
 10,001-100,000 (5)
 100,001 or more (6)
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Q14. What percentage of your company’s products or services sourced or produced in India is
exported out of India (i.e. sold abroad)? (Choose one)
 100% (1)
 75-99% (2)
 50-74% (3)
 25-49% (4)
 1-24% (5)
 0% (6)
 Don't know (7)
Q15. Where are the locations of your major Indian suppliers and/or your major Indian
production facilities (incl. services)? (Choose all that apply)
 Central India (1)
 East India (2)
 North India (3)
 North-East India (4)
 South India (5)
 West India (6)
Q16. For how many years has your company been sourcing or producing in India? (Choose one)
 Less than 3 years (1)
 3 – 10 years (2)
 10 – 20 years (3)
 More than 20 years (4)
 Don't know (5)
You are now presented with thirteen categories of disruptions that could affect supply chain
operations in India. We ask how often any of these disruptions may have affected your company
for the past three years, what the negative impacts may have been, whether any of five
mitigation methods helped to prevent or limit the impact, and which of these disruptions you
expect to encounter over the next three years. There is also room to write in up to two
additional disruptions or risks if you don't find them on the list.
("Disruption" can be defined
as an unexpected event that throws the supply chain into minor or major disorder.)
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Q17 How many
times the past
three years
(since early
2010) was your
Indian supply
chain affected
by the following
supply chain
disruptions? (If
there are
significant
disruptions we
have missed,
you can write in
up to two at the
bottom)

Zero times
(2)

1 - 3 times
(3)

4 - 6 times
(4)

7 - 9 times
(5)

10 or more
times (6)

Flooding (incl.
weather related
events) (7)











Major accidents
(incl. fires,
explosions,
structural
collapses, or
spills) (8)











Terrorism, riots,
or civil unrest
(9)











Inadequate or
slow
transportation
infrastructure
(road, rail,
ports, or air)
(10)
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Inadequate
logistics
infrastructure
(distribution,
warehousing,
or cold storage)
(11)











Inadequate
utilities
infrastructure
(electricity,
water, sewer,
telephone, or
internet) (12)











Property or
violent crimes
(theft, robbery,
hijackings,
vandalism,
computer
viruses or
fraud) (13)











Intellectual
property crimes
(counterfeiting,
copyright
violations, or
hacking) (14)











Corruption or
bribery (15)
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Bureaucracy
(red tape,
unclear,
inconsistent
restrictions or
regulations)
(16)











Labor problems
(strikes, skills
shortages,
incompetence,
turnover, or
absenteeism)
(17)











Tax system
(burdensome,
arbitrary, or
inconsistent)
(18)











Supplier
problems
(quality,
reliability,
timeliness, or
financial
strength) (19)











Write in
additional
significant
disruption: (4)
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Write in
additional
significant
disruption: (5)
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Q18 Please indicate the
operational impact of the
disruptions you checked in the
previous question (choose one per
risk):

No
impact
(1)

Minor
impact
(2)

Flooding (incl. weather related
events) (1)











Major accidents (incl. fires,
explosions, structural collapses, or
spills) (2)











Terrorism, riots, or civil unrest (3)











Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports, or
air) (4)











Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold
storage) (5)











Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer,
telephone, or internet) (6)











Property or violent crimes (theft,
robbery, hijackings, vandalism,
computer viruses or fraud) (7)











Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright
violations, or hacking) (8)
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Moderate
impact
(3)

Major
impact
(4)

Catastrophic
impact (5)

Corruption or bribery (9)











Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions, or
regulations) (10)











Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence,
turnover, or absenteeism) (11)











Tax system (burdensome,
arbitrary, or inconsistent) (12)











Supplier problems (quality,
reliability, timeliness, or financial
strength) (13)











Other 1 (14)











Other 2 (15)











MITIGATION METHODS
Were any mitigation methods useful in preventing or limiting the negative impact of the
disruptions you picked? Mitigation in this context means "efforts that help to prevent a
disruption or make it less severe or painful". The mitigation methods we ask you to evaluate
are:
Buffering:
Have safety inventories, extended lead times or excess capacity
Redundancy:
Have multiple suppliers, sites or equipment
Flexibility:
Have suppliers or facilities that can quickly respond, adjust, or change over
Visibility:
Collaborate with and get timely information from trusted suppliers, customers
and service providers
Insource:
Produce and source internally instead of relying on outside suppliers or
sources, or integrate vertically
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Q19a. Flooding:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the flooding (incl. weather related events)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19b. Major accidents:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the major accidents (fires, explosions,structural
collapses or spills)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19c. Terrorism, riots or civil unrest:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the terrorism, riots or civil unrest?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (6)

Very useful
(3)

Not
applicable (4)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19d. Inadequate or slow transportation infrastructure:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure ?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19e. Inadequate logistics infrastructure:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate logistics infrastructure (distribution,
warehousing or cold storage)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19f. Inadequate utilities infrastructure:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the inadequate utiities infrastructure (electricity,
water, sewer, telephone, internet)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19g. Property or violent crimes:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the property or violent crimes (theft, robbery,
hijackings, vandalism, computer viruses or fraud)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19h. Intellectual property crimes:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the intellectual property crimes (counterfeiting,
copyright violations or hacking)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19i. Corruption or bribery:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the corruption or bribery?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19j. Bureaucracy:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the bureaucracy (red tape, unclear, inconsistent
restrictions or regulations)
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19k. Labor problems:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the labor problems (strikes, skills shortages,
incompetence, turnover, or absenteeism)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19l. Tax system:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the tax system (burdensome, arbitrary or
inconsistent)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19m. Supplier problems:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the supplier problems (quality, reliability, timeliness
or financial strength)?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19n. Other 1:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the Other 1 problem?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q19o. Other 2:
In your opinion, how useful were these mitigation methods in preventing or limiting
the negative impact on your supply chain of the Other 2 problem?
Not useful
at all (1)

Somewhat
useful (2)

Useful (3)

Very useful
(4)

Not
applicable (5)

Buffering:
Inventory,
lead time or
capacity (1)











Redundancy:
Multiple
suppliers,
sites or
equipment (2)











Flexibility:
Quick
response or
change-overs
(3)











Visibility:
Collaboration
and timely
info from
supply chain
partners (4)











Insource :
Produce
internally or
vertical
integration (5)
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Q20. Lastly, how frequently do you
expect the following disruptions will
affect your supply chain in India over
the next three years (as compared to
the previous three years)?

Don't
expect it
to affect
our
supply
chain (1)

Less
frequent
than
previously
(2)

Same
frequency
as
previously
(3)

More
frequent
than
previously
(4)

Flooding (incl. weather related events)
(1)









Major accidents (incl. fires, explosions,
structural collapses, or spills) (2)









Terrorism, riots, or civil unrest (3)









Inadequate or slow transportation
infrastructure (road, rail, ports, or air)
(4)









Inadequate logistics infrastructure
(distribution, warehousing, or cold
storage) (5)









Inadequate utilities infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewer, telephone,
or internet) (6)









Property or violent crimes (theft,
robbery, hijackings, vandalism,
computer viruses or fraud) (7)









Intellectual property crimes
(counterfeiting, copyright violations, or
hacking) (8)
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Corruption or bribery (9)









Bureaucracy (red tape, unclear,
inconsistent restrictions, or
regulations) (10)









Labor problems (strikes, skills
shortages, incompetence, turnover, or
absenteeism) (11)









Tax system (burdensome, arbitrary, or
inconsistent) (12)









Supplier problems (quality, reliability,
timeliness, or financial strength) (13)









Other 1 (14)









Other 2 (15)

















Any other disruption you expect?
(write in)
_____________________________
(16)
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Q21. OPTIONAL: Any other observations or comments you would like to add regarding supply
chain disruptions in India?

Thank you very much! That completes this survey. If you would like a summary report of the
aggregate results, please e-mail us at udbye@pdx.edu and request a copy. Any other feedback
would also be appreciated.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON NATURAL DISASTERS IN INDIA
Table 38: EXAMPLES OF FREQUENT SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS IN INDIA
Type of
disruption
Tropical
cyclones

Description

Source

Of the 30 deadliest tropical cyclones in world
history, 22 happened in the Bay of Bengal and
affected India, Bangladesh and Myanmar, killing
about 2.5 million people

Weather Underground:
www.wunderground.co
m/hurricane/deadlyworl
d.asp
(Tatham, Oloruntoba, &
Spens, 2012)

Power outages

In one of the world's worst power blackouts ever,
more than 600 million people across India lost
electricity July 31, 2012, the second massive grid
failure in two days.
Between 1960 and 2007, India registered 209
earthquakes with a magnitude between 4.5 and
7.6, causing 20,023 deaths, 5 landslides, 1
tsunami and temporarily displaced almost 50
million people.131
During late summer and early fall of 2011, there
were four major floods caused by heavy rains in
the states of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West
Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. These killed 240 people,
destroyed several hundred thousand houses,
damaged croplands, and caused registered
damage for more than $1.2 billion
Huge areas of India are undergoing sustained
draught, with a significant impact on agricultural
outputs. This may shave 0.5% off the country’s
GDP, or about $8.4 billion.
The two most serious recent attacks happened in
Mumbai in July of 2006 and November of 2008,
when Islamic militants targeted public
transportation and hotels, killing 187 and 183
people, respectively. The Indian rail system seems
to be a popular target for extremists, with several
attacks over the past 20 years.

(Lavelle, Smith, & Byerly,
2012)

Earthquakes

Flooding

Draught

Terrorism

131

EXPO-CAT_2007:
http://earthquake.usgs.g
ov/research/data/pager/

(Swiss-Re, 2012)

(Maplecroft, 2012a)

(Global_Integrity, 2012;
IFEP, 2012)

This is a lot less than China, which tends to have more, stronger and much deadlier earthquakes.
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Table 39: SUMMARY OF INDIAN NATURAL DISASTERS FROM 1900 TO 2012132
Type

Sub-type

Drought

Drought

# of
events
14

Seismic
activity

Earthquake

26

Tsunami133

1

Unspecified

6

Bacterial
infectious
diseases
Parasitic
infectious
diseases
Viral infect.
diseases
Cold wave

24

Extreme
winter cond
Heat wave

1

Unspecified

93

Flash flood

22

Epidemic

Extreme
temperature

Flood

General
flood
Stormsurge,
coast flood
Insect infest. Locusts
Dry mass
Avalanche
movement
Landslide

Killed total
& average
4,250,320
303,594
61,817
2,378
16,389
16,389
293
49
4,103,948
170,998

Total affected
& average
1,061,841,000
75,845,786
27,840,383
1,070,784
654,512
654,512
95,997
16,000
70,856
2,952

Damage total
& average
$2,441,122,000
$174,366,000
$4,079,900,000
$156,919,000
$1,022,800,000
$1,022,800,000
-

5

3,411
682

57,135
11,427

-

33

436,222
13,219
4,979
192
180
180
8,869
386
30,536
328
7,419
337
22,471
180
569
142

197,485
5,984
25
1
-

-

225
10
455,269,954
4,896,375
23,431,206
1,065,055
323,180,129
2,585,441
11,500,000
2,875,000

$400,000,000
$17,391,000
$11,673,059,000
$125,517,000
$416,200,000
$18,918,000
$23,437,929,000
$187,503,000
$275,000,000
$68,750,000

26

23

125
4
1
1
1

-

$144,000,000
$5,539,000
-

12
12
45
45

132

To qualify as a disaster, at least one of the following criteria has to be fulfilled: 10 or more people
reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; a call for international assistance; declaration of a
state of emergency.
133
This is the Indian Ocean tsunami around Christmas 2004 that was caused by an earthquake off Sumatra
and killed more than 220,000 people in total. It hit the Indian east coast hard (Perry, 2007)

215

Wet mass
movement

Storm

Wildfire

Avalanche

7

Landslide

35

Unspecified

32

Local storm

27

Tropical
cyclone134
Forest fire

98
2

828
118
3,934
112
2,702
84
2,406
89
159,177
1,624
6
3

10,456
1,494
3,828,660
109,390
5,337,261
166,789
565,175
20,932
87,642,126
894,307

$50,000,000
$7,143,000
$4,500,000
$129,000
$225,000,000
$7,031,000
$2,226,000,000
$82,444,000
$8,976,525,000
$91,597,000
$2,000,000
$1,000,000

Source: (EM-DAT, 2012)

Table 40: IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS BY REGION, 1975 – 2011
Region

Population

Popul.
density
per km2

Occurrences
(share in %)

Killed
(share in
%)

Affected
(share in %)

Damage
US$ million
(share %)

Africa

1,033
mill.
911 mill.

30.5

87

Europe

3,879
mill.
739 mill.

Oceania

36 mill.

4.2

2,057
(19.6%)
2,498
(23.8%)
4,041
(38.6%)
1,390
(13.3%)
489
(4.7%)
10,473
(100%)

728,621
(25.5%)
418,484
(14.6%)
1,521,599
(53.3%)
182,721
(6.4%)
5,999
(0.2%)
2,857,424
(100%)

393,800,705
(6.5%)
210,406,943
(3.5%)
5,402,771,764
(89.0%)
42,065,797
(0.7%)
20,552,254
(0.3%)
6,069,597,463
(100%)

$27,308
(1.2%)
$757,763
(33.9%)
$1,086,756
(48.7%)
306,022
(13.7%)
55,801
(2.5%)
$2,233,649
(100%)

Americas
Asia

TOTAL

42.5

10.2

Source: (Asian_Disaster_Reduction_Center, 2012)

134

The ability to forecast tropical cyclones (their path and point of landing) is much better now than
previously. According to the World Meteorological Organization, the 3 days forecasts are now as good as
were the 48 hour forecasts just a few years ago (WMO, 2012). This has significant positive consequences
for supply chain risk management and preparation.
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Figure 2: EARTHQUAKE FREQUENCIES IN ASIA: INDIA NOT PART OF THE RING OF FIRE
Seismicity Maps – 1900 to present:

Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/india/seismicity.php (public domain)

The red dots indicate occurrences of earthquakes
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Figure 3: INDIA CLIMATIC DISASTERS RISK MAP

Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/India_climatic_disaster_risk_map_en.svg
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An alternative typology of natural disasters is provided by USAID and CRED
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2012). They divide events into five subgroups of disasters135:
Table 41: SUBGROUPS OF NATURAL DISASTERS
Disaster Subgroup

Definition

Geophysical

Events originating from solid
earth
Events caused by shortlived/small to meso scale
atmospheric processes (in
the spectrum from minutes
to days)
Events caused by deviations
in the normal water cycle
and/or overflow of bodies of
water caused by wind set-up
Events caused by longlived/meso to macro scale
processes (in the spectrum
from intra-seasonal to multidecadal climate variability)
Disaster caused by the
exposure of living organisms
to germs and toxic
substances.

Meteorological

Hydrological

Climatological

Biological

135

Disaster main types and
examples
Earthquake, volcano, dry
mass movement
Storm

Flood, wet mass movement

Extreme temperature,
drought, wildfire

Epidemic, insect infestation,
animal stampede

CRED defines a disaster as “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity,
necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and
often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”. Such an event is
obviously in a different league than a freight pallet tipping over. A broader definition provided in
Webster’s dictionary may also be instructive: “a sudden or great misfortune” (Merriam-Webster, 1976). In
supply chain management we are concerned with disruptive and costly events, making both natural
disasters and various mishaps events of interest to us.
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON MANMADE DISASTERS IN INDIA
Table 42: SUMMARY OF INDIAN TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS FROM 1900 TO 2012
Type

Sub-type

Industrial
accident

Chemical
spill

Misc.
accidents

Transport
accident

# of
events
2

Killed total
& average
2
1

Total affected
& average
100,460
50,230

Damage total
& average
-

Collapse

9
39

Fire

19

Gas leak

3

11
1
4,913
126
126,596
6,663
300,751
100,250

-

Explosion

Other

7

Poisoning

14

Collapse

40

Explosion

10

Fire

33

Other

26

Air

22

Rail

111

Road

242

Water

81

203
23
2,075
53
381
20
2,500
833
164
23
980
70
2,798
70
301
30
1,636
50
1,733
67
1,415
64
4,694
42
8,241
34
4,958
61

1,743
125
151,103
3,778
214
21
63,667
1,929
6,187
238
101
5
6,664
60
3,578
15
354
4

Source: (EM-DAT, 2012)

220

$228,000,000
$5,836,000
$470,900,000
$24,784
-

$10,000,000
$250,000
$36,000,000
$1,636,000
$2,000,000
$18,000
-

Table 43: 2011: A TYPICAL YEAR IN INDIA?
(as tabulated by the insurer Swiss Re, (Swiss-Re, 2012))
When
Place
Event

No. of
victims/amount of
damage in US$

1) Natural Disasters
June-July
August

Uttar Pradesh,
Uttarakhand
West Bengal

September

Orissa

Sept. – Oct.

Orissa, Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh

May

Uttar Pradesh,
Shahjahanpur,
Lakhimpur-Kheri,
Budaun,
Ambedka, Bareilly
Cuddalore (Tamil
Nadu)

December

September

Sikkim (and Nepal
and China)

January

Many northern
states
Uttar Pradesh,
Punjab, Haryana

December

Floods caused by heavy
monsoon rains
Floods caused by heavy rains;
several rivers burst their banks;
damage to houses and croplands
Floods caused by heavy rains;
over 100,000 houses destroyed
Floods caused by heavy rains;
50,000 houses destroyed; over
200,000 hectares of cropland
destroyed
Thunderstorm with winds up to
70 km/h; heavy rains

50 dead
$ 20 mill. damage
100 dead
$239 mill. damage

Tropical cyclone Thane with
winds up to 125 km/h; 200,000
houses damaged
Earthquake magnitude 6.9;
aftershocks; over 100,000
houses damaged

47 dead

Cold wave with -23 C
temperatures
Cold wave with temperatures
below 0 degrees C; heavy snow;
damage to croplands and travel
disruptions
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39 dead
$430 mill. damage
51 dead
$527 mill. Damage

42 dead
50 injured

At least 88 dead
154 injured
30,000 homeless
$20 mill. Damage
80 dead
132 dead

2) Man-made disasters136
September
July

Calcutta
Uttar Pradesh

Fire in hospital
Train hits bus at railway crossing

July

Uttar Pradesh

Kalka Mail passenger train
derails

September

Chennai

Two trains collide

October

Darjeeling

October
January
January

Arunachal
Pradesh
Kerala
Kalapet

July

Assam

July

Mumbai

Overcrowded bridge collapses
during public gathering
Suspension footbridge collapses
while people are crossing it
Stampede at Sabarimala Temple
Poisonous chlorine leak at
chemical plant
Bomb explosion causes train to
derail; 200 meters of rail track
destroyed
Triple bomb explosions

September

Delhi

November

Haridwar

December

Rajasthan

Bomb explosion at Delhi High
Court
Stampede at religious festival
Hospital patients die for lack of
care following doctors’ strike

136

89 dead
35 dead
39 injured
68 dead
100 injured
$2 mill. damage
10 dead
52 injured
32 dead
132 injured
30 dead
100 dead
300 injured
100 injured

31 dead
137 injured
13 dead
76 injured
20 dead
50 injured
60 dead

The man-made disasters are categorized as major fires or explosions, aviation disasters,
maritime disasters, rail and cableway disasters, collapses of buildings or bridges, and miscellaneous (such
as terrorist acts, riots or stampedes)
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Table 43 highlights half a dozen, highly publicized supply chain disruptions that
happened in India over the past few years:
Table 44: RECENT EXAMPLES OF INDIAN SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS
When

Company or
industry
affected

Nature of
disruption

Impact

Underlying
cause

Source

Nov.
2008

Entire nation

November
terrorist attack
on several
high-profile
Mumbai
targets.

Loss of life
(160+ fatalities),
property
damage,
political
repercussions

Security risk:
Conflict with
Pakistan over
Kashmir
(terrorism
threat)

Procurement
Intelligence
Unit blog, (S.
Khan, 2012)

August, Transportation
2010
& logistics

Two cargo
ships collided
outside
Mumbai

Oil spill; one
ship capsized;
200 containers
lost; closure of
two Mumbai
ports for 2
weeks; $4 billion
in goods
delayed

Illegal
communicatio
n errors (two
ships were
using different
radio
frequencies)

www.Indiane
xpress.com,
(Webb, 2012)

July,
2006

Transportation

Seven train
bombings over
11 minutes in
Mumbai

210 killed, 714
injured,
substantial
damage to
rolling stock,
tracks and
stations

Attack by
Islamist
terrorists
(Lashkar-eQahhar)

BBC News
and
Wikipedia

2005,
2006,
2007

Businesses and
residents of
Mumbai.

Severe flooding
in Mumbai

Loss of life,
property
damage, severe
delays, loss of
power & phone

Monsoon
season,
urbanization

The Times of
India
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July,
2012

Businesses and
transportation
shut down for
hours or days.

The world's
biggest power
outage

620 million
people w/o
electricity in 20
of India's 28
states.

Growing
demand for
power; theft
of power,
insufficient
infrastructure

www.Huffing
tonpost.com

Dec.
1984

Union Carbide
lost unknown
amounts, incl.
$470 million
settlement
with Indian
govt.

History's worst
industrial
accident: 40
tons of methyl
isocyanate gas
leaked from a
pesticide plant
in Bhopal

3,800 people
killed,
thousands
injured, lasting
impact on
Bhopal

Poor
maintenance,
faulty
equipment
and
procedures.

www.ncbi.nl
m.nih.gov

2010 2012

Logistics &
transportation.
Severe threat
in Uttar
Pradesh,
Madhya
Pradesh137, and
around Delhi

“India is
becoming
increasingly
noted for largescale theft
incidents,
including truck
hijackings and
warehouse
robberies”

$13 million
reported thefts
of iron last 6
months of 2010.
Some violence.

Opportunistic
criminals,
more high
value freight
and high
commodities
prices

(Burges,
2011, 2012)

137

Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are two of the poorest states in India, with annual GDP
per person of $666 and $849 respectively, compared to the national average of $1,329 (Economist,
2012a).
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE PROFILE QUESTIONS
Distribution of respondents, by organizational membership:
 Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC)
 Bombay Chamber of Industry (BCI)
 Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP)
 Indian Merchant Chamber (IMC)

13
12
9
9

30.2%
27.9%
20.9%
20.9%

Distribution of respondents, by organizational level:
 Managing Director, VP, General Manager, C-Level Executive
 Chair, owner, CEO, President
 Manager
 Director, Senior Manager
 Analyst, Specialist, Coordinator, Consultant
 Other

18
9
6
5
4
1

41.9%
20.9%
14.0%
11.6%
9.3%
2.3%

Distribution of respondents, by functional area (multiple responses allowed):
 Supply chain management
25
 General management
24
 Sales and marketing management
11
 Human resources
6
 Other
6
 Production and manufacturing management
5
 Engineering and product development
5
 Financial management, accounting, IT
3

58.1%
55.8%
25.6%
14.0%
14.0%
11.6%
11.6%
7.0%

Distribution of respondents, by general sector:
 Services, incl. education and government
 Durable goods
 Non-durable goods or consumables
 Capital goods (buildings, machines, heavy equipment, etc.)
 Natural resources

16
10
8
7
6

37.2%
23.3%
18.6%
16.3%
14.0%

Distribution of respondents, by location of global headquarters:
 India
 Abroad (USA, Australia, Germany and Qatar)

33
10

76.7%
23.3%

Distribution of respondents, by ownership:
 Fully Indian
 Mixed, with majority foreign owned
 Fully foreign
 Mixed, with majority Indian owned

28
6
5
4

65.1%
14.0%
11.6%
9.3%
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Distribution of respondents, by company activity (multiple responses allowed):
 Owns & operates own production and development facilities in India
27
 Sources from Indian companies
23
 Other or none of the above
6

62.8%
53.5%
14.0%

Distribution of respondents, by business type (Indian National Industrial Classification 2008;
multiple responses allowed):
 Manufacturing
27
62.8%
 Transportation and storage
9
20.9%
 Agriculture, forestry or fishing
5
11.6%
 Construction
5
11.6%
 Information or communication, incl. software or IT services
4
9.3%
 Electricity, gas, steam or air conditioning supply
3
7.0%
 Wholesale or retail trade, repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles
3
7.0%
 Professional, scientific or technical activities
3
7.0%
 Education
3
7.0%
 Mining or quarrying
2
4.7%
 Human, health or social work activities
2
4.7%
 Other service activities, incl. trade associations
2
4.7%
 Water supply, sewerage, waste management or remediation activities 1
2.3%
 Accommodation or food service activities
1
2.3%
 Real estate activities
1
2.3%
Distribution of respondents, by annual global sales, in US dollars:
 Less than $1,000,000
 $1,000,000 - $10,000,000
 $10,000,000 - $100,000,000
 $100,000,000 - $1,000,000,000
 $1,000,000,000 - $10,000,000,000
 More than $10,000,000,000

9
14
7
3
1
6

20.9%
32.6%
16.3%
7.0%
2.3%
14.0%

Distribution of respondents, by functional activity done in India (multiple responses allowed):
 Production or development, incl. goods or all kinds of services
31
72.1%
 Marketing and Sales
22
51.2%
 Sourcing
20
46.5%
 Other
8
18.6%
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Distribution of respondents, by category of goods or services sourced or produced in India
(Reserve Bank of India and International Monetary Fund classification; multiple responses
allowed):
 Other manufactured goods
12
27.9%
 Engineered goods, incl. transportation equipment, machinery
11
25.6%
 Chemicals and related products, incl. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics
9
20.9%
 Agricultural and allied products
6
14.0%
 Transportation services (goods or passengers)
6
14.0%
 Other business services, incl. accounting, law, consulting, R&D, storage 5
11.6%
 Maintenance, repairs or manufacturing services
4
9.3%
 Other products
4
9.3%
 Petroleum products
3
7.0%
 Electricity, gas or water supply
3
7.0%
 Ores and minerals
2
4.7%
 Telecommunications, computer or information services, incl. software 2
4.7%
 Construction services, incl. architecture
2
4.7%
 Personal, cultural or recreational services, incl. A/V, educational
2
4.7%
 Government goods or services
2
4.7%
 Textiles and textile products
1
2.3%
 Handicrafts
1
2.3%
Distribution of respondents, by the annual value of what is sourced, produced or developed in
India:
 Less than INR 10,00,000 (10 lakhs)
0
0.0%
 INR 10,00,000 – 1,00,00,000 (10 lakhs to 1 crore)
6
14.0%
 INR 1,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,000 (1 crore to 10 crores)
11
25.6%
 INR 10,00,00,000 – 1,00,00,00,000 (10 crores to 100 crores)
10
23.3%
 INR 1,00,00,00,000 – 10,00,00,00,000 (100 crores to 1,000 crores)
6
14.0%
 More than INR 10,00,00,00,000 (1,000 crores)
7
16.3%
Distribution of respondents, by number of persons directly employed in India:
 None
1
 1 – 10
4
 11 – 100
14
 101 – 1,000
11
 1,001 – 10,000
8
 10,001 – 100,000
2
 More than 100,000
2
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2.3%
9.3%
32.6%
25.6%
18.6%
4.7%
4.7%

Distribution of respondents, by which percentage of products or services sourced or produced in
India is exported out of India:
 100%
7
16.3%
 75 – 99%
2
4.7%
 50 – 74%
8
18.6%
 25 – 49%
7
16.3%
 1 – 24%
12
27.9%
 0%
7
16.3%
Distribution if respondents, by location of their major Indian suppliers and/or major Indian
production facilities (multiple answers possible):
 Central India
8
18.6%
 East India
8
18.6%
 North India
20
46.5%
 North-East India
2
4.7%
 South India
22
51.2%
 West India
35
81.4%
Distribution of respondents, by how many years they have sourced or operated in India:
 Less than 3 years
6
14.0%
 3 – 10 years
6
14.0%
 10 – 20 years
8
18.6%
 More than 20 years
22
51.2%
 Don’t know
1
2.3%

228

